Helsinški odbor za zaštitu ljudskih prava o represivnoj politici države prema Sandžaku

SANDŽAK:
POSLEDICE REPRESIVNE POLITIKE DRŽAVE
 

Sonja Biserko:

Mislimo da je
važno da u ovom trenutku razgovaramo o situaciji u Sandžaku. U ovom trenutku
duboke društvene i političke krize u Srbiji, Sandžak nam se čini jednom od
potencijalno najosetljivijih tačaka. Prvenstveno zbog toga što je Sandžak bio
deo ratnog programa kada je reč o Bosni. Potvrda za ovu tezu je državna
represija i teror koji su u Sandžaku provoðeni početkom devedestih, a naročito
tokom rata u Bosni.

SANDŽAK:
POSLEDICE REPRESIVNE POLITIKE DRŽAVE
 

Panel
 

Sonja Biserko:

 

Mislimo da je
važno da u ovom trenutku razgovaramo o situaciji u Sandžaku. U ovom trenutku
duboke društvene i političke krize u Srbiji, Sandžak nam se čini jednom od
potencijalno najosetljivijih tačaka. Prvenstveno zbog toga što je Sandžak bio
deo ratnog programa kada je reč o Bosni. Potvrda za ovu tezu je državna
represija i teror koji su u Sandžaku provoðeni početkom devedestih, a naročito
tokom rata u Bosni.

 

Odsustvo
političkog kapaciteta aktuelnog državnog vrha Srbije da se suoči sa stvarnim
problemima ovog društva, izemðu ostalog, i onim što je država činila u
Sandžaku, motiviše nas da otvorimo suštinu problema Sandžaka kao vrlo
specifične regije Srbije. Na žalost, i demokratske vlasti su organizovano
radile na sprečavanju konstituisanja bošnjačke zajednice. Otuda je Sandžak
poslednjih goidna u konstatnoj krizi.

 

Da podsetim –
Bošnjaci su nova manjina u Srbiji nakon raspada Jugoslavije i ima veoma male
kapacitete u konstitusanju vlastite infrastrukture, odnosno identiteta. S druge
strane, te nedostatke Beograd je veoma koristio i uspeo je da razbije sandžačku
političku i društvenu scenu. Zbog toga je religija bila jedini kohezioni
element koji je Beograd, zahvaljujući slabostima koje sam spomenula, takoðe
podelio.

 

Preko fenomena
vehabija obnovljena je teza o opasnosti od islamskog fundamentalizma za koji je
Milorad Ekmečić nedavno potvrdio potvrdio da je srušio Jugoslaviju. Spinovanje
opsanosti od vehabija dobilo je razmere koje ne odgovaraju stvarnosti. Ta
kampanja je završila sa optužnicom protiv 15 vehabija kojima se sada sudi. Nije
slučajno da se ponovo javljaju tekstovi koje piše Ljiljana Bulatović pod
naslovom “Muslimani, islam, džihad, mudžahedini na Balkanu”.

 

Uloga službi
bezbednosti u Sandžaku ima kontinuitet permanentnog destabilizovanja regiona.
Ne samo da je to radila kroz zavaðanje bošnjačkih lidera, već je, naročito
tokom rata u Bosni, radila i na etničkom čišćenju regiona u skladu sa tezom o
“zelenoj transverzali”. Nakon odlaska Miloševića, ni demokratska vlada nije
napravila nikakav napor da ih poništi.

 

I na kraju,
postavlja se i pitanje kako Evropa tretira islam koji je ravnopravna evropska
religija. Istorijski gledano na islam se gledalo kao na političkog neprijatelja
na kome je Evropa gradila svoj politički identitet. Odnos Evrope prema
muslimanima generalno (onim evropskim posebno) bitno će uticati i na položaj
muslimana na Balkanu.

 

 

 

Pavel Domonji: Sandžak: Posledice represivne
politike

 

Represivna politika je, po definiciji,
politika koja se snažno oslanja na nepolitička sredstva i proizvodi užasne
posledice, jer iza sebe ostavlja pustoš, mrtve, strah i nesigurnost. Podsetimo
se da su Bošnjaci Sandžaka tokom raspada Jugoslavije bili izloženi teroru,
otmicama, likvidacijama – dakle, raznim oblicima nasilja, šikaniranja i
maltretiranja, kao i destrukciji imovine. Kada govorimo o posledicama
represivne politike onda ne smemo smetnuti sa uma nekoliko činjenica, prvo,
nasilni raspad Jugoslavije doveo je do promene statusa Muslimana koji su od
naroda postali nepriznata i obespravljena nacionalna manjina, sa svim
problemima koji iz takvog statusa proizilaze; drugo, etnički motivirano nasilje
je produbilo etnokulturalne rascepe u Sandžaku i dovelo do problema u
meðuetničkim odnosima i, treće, eliminacionističke politike na jednoj, i
brutalne negacije identiteta na drugoj strani, naterali su Bošnjake da jače
naglase distinktivna obeležja svog identiteta što je, kao posledicu, otvorilo i
pitanje integracije same bošnjačke zajednice.

 

Osim pomenutih, postoje i drugi problemi koje
ovom prilikom treba, barem, notirati. To se, pre svega, odnosi na, recimo,
problem privrednog zaostajanja Sandžaka, zatim na problem medijskog
stigmatiziranja regiona kao mračnog mesta kriminalnih i ilegalnih aktivnosti,
te problem političke kriminalizacije zahteva za ureðenjem Sandžaka kao posebne
teritorijalno-političke jedinice. Kada je o poslednjem problemu reč treba reći
da o ovom zahtevu nikada nije povedena otvorena i ozbilja rasprava sa
političkim vlastima, niti je meðu stanovnicima Sanžaka postignut konsenzus o
ovom pitanju.

 

Nakon Petog oktobra došlo je do stanovitog
psihološkog rasterećenja i uverenja Bošnjaka da će, participirajući u izgradnji
demokratskog poretka, lakše ostvarivati neke svoje fundamentalne interese. To
se, pre svega, odnosi na procese «izgradnje nacije», ali isto tako i na zahteve
za ostvarenjem pravde i kažnjavanjem ne samo počinilaca, nego i inspiratora i
organizatora zločina nad Bošnjacima. U razgovorima koje su članovi Helsinškog
odbora svojevremeno vodili sa predstavnicima Bošnjaka naglašeno je da će
Bošnjaci preko zahteva za ostvarenjem pravde prosuðivati koliko je srbijansko
društvo spremno da ide daleko u rasvetljavanju zločina, odnosno da li se i
koliko emancipovalo od Miloševićeve politike. Neću pogrešiti ako kažem da
Bošnjaci u svim dosadašnjim suðenjima nisu prepoznali političku volju da se
sudi svima koji su, na ovaj ili onaj način, upleteni u zločine, niti je jasno i
odlučno manifestovana volja da se osudi državna politika etničkog čišćenja,
kako je tu politiku nazivao pokojni Šefko Alomerović.

 

Kada je reč o «izgradnji nacije», pripadnici
Bošnjačke manjine suočeni su sa nizom problema svojstvenih, uzgred rečeno, svim
novonastalim manjinama. Reč je, pre svega o manjku institucija neophodnih za
očuvanje i razvoj kulture i nacionalnog identiteta. Deficit institucija se može
objasniti tragičnim iskustvom Bošnjaka, jer je u uslovima snažnog
nacionalšovinizma i etničkog čišćenja pitanje opstanka potisnulo sva druga
pitanja, pa i ona koja se tiču institucionalne izgradnje bošnjačke zajednice.

 

U «izgradnji nacije» ključnu ulogu imaju
elite, kulturna i politička, pre svega. I jedna i druga artikulišu odnos
pripadnika vlastite grupe prema pitanjima koja zadiru u vitalne nacionalne
interese. Kulturna elita sandžačkih Bošnjaka je, po mom sudu, a on je,
napominjem, ograničen, slaba i marginalizovana, lišena čvrstih i stabilnih
institucionalnih uporišta. U Sandžaku, recimo, nema nezavisnih časopisa, preko
kojih bi, kako kulturna elita, tako i inteligencija Sandžaka, kritički
reflektirala zbivanja u vlastitoj zajednici, zbivanja na Sandžaku, ali i u
samoj Srbiji.

 

Javnim prostorom potpuno dominira politička
elita. Problem sa političkom elitom je u tome što je ona potpuno
antagonizovana, podeljena, opterećena sukobima, sujetom i ambicijom lidera da
govore kao jedini i pravi predstavnici svoje nacije. Tamo gde stranke i
stranačke voðe isključivo sebe vide kao jedine, prave i autentične zagovornike
i predstavnike nacionalnih interesa, tamo gde lideri i njihove stranke nisu u
stanju da se ophrvu zovu autoritarnosti, tamo nema ni volje, ni prostora, ni
mogućnosti da se stranke konstituišu, ne samo kao liberalni i tolerantni
akteri, nego i kao akteri koji se groze upotrebe nepolitičkih sredstava.

 

Dakle, želja političkih aktera da
maksimalizuju svoj uticaj i svoju moć proizvodi niz nekoliko negativnih
posledica. Produbljivanjem i radikalizacijom sukoba otvaraju se vrata upotrebi
nasilja u politici. Sukobi izmeðu političkih aktera postoje i u drugim etničkim
zajednicama, ali ono po čemu se sukobi unutar bošnjačkog političkog društva
izdvajaju jeste brutalnost. Pošto se u tim sukobima koriste rekviziti
svojstveni jednoj drugoj vrsti sukoba ne iznenaðuju predlozi nekih civilnih
organizacija da se bošnjačkim političkim strankama na 10 godina zabrani rad,
zato što „primenjuju nasilje i koriste govor mržnje“. Drugo, dolazi do
pomeranja i prelivanja sukoba izvan političke sfere i to je ono čemu već izvesno
vreme svedočimo. Sukobi se, naime, prelivaju i prenose na islamsku versku
zajednicu. Pojava vehabija samo dodatno komplikuje ove probleme, jer dodatno
zaoštrava antagonozovane oponentske opcije. Napokon, sukobi unutar bošnjačke
zajednice omogućuju i akterima, kako izvan bošnjačke zajednice, tako i izvan
Sandžaka, da se involviraju u sukobe i da ih, u skladu sa svojim interesima,
doziraju, usmeravaju ili preusmeravaju. Vrlo često, na primer, sukobljene
strane nastoje da diskredituju jedna drugu meðusobno se optužujući da deluju
kao eksponenti tajnih, neformalnih struktura i centara moći, BIA i raznih
kabineta. Te primedbe nisu bez osnova, jer državne agencije nisu neutralne ni u
sukobima koje se odvijaju i na drugim stranama. Podsetimo se samo, ilustracije
radi, optužbi koje postoje izmeðu Bunjevaca i Hrvata.

 

Sukobi i naročito njihova brutalizacija
proizvode niz štetnih posledica:

 

1.                             
otežavaju proces integracije bošnjačke zajednice (unutar sebe, kao i u globalno
društvo); 2. otežavaju njeno konstituisanje u zrelu naciju; 3. usporavaju
procese modernizacije; 4. snaže predrasude o Sandžaku kao regionu sklonom
radikalizaciji i nesposobnom za demokratiju.

 

Sukobi ne odgovaraju običnim Bošnjacima i
sirotinji na tržištu rada, ali odgovaraju stranačkim oligarhijama i političkoj
klasi u Beogradu, jer slabe pritisak koji bi iz regije išao u pravcu brže
decentralizacije, otresitijeg sprovoðenja reformi, bržih evrointegracija,
suočavanja sa prošlošću, odlučnije saradnje sa Haškim tribunalom, itd.

 

Ako je ranije od strane države dolazila
represivno motivirana praksa, od koga treba da doðe podsticaj ka
demokratizaciji? U postkomunizmu odgovornost je za to «pripisana» civilnom
društvu. Svoju herojsku ulogu civilno drustvo je u Srbiji odigralo obaranjem
Miloševića, sada predstoji dug, uporan, mukotrpan rad na, ne samo u izgradnji
demokratije, nego i odgoju naroda za demokratiju. Civilno društvo u Sandžaku je
slabo, potisnuto, suočeno sa hroničnom nestašicom novca i nerazumevanjem državnih
organa. No, i takvo kakvo je, opterećeno brojnim problemima, civilno društvo u
Sandžaku je još uvek bolje od svog pojmovnog para – političkog društva – i
zaslužuje svaku vrstu podrške.

 

 

 

Samiha Kačar, Sandžački odbor za ljudska
parava:

 

Sandžak, koji se sada nalazi
u dvije samostalne države, zauzima posebno mjesto u istoriji raspada
jugoslavenske državne zajednice. Imajući u vidu blisku prošlost, kao i sve ono što se dešavalo na tom neuralgičnom prostoru, posebno u periodu od 1991. do 1995., ali i kasnije, može se reći da su zbivanja u
Sandžaku (ubistva, pljačke, otmice nedužnih graðana, topovsko–tenkovsko okruženje gradova, masovna iseljavanja
stanovništva, razni oblici diskriminacije, sudsko–politički procesi, brojni “informativni razgovori”, preventivna
represija, itd.) ostala u sjeni onoga što se tragično dešavalo u Hrvatskoj, BiH i na Kosovu. Zaštita narušenih ljudskih prava i sloboda putem
institucija sistema, na osnovu dosadašnjih iskustava, ne daje pravo za veći optimizam. Brojne krivični postupci žrtava policijske torture su, zbog sudske neažurnosti, odugovlačenja i brojnih
opstrukcija, već zastarjele. Iseljavanje iz Sandžaka i dalje se nastavlja. U Hagu se podižu optužnice za zločine počinjene u Hrvatskoj, BiH, na Kosovu, kao i u Vojvodini. Mnogi zločini počinjeni u Sandžaku su jednostavno prepušteni zaboravu, iako su trebali
biti predmet interesovanja države i sudskih organa. Sandžak takoðer ima pravo na istinu i njeno
institucionalno priznavanje. O svemu onome šta se zbivalo u njemu u proteklom
periodu, uz ostalo, dokumentovano svjedoče i brojne publikacije Sandžačkog
odbora za zaštitu ljudskih prava i sloboda, kao i drugih nevladinih
organizacija (Fonda za humanitarno pravo, Helsinškog odbora za ljudska prava u
Srbiji).

 

Rezultati
referenduma u Crnoj Gori 2006. označili su konačan raspad državne zajednice
Srbije i Crne Gore, ostatka nekadašnje Jugoslavije, a samim tim i razdvajanje
bošnjačke zajednice u Sandžaku, koja sada, podijeljena, živi u dvije odvojene
samostalne države. Referendum u Crnoj Gori je pokazao duboke podjele izmeðu
predstavnika bošnjačke zajednice u «srpskom» i «crnogorskom» dijelu Sandžaka.
Novi Pazar se, sa uvoðenjem višestranačja, kao bošnjački svakoliki centar nije
pokazao doraslim vremenu i svim iskušenjima u proteklom periodu. On je, nakon
svega, definitivno prestao biti bošnjački «centar» odakle su pojedini politički
predstavnici mislili koordinirati radom bošnjačkih institucija i stranaka, bez
obzira na republičke granice, na prostoru Sandžaka. Iskazana je znatna politička
nezrelost bošnjačkih predstavnika, praćenih političkim neiskustvom. Politički
ciljevi su bili artkulisani smušeno, više propagandno, ali neprimjereno vremenu
i okruženju. Pod terminom Sandžak danas se sve više govori o onom dijelu
Sandžaka koji se nalazi u granicama Republike Srbije, dok se o onom drugom
dijelu koji se nalazi u Republici Crnoj Gori sve manje govori. I ovaj veći dio
u Srbiji se, ne samo terminološki, sve više svodi samo na tri opštine: na Novi
Pazar, Sjenicu i Tutin. O Sandžaku se neosporno može govoriti višeznačno, iz
više uglova. Tu se i vide razlike izmeðu političara i predstavnika nevladinih
organizacija. Svim njegovim problemima treba pristupiti obazrivo.

 

U Srbiji danas
Bošnjaci čine manje od dva posto stanovništva. Iseljavanja traju i iz
„srbijanskog“ kao i iz „crnogorskog“ dijela Sandžaka. Mnogi problemi su, bez obzira na odvajanje Crne
Gore, ostali isti. Treba takoðe još više raditi na afirmaciji bošnjačke
duhovnosti, nacionalne svijesti. Ukoliko se tome ozbiljno ne priðe, prisutna je
zebnja da će se Bošnjaci svesti na minornu vjersku zajednicu, bez razvijenih
nacionalnih institucija.

 

Bošnjački pokret
u Sandžaku nikada se nije uspio adekvatno i realno institucionalizovati.
Bošnjački političari uskih vidika nisu uspjeli u proteklih 16 godina da na
pravi način artikulišu potrebe bošnjačke zajednice, niti da ih realno postave,
zaklanjajući se brojnim «memorandumima» i demagoškim tiradama. Na polju
kulture, jačanja nacionalne svijesti, razvijanju ozbiljnih projekata koji bi
uticali na jačanje bošnjačke nacionalne svijesti, istraživanju sopstvene
kulture, jezika, istorije, tradicije postignuti su veoma skromni rezultati.
Iako je bošnjačko stanovništvo u Sandžaku bilo podijeljeno izmedju dvije
republike, nisu ostvareni značajniji rezultati na njegovom duhovnom, kulturnom
i obrazovnom povezivanju. Nikakve propagandne floskule nisu mogle pomoći u
prevazilaženju brojnih problema, osim što su maskirali pravo, poražavajuće
stanje stvari. Meðusobna gloženja, stalna unutrašnja trvenja, umnožavanja
papirnatih institucija samo su pokazali da u tom razdoblju Bošnjaci nisu imali
ni političkog, ali ni intelektualnog potencijala da naðu prava rješenja za
budućnost. Jednonacionalni zahtjevi za autonomijom Sandžaka iskazani 1991. bili
su u startu problematični zbog odbojnosti ne samo političkih centara u Beogradu
i Podgorici, već i odbojnosti srpskog i crnogorskog življa u Sandžaku.
Maksimalistički zahtjevi su bili potpuno suprotni pravom intelektualnom,
ekonomskom, kulturnom potencijalu Bošnjaka Sandžaka. Beograd i Podgorica,
svjesni brojnih slabosti i trvenja unutar bošnjačkih političkih predstavnika,
nisu pokazali nikakvu značajniju spremnost ni za ozbiljnije razgovore, a kamoli
za uvažavanje bošnjačkih zahtjeva. Takva praksa Beograda i Podgorice je bila i
ostala konstanta. Zato je i podjela Bošnjaka logična posljedica promašene
politike bošnjačkih stranaka još od 1990. godine.

 

Nakon promjena
2000. oko čijeg se karaktera u Srbiji odavno polemiše, svakako se lakše diše.
Stanje ljudskih i manjinskih prava u Srbiji pokazuje pomak u odnosu na
predhodni period, ali diskriminacija prema manjinskim nacionalnim zajednicama i
dalje je najčešći oblik kršenja ljudskih prava. Manjinske zajednice nisu više
predmet sistematskog pritiska, ali su i dalje izložene različitim oblicima
diskriminacije i netrpeljivosti. Na zakonodavnom planu je takoðe, napravljen
odreðeni pomak, pogotovo usvajanjem Zakona o pravima nacionalnih manjina,
kao i ratifikovanjem Okvirne konvencije Savjeta Evrope o poštovanju prava
manjinskih nacionalnih zajednica. Meðutim, pri implementaciji Zakona o
manjinama i Okvirne konvencije uočeni su brojni problemi. U nekim
sandžačkim opštinama još uvek nisu implementirane odredbe Konvencije o
službenoj upotrebi jezika, iako je to bila obaveza na samo po meðunarodnom
pravu, već i po domaćem zakonodavstvu (Priboj, Prijepolje). Zakoni o pravima
manjinskih zajednica se više donose zbog preuzetih obaveza pred meðunarodnom
zajednicom, a ne da bi se praktično primenjivali. Svojedobno se mnogo govorilo
o Saveznom zakonu o manjinama, koji je donet uz veliki publicitet, da je to
nešto što će znatno i istinski unaprediti ljudska prava, a u stvarnosti je bilo
drugačije iz više razloga (politički problemi, odnosi izmeðu dvije države).
Pitanja kadrovske strukture, nacionalne izbalansiranosti u Sandžaku zaslužuje
posebnu pozornost.

 

U ovim, ali i
drugim opštinama još uvijek nema značajnih pomaka kada je u pitanju primjena Okvirne
konvencije. Ima indicija da je učešće bošnjačkih predstavnika u lokalnim
organima vlasti uslovljeno nizom kompromisa na koje moraju pristati. To je
slučaj u nekoliko sandžačkih opština.

 

Prema podacima na
osnovu istraživanja Sandžačkog odbora, nacionalna i kadrovska struktura u
pojedinim opštinama ove regije je i dalje izuzetno nepovoljna, ne odgovara
sastavu stanovništva. Sandžački odbor je istražio stanje u kadrovskoj strukturi
u opštinama Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin, Priboj i Prijepolje Nacionalna
zastupljenost je potpuno poremećena u državnim instucijama (MUP, sudovi,
tužilaštva, vojska) na štetu Bošnjaka. Praksa koja je postojala u prošloj deceniji još uvijek nije napuštena. U
Sjenici, u opštinskom tužilaštvu, od ukupnog broja zaposlenih, ne radi nijedno
lice bošnjačke nacionalnosti.

 

Zabrinutost u Sandžaku i za Sandžak je doista
opravdana, imajući u vidu sveopšte stanje, prisilne reducirane potrebe, kao i
sve izraženiju, tešku privrednu krizu koja se manifestira u svim ravnima
života, njegovo sve još očitije zaostajanje u odnosu na druge dijelove zemlje. Malo se u Novom Pazaru, gradu koji želi
da bude bošnjačko političko i nacionalno središte, govori o Bošnjacima u Novoj
Varoši, Priboju ili Prijepolju. Oni kao da su, zbog svoje relativne
malobrojnosti, jednostavno zaboravljeni. Ovi Bošnjaci su najprisutniji u
izvještajima nevladinih organizacija, i meðu njima posebno Sandžačkog odbora.
Seobe ka Bosni, bolje rečeno ka Sarajevu, traju i dalje iz Priboja, Prijepolja,
ali iz Sjenice, Tutina. Taj proces je davno započeo. Kao da mu nema kraja. Iz
Novog Pazara, Sjenice, Tutina, odlaze Srbi, ali i Bošnjaci. To su složene teme
koje se ne mogu prećutkivati. Mnogi su problemi zajednički, iako oni nerijetko
dobijaju isključivu nacionalnu formu. Popisi stanovništva traže odgovore na
brojna pitanja. Jedno od njih je i da li Republika Srbija želi da konačno
prestane iseljavanje Bošnjaka. To je dilema pred kojom su se našle zatečene
mnoge generacije Bošnjaka. Ukoliko je odgovor potvrdan onda se mora
primjenjivati sasvim drugačija politika prema ovim krajevima, mnogo iskrenija,
mnogo operativnija. Ona mora imati institucionalnu i transparentnu formu. Danas
se, iz više razloga, dosta ulaže i govori o tri opštine na jugu Srbije
(Preševo, Bujanovac…), nego o ovom prostoru, mada on zaslužuje brigu države i
svakoliku pomoć.

 

Sandžak je i
prije raspada socijalističke Jugoslavije, slovio kao jedna od najzaostalijih
oblasti u toj državi. Investicije uporno zaobilaze sandžačke krajeve. To je
inače i na hiljade ljudi odvelo i odvodi sa ovog prostora. Raseljeni Sandžak je
mnogo brojniji od onog pravog. Političkom i marketinškom retorikom prekrivaju
se i marginaliziraju njegovi suštinski problemi: nerazvijenost i
besperspektivnost, nizovi devijantnih pojava (kriminal, korupcija,
prostitucija, droga). Sandžak se nalazi u dubokoj društvenoj i ekonomskoj krizi
koja se osjeća u svim ravnima života. Siva ekonomija, droga, prostitucija,
pljačka, ubistva, politički sukobi, takoðe čine dio stvarnosti. Jedan problem
nadrasta drugi.

 

Svjedoci smo
takoðer, s druge strane, postojanja čitavog niza problema u sandžačkoj sredini
koji mogu imati neželjene posljedice po ukupno stanje: «govor mržnje» u
medijima, incidenti na sportskim susretima, ispisivanje nacionalističkih parola
i grafita, pojedine neodmjerene izjave političara, učestali sukobi članova i
simpatizera pojedinih stranaka i slično, sukobi, unutar islamske zajednice koji
mogu biti veoma opasni. Neke pojave nije dovoljno samo osuditi, treba ih
svakako pokušati i objasniti, staviti u realne okvire.

 

Ovaj prostor se,
meðutim, i dalje predstavlja u crno-bijelim šemama, što je nastavak
zamagljivanja njegove složene zbilje. I dalje se uporno u srbijanskim medijima,
ali i po potrebi politike, podržava slika o islamu kao neprijateljskoj religiji
i sveopštoj opasnosti. Znatan dio printanih glasila je ponovo vratio u
svakodnevno korišćenje propagandne termine poput onih sa početka devedesetih
godina prošlog stoljeća, o islamskoj opasnosti, teroristima i slično.
Stereotipi i predrasude pokazuju izuzetnu vitalnost. Novinski članci o nekakvoj
„zelenoj transferzali“, „islamskoj opasnosti“, „Beloj Al-kaidi“ i slično su još
uvijek prisutni, a po potrebi, se i dopunjuju novim „opasnostima“. Mediji o Bošnjacima govore povremeno kao
da se oni mjere u brojkama od više stotina hiljada. Po potrebi, oni su u medijima tek neznatna
manjina, ali, kada zatreba, oni postaju opasnost za Balkan i region u cjelini.
Istinu, meðutim, znaju i novinari i političari. Islamsku opasnost proizvode oni
koji o njoj najviše i pišu, ignorišući brojne činjenice koje govore suprotno od
onoga što plasiraju putem medija. Pojedinačni incidenti koji se dešavaju nisu
pravilo, niti se može raditi o opštim pojavama koje ugrožavaju mir i stabilnost
na ovom prostoru. Mediji, po potrebi, uvijek senzacionalistički apostrofiraju
Sandžak kao novo, moguće krizno žarište, otkrivaju povremeno potencijalne
teroriste i slično. Na ovaj način se širi islamofobija i plaši cijeli region i
Evropa od Bošnjaka.

 

Novi Pazar skoro
da ne izlazi iz „crnih hronika“. Novinare ovdje zanimaju samo takve, nikako drugačije vijesti. A treba reći
da Novi Pazar, kao i druge opštine pritiskaju dugogodišnji problemi. Poreðenje
infrastrukture izmeðu Novog Pazara, Kraljeva ili Čačka daje porazne rezultate.
O tome se malo, ili nikako ne govori. I ovdje žive ljudi, koji traže da imaju
slične uslove života kakvi postoje u drugim gradovima. O sandžačkim selima i
tamošnjim prilikama da i ne govorim. Moram svakako ukazati da je neophodno
ukazivati na potrebu nacionalnog balansiranja u državnim institucijama na
lokalnom nivou (sud, policija, tužilaštvo) gdje bi Bošnjaci, shodno svom broju,
trebali biti još prisutniji. Posebno je pitanje učešće i prisutnost Bošnjaka u
republičkim institucijama.

 

Bošnjaci se
moraju institucionalno izboriti za sva prava koja im pripadaju, moraju
prevazići brojne podjele, kao i improvizacije na mnogim nivoima, kako bi
osigurali ovom prostoru prosperitet i budućnost. Ukoliko do toga ne doðe, ovo
što je ostalo od Sandžaka još više će se dijeliti, ali i marginalizovati. Vlast
u Beogradu redovno prosuðuju u bošnjačkim sporovima, rukovodeći se prije svega,
svojim interesima.

 

 

 

Meho Omerović,
narodni poslanik

 

Zahvaljujem se
Helsinškom odboru i gospoði Sonji Biserko što su, čini mi se, u pravom trenutku
otvorili pitanje Sandžaka na ovakav način, jer, kompleksnost problema Sandžaka
zahteva i kontinuirano bavljenje i uzrocima kao i posledicama i naravno onim
što čini svakodnevni život kada je u pitanju ovaj veoma specifičan prostor. Ja
ću u veoma kratkom izlaganju ukazati samo na jedan aspekt koji nije samo
posledica.nego je, rekao bih, i neka vrsta perfidne politike koju deo države,
koji je, na žalost, oličen u visokim predstavnicima vlasti vodi prema jednom
delu zemlje, Sandžaku, prema jednom narodu odnosno manjinskoj zajednici,
Bošnjacima, i prema njihovoj verskoj zajednici, Islamskoj verskoj zajednici.
Juče je u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srbije, na sednici odbora za bezbednost
i odbranu, direktor BIA gospodin Rade Bulatović, rekao, citiram:»Da su jedan od
faktora ugrožavanja bezbednosti Srbije i tenzije unutar Islamske zajednice»!
Upravo na primeru sukoba unutar Islamske zajednice, država Srbija je pokazala
kako ne bi trebalo da se ponaša odgovorna država.

 

Zašto to kažem i
zašto to tvrdim? Iz jednostavnog razloga koji je veoma poznat javnosti, a na
koji doista svakodnevno treba podsećati i upozoravati, jer je resorni ministar,
ministar vera u Vladi Republike Srbije, gospodin Naumov, prekršio Zakon. Stavio
se na jednu od strana unutar sukoba Islamske verske zajednice što je, složićete
se, nedopustivo. Gospodin Naumov se upustio čak i u objašnjenja, pa je tako
govorio kako država priznaje obe, i onu u Beogradu, i onu u Novom Pazaru, kaže
gospodin Naumov da «ima mesta i za Mešihat ima mesta i za Rijaset…»! Ne
priznaje država Srbija, kaže Naumov, samo jednu islamsku versku zajednicu, on
kaže da «jeste jedna islamska zajednica, ali su ovo različite forme!». Meðutim,
ono što gospodin Naumov nije rekao i za šta nam od tog trenutka, prošlo je
skoro 20 dana, duguje odgovor to je, kako to da jedna niža organizaciona forma,
u ovom slučaju muftijstvo i to samo jedan njen deo, preskače onu iznad sebe i
formira najvišu, a to je Rijaset. E, sada će biti jako interesantno videti kako
se gospodin ministar Naumov ponaša prema jednom drugom, iliti sličnom problemu.
Naime, pre nekoliko dana Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva je podnela zahtev, u
skladu sa Zakonom o crkvama i verskim zajednicama, da se upiše u registar
crkvenih odnosno verskih organizacija. Dakle, da li će gospodin Naumov sad
imati isti stav kao u slučaju islamske zajednice, da mogu postojati dve pravoslavne
crkve u Srbiji.

 

Po svemu sudeći,
iz svega ovoga izvlači se zaključak da bi neki u Srbiji želeli da se formira
neka vrsta «srpske islamske zajednice». Jer, teza da Bošnjaci predstavljaju
izmišljen narod, da su oni Srbi, ustvari, muslimanske veroispovesti, je u
poslednje vreme čak veoma rasporostranjena. Ovakav odnos države i njenih
najviših organa nas dovodi i do ovoga što je i današnja tema, a to je taj vid
represivne politike države koju deo države vodi prema jednom celom regionu.
Zašto je to tako mislim da nam je ponuðen samo jedan jedini odgovor: naime,
očigledno je na delu vraćanje dugova koalicionom partneru. Izgleda da, evo,
država ili bar jedan njen deo, saučestvuje u pokušaju pravljenja privatne ili
partijske islamske zajednice. Jer, nikako drugačije se ne može protumačiti
činjenica da su najviši predstavnici novoformirane islamske zajednice u stvari
bili odbornici ili su i dan-danas funkcioneri Stranke demokratske akcije,
koalicionog partnera partije kojoj pripada i ministar vera gospodin Naumov. Ja
bih vas podsetio, prošle godine, ta ista partija kojoj pripada gospodin Naumov,
je nezakonito u Novom Pazaru uvela privremene mere i u sukobu dve bošnjačke
političke partije se, kao i u slučaju sukoba unutar islamske verske zajednice,
stavila na jednu stranu. Sticaj okolnosti je pokazao da je to uvek jedna te
ista strana, strana koju vodi gospodin Sulejman Ugljanin.

 

Čini mi se da je
problem za sve nas u Srbiji to što ta partija, partija predsednika Vlade
Republike Srbije, koja ima najveći koalicioni kapacitet, ili «potencijal» u
Srbiji, kako oni to vole da kažu, na žalost, ima samo remetilačke partnere. U
Crnoj Gori su to Demokratska srpska stranka i Narodna stranka, u Republici
Srpskoj je to Srpska demokratska stranka sa kojom imaju potpisan i koalicioni
sporazum, a evo, vidimo u Sandžaku, to je partija koju vodi gospodin Sulejman
Ugljanin.

 

 

 

Sonja Biserko: Dajem reč sada g.Vukomanoviću. Nadam se
da ćete nam nešto reći o vehabijima, pošto ste upućeni u to šta je to
vehabizam. Radi se o verskom pokretu koji je i legalan i legitiman i ne može se
zabraniti niti po Ustavu niti po Zakonu o crkvama i verskim zajednicama, kao i
drugim meðunarodnim dokumentima. Meðutim, želela bih istovremeno da citiram i
muftiju Zukorlića koji kaže: «Za mene je to grupa ekstremista i oni su bitni
samo ako ih neko zloupotrebi. Oni ovde nemaju apsolutno uporište meðu narodom i
zato dugoročno ne mogu da budu opasnost. Mi imamo informacije o tome, ali ne
želimo da ih iznosimo već to treba da urade istražni organi»! Ja bih zamolila
da se osvrnete na ovu pojavu na Balkanu s obzirom da očigledno njihovo
prisustvo izaziva takvu pozornost.

 

 

 

Milan
Vukomanović, profesor sociologije

 

Evo, kratko
samo… Ja sam o vehabijama i ranije govorio i to je prenošeno u javnosti
našoj, ali ukratko, suština toga je da je kod nas to jedna marginalna pojava
unutar islama, marginalna, utoliko što nikad nije uhvatila korena na Balkanu.
Ni u Bosni, ni na Kosovu ni ovde u ovom sandžačkom slučaju, iako je bilo
odreðenih incidenata, ali jeste pojava koja se može zloupotrebiti. Vehabizam
kao takav predstavlja jednu vrstu zloupotrebe islama. Znači, (pod 1) to je
jedan pokret koji ima snažne misionarske ambicije, možemo reći, globalne
ambicije, ali nije uhvatio korena svugde onako kako je kao vodeća politička
ideologija, verska ideologija, imao temelje u Saudijskoj Arabiji, u matičnoj
zemlji iz koje je ponikao kao jedna vrsta ideologije, znači, tu je jedan
istorijat. Ali, ovde kod nas, te misionarske tendencije, bar na Balkanu koliko
sam ja imao prilike to da ispratim, zaista nisu imale pogodno tle iz prostog
razloga što ovde na Balkanu tradicionalno živimo zajedno sa jednim islamom koji
je mnogo umereniji, koji je liberalniji u smislu versko-pravne škole, koji je,
na kraju krajeva, islam koji je prilično pod uticajem surfijske tradicije,
duhovne tradicije u islamu, i jednostavno, ta vrsta «importa» nije nikad mogla
da na bitniji način utiče, u smislu transformacije onoga što jeste domaći
islam.

 

Ali, nezavisno od
ove islamološke debate, i nezavisno, naravno, od tih mogućnosti zloupotrebe
pojedinih pokreta ovde, ja bih se osvrnuo na nešto što možda nema toliko veze
sa samim islamom, ali ima veze sa ponašanjem naše države u odnosu na dve stvari
koje su po meni mnogo širi i ozbiljniji problemi, oba se tiču vlasti u Srbiji,
sve tri grane vlasti, najviše, naravno, izuvršne. Ja tu mislim, najpre, na
ugrožavanje slobode veroispovesti, kako verujućih tako i neverejućih graðana u
našoj zemlji. Ugrožena je sloboda vere, ali ugrožena je i sloboda od vere,
dakle, oba elementa su ovde na udaru, to je jedan vrsta udara na verske
slobode, da se izrazim tako, parafraziram naslov knjige jednog mog kolege kada
je to stavio u kontekst prostestantskih zajednica. Druga stvar koja predstavlja
zbiljan problem jesu periodični talasi antimuslimanskog i antiislamskog
ponašanja i delovanja bez adekvatne reakcije državnih institucija. U oba
slučaja nije dakle, samo reč o nekakvoj unutarmuslimanskoj podeli u Sandžaku,
već o nečemu što treba da se tiče i nemuslimana. Ukupno stanje meðureligijskih
odnosa pa i odnosa crkva – država, se pogoršalo sa Koštuničinom vladom, kako
onom prošlom tako i ovom sadašnjom, položaj Srpske pravoslavne crkve je tu
svakako bolji, svi smo toga svedoci, nego što je bilo u Miloševićevo vreme, ali
su zato mnogo više na udaru male verske zajednice, ili manjinske verske
zajednice ovde. Iako sada imamo zakon, a tada ga nije bilo, država. odnosno,
Vlada Srbije, ugrožava verske slobode svojih graðana, i to pre svega čine
vladajuće stranke u ime države, naročito one kojima je poveren odnos sa verskim
zajednicama, to znači one koje supervizira ministarstvo vera, a to je u ovom
slučaju Demokratska stranka Srbije. Da ilustrujem samo i podsetim vas na
opštepoznate stvari ali kada ih sagledamo u kontinuitetu onda vidimo gde leži
stvarni problem. Podsetiću na nastojanja bivše ministarke prosvete da se
potisne darvinizam i afirmiše kreacionizam u javnim školskim programima, zatim,
podsetiću na skandaloznu prvu verziju prednacrta Zakona o verskoj slobodi
tadašnjeg ministra Radulovića, na one stavke o imunitetu sveštenika i čitav niz
drugih stvari, gde se jasno videlo da se Ministrastvo vera stavilo uz većinsku
versku zajednicu u našoj zemlji, zatim, slučajeve moralne panike oko malih
verskih zajednica, gde najviše kumuju neke strukture u samoj policiji, pa i sam
ministar policije je davao vrlo neodgovorne izjave u slučaju, recimo, Novih
Banovaca, gde se olako i ishitreno dovode nekakva grozna ubistva sa delovanjem
malih verskih zajednica. Za posledicu onda redovno imamo i napade na te male
verske zajednice, potpuno nedužne ovde, dakle, religijske zajednice nalaze se
na udaru sveštenici, njihova imovina i tako dalje. Onda imamo diskriminaciju
tih zajednica u samom Zakonu samim tim što je procedura za njihovu registraciju
drukčija od procedure za registraciju tzv. tradicionalnih verskih zajednica, pa
kad tome dodamo još i rasizam u skupštini Srbije i niz nekih problema u novije
vreme, recimo, predrasude u našim sudovima, tužilaštvima kada je reč o
presudama i procesima vezanim za kler Sprske pravoslavne crkve, gde je moralo
sada u novije vreme da reaguje i Ministarstvo pravde oko toga, onda imamo puno
slučajeva u različitim sektorima gde se ovakva teza može potvrditi. Tu dolazi
često do ustavnih prekoračenja, država krši svoje vlastite zakone, one zakone
koje je predložila vlada i Ministarsvo vera, na kraju krajeva, prekršen je
sada, u ovom sandžačkom slučaju, i član 7. Zakona o crkvama i verskim
zajednicama gde se kaže «… da država ne može ometati primenu autonomnih
propisa crkava i verskih zajednica». Znači, ako je postojao nekakav
objediniteljski sabor Islamske zajednice u Srbiji i donet je nekakav ustav
Islamske zajednice u Srbiji, onda ne mogu državni organi da se priklanjaju
nekakvom drugom carstvu i da daju signale koga oni podržavaju u celom tom
sporu, jer time krše i svoj vlastiti zakon. Na to je, na kraju krajeva, s
pravom, upozoravao i sandžački muftija u više nastupa u javnosti, to je
ozbiljan prigovor kada vam lider jedne tradicionalne verske zajednice u Srbiji
skrene pažnju na to da država krši svoje sopstvene zakone. Meni to znate,
pomalo liči na one zahteve ruskih religijskih disidenata, sovjetskih, iz
Brežnjevljevog vremena, otprilike to je taj nivo komunikacije.

 

Iznete su takoðe
ozbiljne optužbe u pogledu «cezaropapizma» jednog lokalnog političara,
predsednika opštine, to je stvar koja takoðe treba da nas zabrine, tu mislim
pre svega, na Ugljaninov zahtev za ukidanjem Islamske zajednice i stavljanjem
pod kontrolu bošnjačkog nacionalnog veća. Dakle, tu imamo direktnu umešanost
politike u verske strukture, ova vlada, iako nemuslimanska, kao da neguje neku
vrstu političkog islama pa gura politiku u te religijske strukture. Najzad, o
tome je više puta govorio i sandžački muftija, mi zaista ozbiljno treba da
uzmemo u obzir ove optužbe za saradnju nekih sveštenika i imama sa obaveštajnim
službama u ovoj zemlji. Ja ne bih potcenio takvu jednu izjavu. U Bosni i
Hercegovini nedavno su objavljene knjige sa imenima sveštenika, imama i
predstavnika drugih crkava i verskih zajednica, tzv. «plava», «zelena» i
«crvena» knjiga gde se ukazuje na tu saradnju u SFRJ i docnije, Dakle, to je
nešto što se ozbiljno mora ispitati i država o takvim optužbama mora da povede
računa.

 

Izvršna vlast
ovde, dakle, zamuti stvari, zamuti do kraja, naročito Ministarstvo vera, onda
se, tobože, oni ne mešaju, ostaju van toga, znači, proizvedu krizu i ostave nam
je; ja bih se zapitao sada kako se osećaju druge verske zajednice u Srbiji,
kada je reč o ovim meðureligijskim odnosima, kada imamo indukovanu podelu u
islamskoj zajednici, gde se vidi čija je i gde leži državna naklonost. Kakve to
sada posledice ima na odnose sa, recimo, pravoslavnom crkvom, katoličkom
crkvom, kako će se sada predstavnici tih verskih zajednica ponašati kada budu
pozvani, recimo, na neki dogaðaj ili prijem, nešto što organizuje Islamska
zajednica, kako nevladine organizacije sada da organizuju škole, recimo u
Sandžaku, a da očekuju da će im prisustvovati, recimo, ako je reč o
interetničkim i meðureligijskim odnosima, da će im prisustvovati zvanični
predstavnici Srpske pravoslavne crkve, Rimokatoličke crkve kada imaju takvu
podelu i strah ljudi da će to biti ispolitizovano na ovaj ili onaj način. Kako
sada uopšte da radimo u tim uslovima? Da li je bilo ko, ko je takve stvari
zamućivao, vodio računa i o tim sekundarnim posledicama?

 

Nezavisno od ovih
podela u islamskoj zajednici, ja bih rekao da se u sadašnjem Zakonu o crkvama i
verskim zajednicama, nalazi jedan ipak besmisleni, ali ne slučajni član, to je
član 19. u kome se kaže, ja ću ga navesti: «…da se u registar ne može upisati
verska organizacija čiji naziv sadrži naziv ili deo naziva koji izražava
identitet crkve, verske zajednice ili verske organizacije koja je već upisana u
registar ili koja je ranije podnela zahtev za upis». Naravno, ovaj član će biti
aktiviran u slučaju prijave za registraciju Crnogorske pravoslavne crkve.
Verovatno tu i stoji da se ne bi omogućila registracija Makedonske pravoslavne
crkve i Crnogorske pravoslavne crkve, ali moram da objasnim zašto je besmislen
takav član: mi smo svi svesni da se u političkom životu, pojavljuju stalno nove
i nove stranke koje u svom imenu sadrže deo imena ili nekakav prefiks kao što
je demokratski, kao što je liberalni, kao što je socijaldemokratski
i tako dalje, to je prosto neizbežno, jednostavno to je neka vrsta amblema,
identiteta stranke i njene političke orijentacije ili ideologije. Još je to
važnije i osetljivije u religijskom životu. Tu stalno nastaju nove religijske
zajednice, denominacije, dolazi do fragmentacije postojećih, naročito u
protestantizmu one se odvajaju od svojih matičnih crkava i osnivaju kao nove.
Imate, ne znam, Hrišćansku adventističku crkvu ali imate i Adventističku crkvu
sedmog dana, imate baptiste ove ili baptiste one i tako dalje. Jednostavno to znači
onemogućiti uopšte verske zajednice da slobodno deluju i da se nazivaju onako
kako one s pravom žele da se nazivaju u vezi sa religijskom zajednicom porekla,
da tako kažem. Dakle, s te strane, principijelno gledano, ovakav član u zakonu
je potpuno besmislen i nepotreban, ali ima smisla, naravno, u jednom ovakvom
političkom kontekstu želje da se ti meðureligijski, meðucrkveni odnosi,
kontrolišu. Nama ti meðureligijski, meðucrkveni odnosi direktno utiču i kvare
meðudržavne odnose. Kad vi pogledate od slučaja sa Makedonskom pravoslavnom
crkvom, pa Crnogorskom pravoslavnom crkvom, pa sada ovaj slučaj sa Islamskom
zajednicom, nama su se vodnosi, meðudržavni, sa Makedonijom, sa Crnom Gorom,
sada i sa Bosnom i Herccegovinom, znatno pogoršali: u dva prva slučaja reč je o
većinski pravoslavnim društvima, odnosno, društvima gde je pravoslavlje
dominantna religijska zajednica. To je potpuno paradoksalno.

 

Druga stvar na
koju sam hteo da ukažem jeste ovo antiislamsko i antimuslimansko delovanje u
Srbiji u periodu od 2004. do 2007. godine naročito, i to možda u najvišim
državnim institucijama kao što su policija i vojska, možemo se zapitati da li
je tu reč o nekakvom tihom, prećutnom, kontinuitetu sa prethodnim etničkim
sukobima iz devedesetih, jer, nekada je to antiislamstvo latentno, nekad je
vrlo naglašeno, ja bih ga simbolički mogao staviti u onaj vremenski okvir od
paljenja džamija u Beogradu, Nišu, u Novom Sadu i uništavanju nadgrobnih
spomenika izuzetno retkih i izuzetno vrednih u Vojnom muzeju na Kalemegdanu, pa
do upada u policijskim čizmama u džamiju u Sjenici ove godine. Dakle, to je
jedan okvir antimuslimanskog, antiislamskog delovanja koji bih ovde želeo da
naglasim. Sećamo se da su kazne za prestupnike u Nišu bile više nego
simbolične, to je bila jedna farsa od suðenja, gde je trebalo deset puta
zakazivati ročišta. Sećamo se, na kraju krajeva, i reakcije na te presude, to
je bilo besprizorno ponašanje optuženih za blage prestupe, što je, naravno,
direktna posledica i na same presude. Ili da spomenem izjavu tadašnjeg
funkcionera Demokratske stranke Srbije Obrena Joksimovića o «mudžahedinskoj
stranci» u skupštini Srbije, bojazni da ćemo imati, kako je on tada rekao, Al
Kaidu i Homeinija u skupštini kao «..transmitere muslimanske fundamentalističke
ideje…»! Naravno, ti tzv. mudžahedini su omogućili opstanak na vlasti
Vojislavu Koštunici docnije, a Vlada je uvela prinudnu upravu u opštini Novi
Pazar i spasla Ugljanina od opoziva na referendumu.

 

Imamo sada opet
proizvodnju kriza kao u Miloševićevo vreme, ovakvim ponašanjem nas država samo
gura u nove probleme, kako na domaćem tako i na meðunarodnom planu, možemo se
zapitati da li se predsednik Tadić susreo sa reisom Cerićem krajem marta ove
godine, uz prisustvo Rasima Ljajića i muftije Zukorlića, da li se tu zaista
govorilo o istorijskom i moralnom pravu Islamske zajednice u Srbiji da bude u
duhovnoj vezi, u savezu sa Islamskom zajednicom u Bosni i Hercegovini, da li je
to bilo ili nije bilo? Govorilo se tu, koliko se ja sećam i o pokretanju novog
srpsko-bošnjačkog dijaloga, koji je preko potreban nakon sukoba i zločina
devedesetih, šta će sada ova država da uradi povodom toga? Hoće li ona da se
svaða sa lajčakom u Bosni, da nas gura u nove krize i probleme, u meðuvremenu,
samo da vas podsetimo, umesto Miloševićevih slika na raznim skupovima ovde u
regionu, počele su uveliko da se nose Putinove slike.

 

 

 

Mirko
Ðorðević, publicist: Država i verske zajednice – smetnje na vezama

 

U nekoj prilici –
u široj raspravi o trenutnoj državnoj politici prema crkvama i verskim
zajednicama – valjalo bi temeljnije objasniti odnos Crkve i države i verskih
zajednica u Srbiji. Problemi se ili prikrivaju, ili se svesno zaobilaze i tek u
incidentnim situacijama se vidi o čemu se radi. Incidenti i nesporazumi koje mi
ovde blago nazivamo «smetnje na vezama» izazivaju nove i otkrivaju da u
državnoj politici nema doslednosti – od prilike do prilike i po potrebi
političkog momenta država se odreðuje i sama se loše snalazi u svemu. Videlo se
to i na primeru zbivanja oko Islamske zajednice u Srbiji koja je razdeljena,
imamo dve – koje tvrde da su jedine – a napetosti se reperkutuju u najširim
državnim i društvenim okvirima. Iza ovog raskola stoji politika i to je
uglavnom jasno. Da je to tako najbolje objašnjava muftija Islamske zajednice iz
Beograda, efendija Jusufspahić – Boris Tadić i Demokratska stranka, Vojislav
Koštunica i Demokratska stranka Srbije, Tomislav Nikolić i Srpska radikalna
stranka i sve druge stranke podržavaju koncept Islamske zajednice Srbije zato
što je on državotvoran. Ne navodi se ni jedan dokaz da Islamska zajednica u
Srbiji nije lojalna državi. Problem nije dogmatske prirode već čisto
organizacione – sve verske zajednice su jednake i država prema Zakonu o crkvama
i vrskim zajednicama priznaje jednu jedinstveno organizovanu u duhu islamske
tradicije. Ovoga puta država se opredelila za jednu, što se protivi pomenutom
Zakonu i Ustavu Republike Srbije, a poznato je da moderna država – pravna
država – sigurno nema pravo da osniva ni crkve ni druge verske zajednice, njena
je funkcija da štiti autonomiju i slobodu delovanja. Situacija u kojoj su se
našli vernici pokazuje da je polumesec na Srbijom zašao u duboku političku
senku i krivica je u lošoj državnoj politici prema verskim zajednicama uopšte.
Naravno i crkvama, jer je princip da jedne budu posebno priznate a druge
marginalizovane – ili manipulisane – ugraðen u sam pomenuti Zakon. Ovo je
prilika da se pokaže kako smo bili u pravu kada smo upozoravali da se pomenuti
Zakon kosi sa Ustavom i da će ga biti teško primeniti.

 

Sve ostalo u
sporu – u medijima – o tome gde je duhovni centar crkava i verskih zajednica –
zaista je nebitno.

 

Pomenuću i
problem koji se «vrti», da su navodno, u sve ovo umešane ne samo država i već i
bezbednosne službe. U dubljem smislu o ovome se može razgovarati samo ako imamo
dovoljno sigurnih dokaza, a mi ih, osim verbalnih tvrdnji, nemamo. No, bilo
kako bilo, tu nečeg ima. Još u aprilu ove godine muftija Zukorlić je u više
navrata upozoravao[3] na to i obratio se pismom Tadiću i
Koštunici: – «Posebno brinu brojne informacije o aktivnoj umešanosti
obaveštajnih i bezbednosnih službi Srbije u navedenim aktivnostima protiv
Islamske zajednice». To je sve što znamo, a odgovor najviših državnih činovnika
javnosti – šire i jasnije – nije poznat. Postoji još jedan dokument na koji se
zaboravlja, a potiče od samog šefa tajne policije BIA, gospodina R. Bulatovića
u kojem stoji[4] i ovakav stav, kakve bar javno, šefovi
tajnih službi retko izriču: -«konkretno, sada tragamo za tri dosijea crkvenih
velikodostojnika, koji su nestali u periodu posle 2000. godine. Imamo i
pretpostavku zbog čega su uzeti i gde su završili».

 

U detalje ovde ne
možemo ulaziti – manjkaju kao takvi – ali se iz ovoga vidi da se država bavi
crkvama i verskim zajednicama, kao i one državom, na loš način i da upliće
prste i tamo gde joj sigurno nije mesto. Ono što se dogaða sa Islamskom
zajednicom i sa nekim crkvama nije moguće objasniti bez istraživanja kojih za
sada nema – a svi dogaðaji su u vezi sa nečim sličnim.

 

Neki se
zaključci, reklo bi se, sami nameću – najpre tu je nesporna krivica ministra
vera u kabinetu Vojislava Koštunice i da je kako nije – da živimo u pravnoj
državi – ministar bi trebalo da podnese ostavku. Da li u državi može postojati
nekoliko pravoslavnih crkava, a ne može više katoličkih i da li mogu postojati
dve islamske zajednice u Srbiji to nije nepoznato – svako se organizuje prema
svojoj tradiciji, a država bi tu trebalo da bude neutralna. Ovako, kako se sada
čini, otvara se prostor za političke manipulacije kakve su se nazrele oko
vehabija, o čemu još ne znamo mnogo – čeka se kraj sudskog postupka. Nije bitno
ni reagovanje medija, jer su uglavnom pod kontrolom sfera moći – ili se
svrstavaju na jednu stranu, ili se prave da im nije jasno o čemu se radi.
Postoji još i druga strana medalje a to su odnosi u samoj islamskoj zajednici
gde se ne isključuje rivalstvo voða. Navodila se istočnjačku parabolu o
najvećem i najlepšem ćilimu u džamiji koji često biva tesan za dvojicu imama.
Reč je i o materijalnim interesima. Najopasnije je što podele u krilu
bošnjačkog naroda u regiji, dakle, odnosi u samoj islamskoj zajednici, mogu
biti otvaranje vrata nasilju koje na Balkanu nikad nije isključeno. Stoga je
ovaj raskol i karakterističan i dolazi u vreme kada se oko Kosova forsira
snažna diplomatska akcija širom sveta i kada se i u susednoj BiH osećaju
previranja koja bi trebalo da opomenu da je ponavljanje grešaka opasno za sve.
Jednom reči, nevolja je u tome što ne postoji izgraðen model odnosa crkve i
države i verskih zajednica uopšte izveden iz bogatog evropskog iskustva, već se
nešto slično otvara od prlike do prilike i uvek po potrebi paretija koje drže
vlast u Srbiji.

 

 

 

Sonja Biserko: Nedavno ste rekli da «… nacionalne
revolucije često izbijaju u vreme kada su stare nepravde prestale, a unutrašnje
jedinstvo pobunjenih nestalo. Sandžak, izgleda, nije izuzetak!» Ako biste mogli
nešto o tome da nam kažete?!

 

 

 

Čedomir Antić,
istoričar

 

Činjenica je da,
u istoriji se pokazalo, vrlo često pobune i revolucije, stvaranje nacionalnih
država počinju u vreme kada su te drevne nepravde zbog kojih su navodno počele,
prestale. Dakle, evo jedan primer iz XIX veka, najveće pobune protiv osmanskog
carstva dešavale su se upravo u vreme velikih reformskih pokušaja, i to je,
prosto, jedno pravilo.

 

Meðutim, da se
vratim na ovu sadašnju temu, ja je ne vidim kao istoriografsku već kao
političku, meni je žao, pošto je naslov ovako širok, ne može se reći da li je
reč o dogaðanjima u oblasti Sandžaka u protekle 2, 4, ili 20. godina, žao mi je
što to nije do kraja definisano, a potom, pošto je reč o, navodno, državnoj
represiji, kažem «navodno» misleći na protreklih 7 godina, mislim da bi bilo
dobro da je neko pozvan prosto i od predstavnika vlade. Ova vlada nije
jednostranačka, u njoj postoje različite stranke, jedan ministar je Bošnjak,
tako da bi bilo dobro da čujemo i od nekoga, da tako kažem, sa izvora, o svemu
tome. Potom, Sandžak, ovaj srpski deo Sandžaka, je multietnička regija, mislim
da bi bilo dobro da je došao neko i od predstavnika drugih nacionalnosti iz te
oblasti, ali, teško je sagledati celokupnu istinu, teško je skupiti sve aktere,
tako da je dobro makar što je izvršen jedan pokušaj, i sa ovakvim panelom ovako
kako je organizovan.

 

Ja bih rekao da u
proteklih 7 godina Srbija prolazi kroz veliki reformski pokušaj, možda jedan od
najvećih u svojoj istoriji i mislim da treba da predstavlja zadovoljstvo za
većinu graðana Srbije, odnosno za sve graðane Srbije, što u njemu
učestvuju i druge nacionalnosti. Neću da iskoristim onaj naziv manjinske,
mislim da je to besmisleno, dakle, učestvuju svi graðani. Posebno je dobro što
u velikoj koaliciji DOS i kasnije u svim vladama koje su usledile, je bilo i
predstavnika bošnjačkih stranaka. Ovde nije spomenuto, čak ovaj period od 2004.
godine je vrlo loše ocenjen, meðutim, eto, upravo 2004. godine je promenjen
onaj, ja ću reći manjkav izborni zakon, koji je omogućavao samo onim strankama
koje preðu census od 5 odsto da dobiju poslanike u parlamentu. Tako da, po prvi
put su i nacionalne zajednice koje u ukupnom stanovništvu Republike Srbije
broje manje od 5 odsto, dobile priliku da se naðu u parlamentu.

 

Ovde je jedan od
govornika spmenuo potrebu da bude izgraðena bošnjačka nacija u Srbiji. Ja moram
da kažem da proces izgradnje nacija ne vidim u vezi sa pitanjem sprovodjenja
ljudskih i graðanskih prava, zato što iskustva pokazuju da izgradnja nacija
nije nimalo blag proces i vrlo često, nažalost, nije demokratski proces. Tako
da, kada je većina evropskih nacija graðena u XIX veku, stvari su bile
drugačije: i onda, kad u nekom prostoru bude formirana država, i formiran
prosvetni sistem, onda bi se razne etničke grupe unifikovale u naciju. Početkom
XXI veka, u vreme elektronskih medija, u vreme, ‘ajde neću da kažem
stoprocentne pismenosti u Srbiji, ona nije stoprocentna, ali visokoprocentne
pismenosti, stvari nisu tako jednostavne i moramo da budemo oprezni da ne
prekršimo ljudska prava nekih ljudi, pravo ljudi da budu pripadnici do kraja
neizgradjenih nacija, koje je sada neosporno. Dakle, besmisleno je kritikovati
nekog srpskog funkcionera koji bi, srećom, ih više nema u vlasti, nekad rekao
da su Muslimani iz Bosne Srbi – muhamedanci, a onda podržati drugu osobu koja
je posle 2000. godine bila na vlasti u Srbiji, koja kaže da su Bunjevci
izmišljena grupa. Jednostavno, svako ima pravo da, ako ima odreðeni broj
graðana koji se osećaju kao Bunjevci, mislim da je to nesporno i mislim da to
treba podržati.

 

Ovde je spomenuto
pitanje verskih zajednica. Ja sam saglasan da kod nas tek treba da bude izgraðena
dobra zakonska regulativa i mislim da je to možda sreća u nesreći što poslednji
ulazimo u tranzicioni period, pošto možemo da uporedimo naše potrebe sa
uspešnim iskustvima drugih evropskih zemalja, naročito onih koje su nam susedne
i koje imaju veliki broj raznih verskih zajednica organizovanih meðu svojim
graðanima.

 

Dakle, ne bih
video neku veliku katastrofu u tome što je neki prednacrt zakonskog akta bio
loš, važno je da je u skupštinu došao predlog koji nije podržala samo jedna
monolitna stranka koja ima apsolutnu većinu, već je više stranaka taj zakon
podržala.

 

Ja nisam,
naravno, stručnjak za verska pitanja, meðutim, malo sam se obavestio kada je
počela ova kriza u Sandžaku, i zanimljivo je razmišljanje jednog
velikodostojnika Islamske verske zajednice, neću reći koje od ove dve, koji je
rekao da svi vernici muslimani u Srbiji, nisu Bošnjaci. I zaista, ako pogledate
statistike sa prošlog popisa, vi će te videti da u oblasti istorijskog Sandžaka
postoji čak 6,35 odsto, to je malo više od 27.000 graðana, koji tvrde da su
Muslimani po nacionalnosti. U ovom srpskom delu je malo manji to procenat,
negde je to oko 3,5 odsto, u crnogorskom je skoro 10 odsto, tačnije 9,88 odsto.
Želim da kažem da, jedna demokratska država ne treba da sprečava izgradnju jedne
nacije, ali ne treba ni da je podstiče. I jedno i drugo bi bilo kršenje
demokratskih prava.

 

Spomenute su dve
islamske zajednice u Srbiji. Ja sam nedavno slušao vrlo inspirativan intervju
koji je dao gospodin Oliver Potežica, on spominje, ja o tome zaista nisam
razmišljao, čak pet islamskih verskih zajednica u Srbiji, mi zaboravljamo da u
oblasti Preševa, Bujanovca i Medveðe postoji jedna organizovana zajednica
Albanaca koji su muslimani, i recimo, oni imaju čak dve zajednice, jedna se
zove Islamska zajednica Preševa, Bujanovca i Medveðe, njen predsednik
Džemaludin Hasani je svojevremeno izjavio, kako su, citiram: «…prošla ona
komunistička vremena kada je Islamska zajednica iz Sarajeva sve kontrolisala»!
Opet, on ima svog protivnika, izvesnog Tahira Mumina, koji je, čini mi se,
predsednik Islamske zajednice Kosova za Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveðu i sad,
zamislite, to je Islamska zajednica Kosova koja je nedavno pristupila Islamskoj
zajednici Srbije prema, opet, ovom citatu gospodina Potežice. Prema tome,
stvari vezane za verske zajednice su vrlo složene i bilo bi najbolje kada se
politika u njih ne bi mešala osim kao dobar servis. Dakle, država treba da
spreči sukobe, treba da spreči zloupotrebe, a najbolje bi bilo kada bi, meðu
vernima došlo do odreðenog sporazuma, jer, o suština je u tome da se verni meðu
sobom dogovore.

 

Ja sam svestan
činjenice i mislim da ne postoji niko u ovoj prostoriji ko se sa mnom ne bi
složio, da oblast Sandžaka predstavlja jednu od najnerazvijenijih oblasti
Republike Srbije. Meðutim, ne bih voleo da metodološki pogrešimo pa da standard
u Sandžaku poredimo sa, recimo, standardom u Čačku ili sa standardom, recimo, u
Beogradu. Kao što nije pošteno porediti standard u Kraljevu sa standardom u
Beogradu, tako i to, nije pošteno. Mi moramo da shvatimo, da u Srbiji
siromaštvo koje je, nažalost, preovlaðujuće naročito u oblastima na krajnjem
jugu i zapadu zemlje, nije etnički rasporeðeno. I to je opet jedan od paradoksa
prilika u Sandžaku, ekonomski napredak ostvaren je u vreme političke represije
devedesetih godina. Taj ekonomski napredak na žalost, njegovo zaustavljanje
koincidira sa početkom reformi i to je nešto o čemu treba razmišljati. Mi to
naravno nećemo sprečiti ako primenimo taj stari princip koji se primenjuje a to
je kada imate jednu zajednicu koja je ugrožena, koja je manjinska, ona uvek
kada je ugrožena i kada ima unutrašnje probleme, ona poziva na mobilizaciju
protiv nekoga trećeg. To ne može da donese neke velike koristi. U ovom trenutku
vrlo je teško reći da država sprovodi teror nad Bošnjacima, nad verskim
osećanjima u Sandžaku, ili nad političkim aketrima u sandžaku zato što obe
velike bošnjačke partije, ja mislim i nekoliko manjih su u vlasti. E, sad, mi
možemo kritikovati elitu, meðutim, ta elita ipak redovno dobija podršku na
izborima. Tako, ako kažemo da je Ustav loš, ja sam, recimo, kritikovao ovaj
ustav, sa drugih nekih pozicija u odnosu na većinu mojih predgovornika,
meðutim, u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srbije, koliko se sećam, niko nije
glasao protiv tog ustava, već je jedan broj poslanika bio odsutan, što govori o
tome da ipak, ako je demokratsko najvažniji argument za donošenje tog ustava,
to je postignuto. Ustav treba menjati tamo gde je loš, ali ne možemoi reći da
je to jedan nedemokratski ustav.

 

Želim da kažem i
da, kada je reč o pravima nacionalnih manjina ili konstitutivnih naroda, treba
razmišljati o poreðenju sa drugim situacijama. Ovde je izneto poreðenje sa
prilikama u Crnoj Gori, ja spadam u ljude koji nisu stručnjaci za kanonsko
pravo, i mislim da me to ne lišava prava da kažem nešto i o tome, mislim da je
osnovno pravo savih graðana da se verski organizuju kako god žele. Meðutim, u
Crnoj Gori situacija nije ista kao u Srbiji. Nije ista iz vrlo jednostavnog
razloga: pre svega, u Srbiji je došlo do podele unutar jedne regularne
hijerarhije Islamske verske zajednice. Kada je reč o Crnoj Gori, tamo je jedan
bivši svešttenik, u prvo vreme protiv volje države kasnije uz pomoć države, uz
pomoć laika, uz pomoć ljudi koji nisu u verskim strukturama bili prethodno
pravoslavne crkve, stvorio crku i ono što mene navodi na to da kažem da su
drugačije prilike, to je činjenica da su, čini mi se, jedan ili dva crkvena
objekta preuzeta od strane Srpske pravoislavne crkve odnosno mitropolije
Crnogorsko-primorske, a potom, tamo niti je počela liturgija, niti su, kada je
reč o manastiru, tu došli neki monasi. Prema tome, suština je bila u političkoj
potrebi da se spreči jedna crkva da ispoveda svoju veru. Ovde to nije tako.
Naravno, ako prihvatimo ove argumente koje sam izneo, to ne znači da je stanje
u Sandžaku dobro. Ne samo ekonomsko, političko stanje nije dobro. A tačno je,
treba izgraditi i ekonomsku i kulturnu elitu, pa nju treba izgraditi u
Beogradu, a kamoli u Novom Pazaru, ili u Nišu, ili u Leskovcu. Takoðe je tačno
da se nismo do kraja suočili sa dogaðajima iz devedesetih godina, meðutim,
moram, ja ne znam da li da kažem, reći ću u stvari, sa žalošću da primetim da
mi nismo se nigde suočili sa prošlošću. Dakle, tamo gde ona nije opterećena
etničkim sukobima, tamo gde ona nije opterećena kontroverzama, mi se nismo sa
njom suočili. Podsetiću, od 2000. godine do danas, jedini iskorak je učinjen
posle one naše velike tragedije kada je ubijen prvi demokratski premijer, tada
je jedan broj ljudi osuðen za neka dela koja su do kraja rasvetljena posle
operacije «Sablja». Inače, da se nije taj nesrećni slučaj dogodio, verovatno ne
bismo imali pravdu gotovo nigde, osim kada je reč o žrtvama u RTS-u i činjenice
da je osuðen bivši direktor RTS-a.

 

 

 

Miroslav
Filipović, novinar

 

Sandžak je u
poslednjih nekoliko decenija u veoma čvrstom zagrljaju srpskih tajnih službi,
najpre jugoslovenskih a sada srpskih, s tim što bih ja tu izbegao, jer nema
potrebe da govorim o onome što je legalno i legitimno i na šta svaka država ima
pravo, pa i ova naša, dakle, ja bih da mi govorimo o onom segmentu koji može da
predsatavlja neku zloupotrebu korišćenja tajnih službi na jednom ovakvom
području. Sandžak je dugo bio pod dominantnom kontrolom tzv. «zelenih» službi,
odnosno vojnih službi bezbednosti, odnosno kontraobaveštajne službe. To je
naročito postalo značajno, govorim o Sandžaku, kada se Sandžak našao na granici
nove države, dakle, kada je bivša socijalistička Jugoslavija prestala da
postoji pa je onda postojala Savezna Republika Jugoslavija i Sandžak više nije
bio u sredini nego se našao na kraju i, što je posebno interesantno, našao se
usred kontinuiteta rasporostranjenosti muslimanskog, odnosno bošnjačkog naroda.
Tako da ste, od one bivše granice sa turskom državom na rečici Piloreta kad se
izaðe iz Raške i krene ka Novom Pazaru, maltene do Cazinske krajine imali
tampon većinski nastanjen Bošnjacima. To je proglašeno strašnim remetilačkim
faktorom za srpski nacionalni cilj, i onaj čudovišni plan «potokovica» o kome
se nekad više, nekad manje a nekad uopšte ne govori, upravo je započet na
desnoj obali Drine, da bi se prekinuo, da bi se ta traka većinske
rasprostranjenosti bošnjačkog naroda, prekinula, pa da neko slučajno ne zatraži
za bošnjački narod isto ono što su nacionalisti u Srbiji, predvoðeni
Miloševićem, naravno, tražili za srpski narod, znači, ono gde su Srbi većina da
to bude Srbija. Nema veze da li je to Knin, da li je to Banija, znači, sve osim
Slovenije, pretpostavilo se da će možda postojati mogućnost da to traže i
Bošnjaci, a koliko se ja sećam, Sulejman Ugljanin je početkom devedesetih to
isto i tražio. Ja sam tada radio jedan intervju sa njim i znam da je on, vrlo
se dobro sećam te rečenice, da Bošnjaci Sandžaka traže isto ono što Srbi traže
za Knin i za Kninsku krajinu. Dakle, desna obala Drine je potpuno očišćena od
Bošnjaka i, verovali ili ne, posledice tog plana i tog čišćenja i danas
postoje. I danas neko ne dozvoljava Bošnjacima iz tih sela na desnoj obali
Drine u opštini Priboj da se vrate u svoja sela. Dakle, čak i ona najbolja
vlast koju smo imali, vlast Zorana Ðinðića, nije gotovo ništa uradila da se to
poništi, te posledice tog zaista čudovišnog plana «potkovica». Delovi tog plana
su i ove otmice o kojima govorimo, Sjeverin, Štrpce, kada je trebalo zastrašiti
bošnjački narod da bi on jednostavno pobegao glavom bez obzira. Ali, to je
jedna jako široka tema, jedna druga tema, samo sam je napomenuo kao početak
novog poglavlja u interesovanju tajnih službi za Sandžak.

 

Naravno, kada je
JNA prestala da postoji a sa njom i njena tajna služba, onda su na neki način
primat preuzele tzv. «plave» tajne službe, odnosno poilicijske, i gotovo sve
što je svaka vlast počev od devedesetih godina, pa do dan danas radila u
Sandžaku, govorim o vlasti iz Beograda, radi se po savetu, nekad i po diktatu,
iz tih struktura. Znači, ako su premijer Živković i ministar Gašo Knežević
otišli na noge muftiji Zukorliću i odneli mu dozvolu za rad Internacionalnog
univerziteta, onda su to učinili zato što im je iz tajnih službi savetovano da
to tako treba i da je to korisno za, šta ja znam, državu Srbiju. Ako je sada
dozvoljeno da se osnuje nova islamska zajednica, govorim o Islamskoj zajednici
Srbije za razliku od Islamske zajednice u Srbiji onda je to zato što je neko
zaključio da je uticaj Moamer efendije do te mere porastao da mora malo da mu
se nešto uskrati jer, znate, 120 džamija, pa onda Internacionalni univerzitet,
pa onda Fakultet za islamske studije, pa se navodno priprema islamska akademija
nauka i umetnosti, pa se navodno priprema važno mesto za Novi Pazar i za
Sandžak u osnivanju nekog evropskog Al-Azhara, najvišeg Islamskog univerziteta
sa sedištem u Kairu.

 

Kad govorimo o
uticaju tajnih službi, ovde je više govornika pomenulo pismo Moamer efendije u
kome on od državnih organa traži dosijea ljudi iz Islamske zajednice koji rade
za «službu». Da sam na mestu Moamer efendije ne bih se ja previše hvatao za to,
jer, može tu da dobije razna dosijea, naravno, neće ih dobiti, a ustvari hoću
da kažem da «služba» podjednako radi svugde. Jer, ja znam, pošto sam 20. godina
kao novinar u Sandžaku, «pokrivam» Sandžak, da se isto to pričalo i za njega,
pa za onaj Nacionalni kongres Bošnjaka koji je negde krajem devedesetih osnovan
kao politička partija, pa, onda, za ovu islamsku zajednicu Preševa, ovu seperatističku,
da je takoðe osnovana po savetu «službe», čak je «služba» navodno i tadašnjeg
muftiju Nedžedina Saćipija postavila za muftiju… Hoću da kažem da su tajne
službe tamo prisutne, ali isto kažem – pa šta ako su prisutne? One su prisutne
svugde, ne bih se iznenadio da su i ovde, meðu nama prsutne, to je jednostavno
način života u postkomunističkim društvima, da li ćemo se mi i kada ćemo se
toga osloboditi ja zaista ne znam, da li «službe» i u kojoj meri
zloupotrebljavaju svoju funkciju, to je sad jedno jako komplikovano, jako
složeno pitanje, ima tu puno mistifikacije, nije sve to tako kao što izgleda:
na kraju, «služba» ima i pravo, ona je osnovana po zakonima ove zemlje, ona ima
svoje mesto.

 

Granica izmeðu
upotrebe i zloupotrebe je jako delikatna i sigurno se na ovakvim vrstama
skupova nećemo približiti svemu tome, ali, ne bih se mnogo hvatao za to da neki
moji politički protivnici rade za «službu». Jer, isto to oni i tvrde za mene, a
kakve Muslimani vole da kažu, «jedino Alah zna kako to sve stoji i šta je sve
tačno»!

 

 

 

MEŠA SLEZOVIÆ,
umetnik: SANDŽAK – POSLEDICE REPRESIVNE POLITIKE DRŽAVE

 

Manjine, više
nisu tema zvančne politike

 

Opšte uverenje da
je pložaj manjina u načalu rešen uz neka sitnija zakonska akta koja treba da
budu donesena i da je taj položaj u skladu sa najvišim meðunarodnim
standardima. Nedavna aktualizacija položaja maðrske manjine, permanentna slika
crnih hronika u Sandžaku kao da demantuje ove ocene. Po svoj prilici, manjine
su i dalje predmet političkih strategija i svojevrsnih političkih
instrumentalizacija. Sanðačka stvarnost je više nego zanimljiva u tom pogledu.

 

Već iz same teme,
jasno je, koliko je to jedno kompleksno područje. Njime se mogu baviti
specijalisti različitih struka od psihijatara i psihologa, preko ekonomista i
pravnika, do istoričara, politikologa i političara. Ostaje iprostora i za one
koji se bave pitanjima duha, dakle recimo sociologa kulture, religije, do
kulturnih stvaralaca i etnologa.

 

I to sa posebnim
razlogom, jer je Sandžak jedan izrazito zanimljiv region, sa vrlo osobenim
karakteristikama.

 

Ono što, ovoj
temi, daje posebnu aktuelnost jeste činjenica da se represija države ovde
pojavljuje ne kao incident već više konstanta politike. Naravno u različitim
oblicima, i sa vrlo sofisticiranim straregijama u zavisnosti od trenutne
političke situacje, oblika države u odreðenom istorijskom trenutku, do izvesnih
stereotipa ali i konstanti koje su oblikovale odnos prema ovom prostoru.

 

Jedna stvar
nedvosmisleno potvrðuje ove stavove: permanentno iseljavnje iz ove oblasti,
njegova već poslovična zabačenost i zapuštenost kao i konstanta neadekvatnog
političkog rešenja za ovaj prostor.

 

Sandžak je
istorijska regija. Po svojim kulturnim i istorijskim slojevima ne samo da je
multikulturan i multikonfesionalan već i inerkulturalan, što bi značilo da se
kulturni religijski i etnički supstrati ovde u najboljem smislu prožimaju
gradeći i jedan opšti, zajednički identitet ovog prostora i njegovih žitelja.
Ova činjenica je značajna za ve političke procese koji su se ovde odvijali, za
sve državne projekte koji su uglavnom loše eksperimentisali sa ovim prostorom,
za sve političke strategije koje se su se ovde isprobavale. Istovremeno je i
važan, ali isto tako i bez važnosti. Ove koordinate paradoksa, u velikoj meri
odreðivale su njegovu sudbinu i položaj.

 

U ovom uvodnom
delu, naglasio bih nekoliko elemenata koji daju ton aktuelnom stanju, pri čemu
hoću posebno naglasiti interaktivan odnos lokalnih političkih subjekata i
državne politike, odnosno njenih institucija u procesu današnjeg, iliti
savremenog izgleda Sandžaka i njegovih žitelja. Danas je to jedna veoma
dinamična slika. Sa pozicije pitanja identiteta Bošnjaka i identiteta Sandžaka
koje još uvek nije skinuto sa dnevnog reda moglo bi se reći, da se uočavaju
procesi koji idu za tim da dovode u pitanje mnoge već standardne ocene i
osobenosti.

 

Prenaglašavanje
islamske paradigme i unutarnjih procesa vrenja unutar nje

 

Nije problem u
islamskoj zajednici, koliko je problem u neuspešnosti drugih paradigmi –
ekonomskoj ali i političkoj. Drugi slojevi pkazuju svoju neuspešnost i
neifikasnost .

 

Stvoren je širok
vakum u koji je uskočila religija, kao sloj identiteta, ali i kao
institucionalna struktura sa širim ambicijama. Kulturna dimenzija Bošnjaka se
ne može ni u kom smislu svesti samo na ovu paradigmu, ali svim prvidima uprkos
ni islamski sloj kulturnog identiteta ne pogaða srž problema. Izmeðu bošnjačkog
nacionalnog individualizma i islamskog kosmopolitizma, izmeðu bošnjačkog
evropejstva i orjentalnog islamstva, zjapi prazan duhovni prostor u koji se sve
više uvlači strano telo – pseudovehabizam. Podseto bih na briljantnu
opservaciju Farida Zakarije u njegovoj studiji „O budućnosti slobode“, u kojoj
on pokazuje da islam kao islam nije globalni problem već da je to Bliski istok.
U nekoj odviše hipotetičkoj i od stvarnosti dalekoj opservaciji, moglo bi se
razmišljati i o izvesnim namerama izvesnih interesa da se i ove evropske
muslimanske enklave uvuku u vrtlog bliskoistočnog koflikta. Do nedavno se
govorilo o reislamizaciji muslimana. Nije se govorilo ni o kakvoj
reislamizaciji. U tom smislu i novija dešavanja u okviru islamske zajednice
dobijaju kudikamo šire i ozbiljnije rezonance i reperkusije iako se radi o
nekim sasvim banalnim, lokalnim političkim zahtevima, koji, naravno imaju vrlo
štetne posledice i koji vremenom mogu izazvati veoma ozbiljne i razorne efekte.
Mudra državna politika, nikako ne bi podsticala raskole, ne bi učestvovala u
njima, imala bi partnerski odnos sa ovom vrlo značajnom institucijom koja je i
verska i nacionalna i kulturna po svom sadržaju. Iz jednostavnog razloga, što
sva ta previranja samo proširuju prostor za nekontrolisanu provlu svakovrsnih
verskih i ideoloških učenja koja mogu biti vrlo saglasna sa nekim ekstremnim
islamističkim tendencijama. Dakle, igra oko urušavanja jedne ovakve institucije
može biti vrlo ozbiljna i opasna.

 

Ustavni okvir

 

Usvajanje jednog
neevroskog, u suštini dnevnopoitičkog, nekonzistentnog najvišeg zakonskog akta,
koji se, uprkos činjenici da se dobrim delom bavi pitanjima manjina, kreirala
sasvim nova pravna pozicija položaja nacionalnih manjina. Ona se više može
posmatrati u svetlu diskontinuiteta, nego li kontinuiteta sa politikom prema
nacionalnim majinama do trenutka donošenja novog ustava.

 

U kojoj su meri
konstituent u državi koja je po definiciji istovremeno i nacionalna i
graðanska, a u kojoj meri su i, čija su nacionalna manjina, jer po definiciji
BOSNA NIJE NACIONLNA DRŽAVA BOŠNJAKA, sandžački Bošnjaci koji se ne mogu
identifikovati ni sa jednom državom kao matičnom. Oni su time nacionalna
manjina sopstvene države koja nije njihova po NACIONALNOJ definiciji i u kojoj
su samo graðani. Ovim je stvoren okvir njihove de facto neravnopravnosti
iz koje će proizaći mnoge strukturane i pravne konsekvence. Važno je podsetiti
da je ČIN donošenja ustav bio čin jasne političke diversifikacije unutar
političkih subjekata bošnjačke manjine, na one koji su pozivali na podržavanje
i onih koji su bojkotavali ovaj čin. Uverenje je da narod nije podržao ovaj ustav
i da ga nije prepoznao adekvatnim okvirom svog statusa.

 

Politički
okvir

 

Potraga za
izgubljenim identitetom–šizofrena situacija cepanja bića i identiteta
sandžačkih Bošnjaka kroz dihotomije
istočno-zapadno-balkansko-orjentalno-evropsko, savremeno i prošlo, nedostaje
JASNA VIZIJA u situaciji kada se kulturni prostor sve više duhovno prazni,
aspekti konstruktivne kulturne politike gotovo i ne postoje. Ne sagledava se ni
jasna vizija budućnosti nacionalnog razvoj i afirmacije (dileme
multikulturalizma i interkulturalizma).

 

Demokratija sa
svim obeležjima neliberalne demokratije, autokratija, segregacija
PARTIOkratija, totalitarizam na mikroplanu. Zatvaranje okvira, što je OČIT
PRIMER GUBLJENA SLOBODE I GETOIZACIJE PRED LOKALNIM VLASTODRŠCIMA.

 

Svojevrsni
eksperiment

 

Sa stanovišta
označene teme, represije i posledica, aktuelna slika stanja ocrtavala bi
konture svojevrsnog eksperimenta. Postavljene u položaj marginalnih grupa,
manjine sve više postaju poligon značajan kao baza sigurnih glasova pojedinih
političkih stranaka, i to, paradoksalno, ne onih koje po definiciji jesu
manjinske i regionalne već onih glavnih aktera na plitičkoj sceni. Regionalni
ili manjinski predznak samo je kulisa za prikupljanje glasova, dok se
autentični interesi gube u nekim nejasnim računicama i partikularnim
interesima. Uspostavljena je čudna saradnja izmeðu predstavnika manjinskih
zajednica i reprezenata države, pa čak i onih politika, čije su manjine bile
žrtve. Radi se o fenomenu STADA i Pastira. Otuda je razobličavanje ove
politike, i ovih relacija, veoma važno za uspostavljanje liberalne demokratije.
Politička realnost demaskira vazalnost ispod granica dostojanstva. Servilnost i
vazalstvo pokazuje se u svetlu sentence da služiti znači vladati. Otuda i
intencija da pojedinci budu zmena za preko potrebne mnjinske institucije. Tim
gore, jer se radi o lažnim autoritetima koji su samo degradacija i stvarnih
interesa manjina i njihovog realnog položaja.

 

Iz brojnih fakata
sa terena sandžačke svakodnenice, nameće se utisak da su sandžački Bošnjaci,
stavljeni u orbitu, NIMALO SVOJOM VOLJOM NITI SVOJIM INTERESOM, antizapadne i
antievropske politike, koja se globalno pokazuje, a lokalno aktualizuje, da je
pažljivo pripremana i uslovljena, i da su protekle godine otvorene represije,
pripremile plodno tle. Zato sve više postaje vidljiva uloga nekih do skora
neprikosnovenih političkih autoriteta, u vrlo problematičnom svetlu, koje ih
sve više kompromituje kao aktivne sudionike takve politike i njihove
instrumentalizacije. Fenomen kukavičijeg jajeta ostaje oprobani mehanizam. Na
tamnom ekranu sandžačke svakodnevnice, sve se jasnije oslikava politički profil
nekih od ovih lidera, što čini da njihova do skoro neprikosnovena svetla slika
sve više tamni. Zaziranje od aktuelnih dešavanja, običnog graðanina sve više
stavlja u poziciju pasivnog posmatrača, da se njegova neiskazana volja sve
jasnije krivotvori. Sandžak sve više klizi graničnim tačkama koje
obesmišljavaju svaki demoratski proces. Hoće li ovaj proces dovesti do promena
postojećeg stanja ili će se produžiti u beskraj, čini se i nije više volja
glasača, graðana, pripadnika manjinske zajednice, već političke volje države,
njenih službi i delotvornosti strategije servilnosti i vazastva, koja se, kako
se vidi, dobro pokazala. U dobrobit i ličnu korist predstavnika političke elite
a sve na štetu graðana, koji više u politici i ovoj lokalnoj modifikaciji
neliberalne demokratije ne prepoznaju svi okvir političkog ispoljavanja. Nije
li to tačka kojoj se i težilo, krajnje ponižavanje uloge, mesta i položaja,
manjinskih zajednica i njihovog udela u politici država u kojima žive. Čini se
da primer Srbije to odlično pokazuje. Ali, ne treba prevashodno kriviti DRŽAVU
I NJENU VLADU. Biće da je odgovornost mnogo veća samih navodnih manjiskih političkih
prestavnika.Oni se ne moraju tako ponašati, iako im je nametnut takav okvir. A
i manjina, koje se ne moraju saglasiti sa ovakvim položajem. U slučaju
Bošnjaka, pogotovo ne. Čini mi se ipak da tačka preokreta i nije tako daleko.

 

Time se i pitanja
identiteta lišavju svakog stvarnog smisla i sadržaju, a potvrðujuoni poznati
stihovi ,,Vuk na ovcu svoje pravo ima’’.

 

Hoće li Aska,
odigrati svoj ples do kraja ili će pasti u čeljusti krvožednog vuka, hoće li
prepoznati naći dobronamernog pastira, ili će se predati, videćemo. ASKA IZ
Andrićeve pripovetke poučna je u svakom pogledu. Ali ne bih baš da idem tako
daleko u analizi ove metafore .

 

 

 

Ramiz
Crnišanin, advokat

 

Posle rata,
Drugog svetskog rata, jedan naš stari adžo, sretne Voju Lekovića i kaže: «Vi
komunisti ste prije rata govorili da je Sandžak bogu iza leða. Kome je sad on,
kad vi ne verujete u boga, kome je sada iza leða?» A on (Leković) kaže: «Neće
više biti iza leða»!

 

A stvarno je
ostao i dalje iza leða.

 

Ipak, treba
promijeniti neke stereotipe i o Sandžaku i o Bošnjacima. Nije Sandžak ono što
je nekada bio. Kad sam ja završio malu maturu 1941. godine, samo je 28
bošnjačke, tada muslimanske dece bilo u gimnaziji novopazarskoj. Sreten
Vukosavljević je pisao, od devet ukinutih gimnazija, četiri su iz Sandžaka.
Tamo ih nije ni bilo dosta, više gimnazija je ukinuto, tako da su morali i Srbi
i Muslimani, da idu u druge gradove, Kraljevo, naravno, Muslimani su išli u
Prizren i tamo gde ima muslimanskog življa.

 

Danas mi imamo
gotovo stoprocentnu pismenost; u Sandžak se stiže iz najudaljenijih krajeva
Srbije za 4-5 sati, danas ima mobilnih telefona na stotine hiljada, ima samo u
Novom Pazaru 30.000 automobila ima dva univerziteta i privatni i državni, tri
zapravo, ima i Karićev, ima više od 6.000 studenata, ima… kažem, da ne bi
slika bila crna… struktura se promenila, promenili su se odnosi i mora sa
time da se računa. Danas postoje političke stranke i zašto bi Bošnjaci bili
nešto drugo od drugih i zašto se dramatizuju sukobi meðu Bošnjacima kad tih
sukoba ima kod svih naroda? Ali, ono što ne valja – u Srbiji 40 odsto birača
koji glasaju za socijaliste i za radikale, kažu da smo mi izmišljena brozovska
nacija. I zovu nas Turcima. E, to je ono što kod Bošnjaka, većine, nema više
problema jesu li ili nisu Bošnjaci. Ja sam nekim mojim prijateljima, još u ono
komunističko doba, ja sam tada bio funkcioner, pa mi kažu … «… ma šta ‘oćeš
ti, Musliman, ti si Srbin muslimanske vere» a ja velim: «.. pa kad sam Srbin
muslimanske vere, što mi ne psuješ srpsku majku muslimanske vere, nego sve
tursku ti majku»!!?

 

Izvinjavam se što
to kažem. Ali to je činjenica. Pogledajte, molim vas, naslove knjiga u
knjižarama, pogledajte koliko ima islamofobije i antimuslimanstva,
antibošnjaštva, a to mora da se sprečava, ne samo našom akcijom, bošnjačkom. Ja
znam da ne možemo mi kriviti samo «udbu», državu…. Mi moramo da trčimo k'o
Alisa u zemlji čuda da bi stajali na istom mestu. To je naša sudbina. Ali, ono
što država mora da čini to je da se te razlike bar ne povećavaju. Da se one
smanjuju, ako je moguće, ili bar da se ne povećavaju. A razlike su i u pogledu
zapošljavanja i u pogledu svega ostalog – ne bih ponavljao ovo što je već
rečeno.

 

Drugo – treba
ispraviti one nepravde koje država može da ispravi. Evo, recimo, otmica
Muslimana u Sjeverinu, paljevina kuća u Kukurovićima i tako dalje. Mi smo
podneli tužbu protiv države da se nadoknadi šteta porodicama koje su sve
izgubile. Prvi opštinski sud doneo presudu, kaže – zastarelo. A to je izvršeno
krivičnim delom, ne može da bude zastarelo. Ono zastareva za ono vreme za koje
krivično delo zastareva. Meðutim, nisu voljni da isprave očigledne činjenice.
E, to su te stvari za koje ne treba mnogo, treba samo volje. E, sada, tu mi
imamo pet poslanika u skupštini, dva s jedne strane, dva s druge, obe su u
istoj koaliciji, oni moraju da sednu pa da vide šta će da rade u toj skupštini.
Da se sastanu, ne da optužuju jedni druge, nego da kažu: ovo je nacionalni
interes Bošnjaka iz Sandžaka, ne samo Bošnjaka nego i Srba i drugih, tu moramo
da budemo zajedno, tu da radimo. Imamo ministra, imamo potpredsednika,
potpredsednik narodne skupštine Republike Srbije nikad nije bio Bošnjak. I mi
više ne možemo da se žalimo da nismo zastupljeni – jesmo. Ali mi birači treba
da ih nateramo da se ponašaju onako kako treba.

 

E, sad, ja kad
govorim o Bošnjacima, o tom identitetu, treba da se razbijaju stereotipi, ja
očekujem jednu daleko veću podršku inteligencije u Srbiji, srpske
inteligencije, srpskih naučnih krugova. Politika sada gotovo da je ista
kao i onda kada smo imali «odjeke i reagovanja» za vreme Miloševića. Molim vas
lepo, tu moramo da dobijemo podršku. Jer, zna se da u Bosni nije bila izvršena
diferencijacija na nacionalnoj, nego na verskoj osnovi. Vuk (Stefanović
Karadžić) je govorio o turskom zakonu i o hrišćanskom zakonu. Meðu hrišćanima
nije bilo razlike na Srbe i na Hrvate, nego na katolike i pravoslavce. Pa je
Ilija Garašanin poslao sto i nešto agenata preobučenih u popove da agituju za
izjašnjavanje da se u pravoslavnim crkvama pravoslavci izjašnjavaju kao Srbi, a
franjevci su to uradili za Hrvate i tu se izvršila diferencijacija. Ostali su
muslimani koji su proglašeni Turcima, balijama i tako dalje. To je to, što se
očekuje od naučne, stručne, kulturne i druge javnosti srpske, progresivne, da u
tom smislu rade, a ne da proglašavamo ove ili one verske zajednice.

 

Da napomenem,
sedam godina je Alžir vodio borbu protiv Francuza. Francuzi nisu mogli da naðu
nikog da im ubace u oslobodilački pokret. Čim su se oslobodili, oni, evo, šta
rade, biju se k'o žuti mravi. Prema tome, hoću da kažem, da se mora voditi
računa, s jedne strane, da se pruži podrška ovim institucijama koje su nikle
tamo a to su škole, univerziteti… S druge strane, da se pruži podrška da se u
programima razvoja ne gleda se Sandžak kao neko telo, strano telo, kao neko
remetilačko telo koje će sada da dovede do uništenja srpske ili crnogorske
države. O tome smo govorili dosta, da se ja ne bih ponavljao, nego da se
zajedničkim akcijama i državnih organa a u prvom redu Bošnjaka koji su tamo i
zastupljeni u državnim institucijama, bilo kao poslanici, bilo kao predsednici
bilo kojih tela, da tamo rade, a ako ne treba, neka im birači otkažu poverenje
na izborima, pa neka ostanu tamo. Svakoj policiji na svetu je drago kad naðe da
radi nekog posla, kako da joj neće biti drago da iskoristi sukobe. Crnogorci su
podelili bošnjačko telo na tri dela: na Muslimane, na Bošnjake i na
Crnogorce-Mmuslimane. Jer, tamo je bilo 15 odsto Muslimana koji su se
izjašnjavali, 15 odsto Muslimana, 9 odsto Albanaca, 30 odsto Srba i nema
samostalne Crne Gore. Morali su da stvaraju razdore. Naravno da će to da radi
svaka država. To rade i sada. Još pre, neko je govorio (Pavel D.) zašto nije
došlo do podrške, šire srpskog naroda Muslimanima onih godina kad je bilo
nasilja: pa nije jer je još od prije, Osme sednica (CK SKS), počela je jedna
intenzivna psihološka priprema srpskog naroda da bi se opravdalo nasilje koje
će se vršiti posle. On rano ujutro pusti pesmu «…ubiću te Mujo!» I kako onda
da to dete koje sluša od obdaništa takve pesme da drugačije misli. Na taj način
je govorila ona Ljiljana Bulatović, i danas ona dobija mesto, i danas na
Pravnom fakultetu u Beogradu drže zborove. Pa onaj vlasnik «Jurišnika» osuðen
je na Nirnberškom procesu na vešala i presuda je izvršena, zato što je širio
antisemitizam u svom listu. Niko od naših novinara ni zašta nije dosad osuðen,
ni ona Baletić, ni iko drugi. A samo uzmite naslove, šta je tada pisano, što ni
pas s maslom ne bi pojeo.

 

Šta da vam kažem
još!? Mi se tamo, u Sandžaku, borimo se za ove pravce o kojima je govoro
Slezović, o kojima je govorio gospodin Mirko Ðorðević, gospodin Filipović i
svi.
 

 

SANDŽAK:
CONSEQUENCES OF REPRESSIVE STATE POLICY

 

Panel
Discussion

 

Sonja Biserko:

 

We think that it is
very important to discuss the situation in Sandzak at this moment of time, for
Sandzak seems one of the potentially most vulnerable spots, in view of a
continuing, deep political and social crisis in

Serbia . This is primarily due to
the fact that Sandžak made part of Bosnia-related war progam. Such a thesis is
confirmed by the state terror campaign in and its stranglehold on Sandzak in
the early 90’s, and especially, during the war in

Bosnia .

 

Absence of political
capacity of the incumbent Serb state leadership to face up to the genuine
problems of this society, including the state wrongdoing in Sandžak, has
motivated us to raise the gist of issue of Sandžak, as a very specific region
in Serbia. Unfortunately, democratic authorities also worked in a very
organized way on thwarting a more solid constituting of the Bosniak community.
Hence a perpetual crisis in Sandžak in recent years.

 

Let me remind you that
Bosniaks are a new minority in

Serbia
. They have emerged in the post-SFRY disintegration, and have very little
capacity to build/constitute their own infrastructure, that is, identity. On
the other hand,

Belgrade
deftly used that shortcoming of theirs to break-up the Sandžak political and
social scene. Though religion was the only cohesive element among the Bosniaks,

Belgrade also
managedt to divide them along those religious lines, thanks to the
aforementioned weaknesses.

 

The Wahabi phenomenon
served to renew the thesis of a dire danger of the Islamic fundamentalism,
which, according to recent reiteration of Milorad Ekmecic, had caused the
break-up of

Yugoslavia
. Hyping and spinning of the Wahabi danger has gotten out of proportion. Such vilification
campaign peaked by the filing of indictment against 15 Wahabis to face trial
soon. In view of the foregoing a resurgence of the anti-Muslim articles, like
the one penned by Ljiljana Bulatović, “Muslims, Islam, Jihad, Mujaheddins in
the Balkans” is not surprising.

 

Security services in
Sandžak were and are still tasked with a continued destabilizing of the region.
That task is carried out through generating strife between Bosniak leaders,
while during the war in

Bosnia
, it was actively engaged in ethnic-cleansing of the region in line with the
thesis of a “Green Transversal”. After ouster of Milosevic, the new, democratic
governments did very little to neutralize the effects of work of those
services.

 

And finally there is
also the issue of
Europe ’s treatment of
Islam, which in our view should be on an equal footing with other religions.
Historically Islam was perceived as a political foe, and on that view
Europe also built its political identity.
Europe ’s position on Muslims in general (and on the
European Muslims in particular) shall have a major impact on the position of
the Balkans Muslims.

 

 

 

Pavel Domonji:

Sandžak: Consequences of repressive policy

 

Repressive policy is by definition a policy
with a strong reliance on non-political means, which as such leaves in its wake
terrible consequences, notably devastation, casualties, fear and uncertainty.
Let me remind you that Sandzak Bosniaks during the period of disintegration of
Yugoslavia were exposed to a veritable terror campaign: abductions,
liquidations, various forms of violence, intimidation, harassment and
destruction of their property were commonplace. When speaking about
consequences of that repressive policy we must have in mind several facts,
notably that a forcible break-up of Yugoslavia led to the change of status of
Muslims, who from the people, morphed into an unrecognized and disenfranchised
national minority, with all the problems stemming from such a status; secondly,
ethnically motivated violence deepened ethnic-cultural fissures in Sandžak and
provoked inter-ethnic tensions, and thirdly, elimination-minded policy on the
one hand, and brutal denials of their identity on the other hand, made Bosniaks
strive to emphasize strongly distinct features of their identity. In
consequence the issue of integration of the Bosniak community proper emerged.

 

Aside from those there are other note-wothy
problems, notably the economic lagging-behind of Sandžak, the media
vilification of the region as «a legal wilderness» in which all criminal and
illegal activities are rife, and the problem of political criminalization of
the demand that Sandzak be arranged as a distinct territorial-political unit.
As regards this last problem, one should underscore that no serious and open
discussion with political authorities has been initiated on this issue, and that
no consensus on that issue was reached among Sanžak inhabitants.

 

The post-5 October period brought significant
psychological relief and strengthened the Bosniak conviction that participation
in building of democratic order would help them attain in an easier way their
fundamental interests. The foregoing primarily concerned the process of
nation-bulding and meeting of demands that justice be dispensed, that is, that
masterminds and organizers of crimes against Bosniaks be punished. In talks
which members of the Helsinki Committee had some time ago with Bosniak
representatives, the latter underscored that they would measure the Serb
society's readiness to fully clarify crimes- and thus make a clean break with
Milosevic era policy- by the extent to which Bosniak claims for justice were
met. I think it would be only right to conclude that Bosniaks in trials held so
far did not see the Serb political readiness to try all those involved in
crimes. They also did not see a manifest and resolute will on part of Serbia or
its politicians to condemn the state policy of ethnic-cleansing, as it was
called by the late Šefko Alomerović.

 

As regards «nation-building», members of the
Bosniak minority face a host of problems , by the way, typical of all the
newly-emerged minorities. The most salient problem is shortage of institutions
necessary for preservation and development of culture and national identity.
This deficit may be explained by a tragical experience of Bosniaks, for in
circumstances of full-blown nationalism, chauvinism and ethnic-cleansing, the
survival issue suppressed all the other issues, even those relating to the
building of the Bosniak community.

 

Cultural and political elites play a key role
in «nation-building». Both elites articulate position of members of their own
group on issues encroaching on the vital national interests. My limited
assessment is that the cultural elite of Sandžak Bosniaks is weak and
sidelines, devoid of stable and firm institutional strongholds. In Sandžak. For
example, there are no independent magazines, through which both the local
cultural elite and intelligentsia would critically reflect develoments within
the local community in Sandžak, but also in Serbia proper.

 

Public arena is totally dominated by the
political elite. But the problem with that elite lies in the fact that it is
totally antagonized, divided, burdened by conflicts, vanities and ambitions of
leaders, who speak as the only and genuine representatives of their nation. And
in places in which parties and their leaders see themselves as the only
authentic representatives and advocates of national interests, in places in
which parties and their leaders cannot resist the lure and call of
authoritarianism, in such places there is no will, room or possibility for
constituting of parties as liberal, and tolerant actors, above all averse to
the use of non-political means.

 

So the wish of political actors to maximalize
their influence and power produces some negative spin-offs. Deepening and
radicalization of conflicts opens the door to the use of violence in politics.
In other ethnic communities there are also conflicts between political actors,
but what marks out the conflicts within the Bosniak political body is
their-brutality. In view of the use of tools characteristic of another kind of
conflict by those parties, it is not surprising that some civil organizations
suggest banning for ten years the work of Bosniak political parties, because
„of their use of violence and hate speech.“ Secondly, the local political
conflict is slowly being spilled out into other spheres of life, and we are
increasingly witnessing that phenomenon. Emergence of Wahabis only compounds
those problems, for it leads to escalation of clashes between
already-antagonized options. And finally intra-Bosniak conflicts enable their
protagonists both in and outside Sandzak to get involved to a lesser or greater
degree in those conflicts, and channel, re-direct and dose them in line with
their own, particular interests. For example, the confronted sides very
frequently try to discredit each other by launching smear campaigns, that is,
by labelling each other as exponents of secret, informal structures, power
centres, the Security-Informative Agency, and various cabinets. However, those
remarks are to a certain extent grounded, for the state security and
information agencies are not neutral in conflicts taking place elsewhere. Let
me remind you of accusations of similar kind which Bunjevci and Croats hurl at
each other in Vojvodina.

 

Conflicts and brutalization thereof produce a
host of detrimental consequences:

 

1.                 
they make more difficult the process of internal and external –in the global
society- integration of Bosniak community; 2. they make more difficult the
constituting of the Bosniak community as a mature nation; 3. they slow down
modernization process; 4. they strengthen prejudices about Sandžak as a
radicalization-prone and democracy-negating region.

 

Conflicts do not favour ordinary Bosniaks and
the poor in the labour market, but they are useful for the party oligarchies
and political class in Belgrade, for conflicts decrease the local pressure for
an accelerated decentralization, more efficient implementation of reforms,
swifter European integrations, facing up to the past, a more resolute
co-operation with the Hague Tribunal, etc.

 

If the state earlier generated repression, who
should then give democratization incentives in this moment of time? In the
post-communist times civilian society has taken on that task. In Serbia
civilian society played that role well by ousting Milosevic. However, it now
faces a long, painstaking work on democracy-building, and also in education of
the general populace for democracy. But on this point it bears stressing that
civilian society in Sandžak is weak, repressed, faced with chronic shortage of
funds, burdened by numerous problems, and misunderstanding of the state bodies.
But even such civilian society in Sandzak is still better than the political
society and hence deserving of all kinds of support.

 

 

 

Samiha Kačar, Sandžak Committee for Human
Rights:

 

Sandžak,
which is currently located in the two independent states, played a special role
in the history of disintegration of

Yugoslavia . Having in mind recent
past, and all developments in that neuralgic area, notably in 1991-1995 period,
and even later, one may say that murders, robberies, thefts, abductions of
innocent citizens, armed seiges of towns, mass emigration of locals, various
forms of discrimination, political trials, numerous “informative talks”, preventive repression, etc, were overshadowed
by the simultaneous developments in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.
Protection of human rights and liberties by the system
institutions to date was so lacking that there is no ground for any future
optimism in that regard. Numerous complaints filed by victims of the police
torture due to the judicial inefficiency, procrastrination, and numerous
obstruction, have become cold cases. Emigration from Sandžak continues. The Hague Tribunal has filed
indictments relating to crimes committed in
Croatia
,

Bosnia and Herzegovina
, Kosovo and Vojvodina, while many crimes committed in Sandžaku
have simply sunk into oblivion, though they should have been dealt with by the
state and its judicial bodies. Sandžak
is also entitled to truth and its institutional recognition. Numerous
publications of the Sandzak Committee for Protection of Human Rights and
Liberties and of other NGOs (the Humanitarian Law Fund, the Helsinki Committee
for Human Rights in

Serbia
) in a well-documented way testify to the aforementioned crimes.

 

Results of the 2006
Montenegrin referendum marked the end of the state union of
Serbia and
Montenegro
, of the remainder of former

Yugoslavia
, and consequently brought about division of the Bosniak community in Sandzak,
which now lives in two, separate, independent states. Referendum in

Montenegro
showed a wide rift between representatives of the Bosniak community in the
«Serb» and «Montenegrin« part of Sandžak. Novi Pazar, after introduction of
multi-party system, did not live up to its reputation, as a Bosniak centre. In
fact it ceased to be a Bosniak «centre» from which some political
representative intended to co-ordinate the work of Bosniak institutions and
parties in Sandzak, regardless of the republican borders. Bosniak political
representatives moreover manisfested a great degree of political inexperience
and immaturity. Their political goals were articulated clumsily, out of sync
with the times and broader environment. Under the term Sandžak is increasingly
understood the part thereof which is located in the
Republic
of
Serbia and within its borders,
while the other part of Sandzak, which lies in the

Republic of
Montenegro
is rarely mentioned. And in fact that larger part in

Serbia may be reduced to only three
municipalities: Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin. Sandžak may be discussed from
various angles, and therein lies the difference between politicians and
representatives of NGOs. We should have a very cautious tack to all Sandzak
problems.

 

In the present-day
Serbia Bosniaks make up less of 2% of population. Their emigration continues
both from the „Serb“, and the „Montenegrin“ part of Sandžak. Regardless of
separation of

Montenegro
many problems have remained unresolved. Added to that concerted efforts should
be made to affirm the Bosniak spirituality, national self-awareness. Unless
that objective is seriously pursued, there are concerns that Bosniaks may be
reduced to a minor religious community, without developed national
institutions.

 

Bosniak movement in
Sandžak has not managed to adequately and genuinely morph into an institutional
movement. Due to their narrow-mindedness Bosniak political leaders have not
managed in the last 16 years to genuinely articulate the needs of the Bosniak
community, to realistically position them. Instead they simply engaged in
numerous demagogical diatribes and claimed their committments to various
«memoranda». In the fields of culture-strengthening, development of various
projects contributing to the national awareness-strengthening, research of
Bosniak culture, language, history and tradition, very modest results have been
achieved. No spiritual, educational, cultural linkage was made between Bosniaks
living in the two republics. Much-used propagande phrases failed to solve
genuine problems, and by extension only masked a genuinely distressing state of
affairs. Internal strife and multiplication of bureaucratic institutions only
showed that Bosniaks lacked a genuine political and intellectual potential to
find solutions for the near future. One-nation claims for autonomy of Sandžaka
made in 1991, from the very outset were problematic, both because of resistance
and resentment of the Serb and Montenegrin population in Sandzak, and political
centers in

Belgrade
and Podgorica. Those maximalist claims were totally contrary to the genuine,
intellectual, economic, and cultural potential of Sandzak Bosniaks. Thus

Belgrade and Podgorica,
aware of numerous weaknesses of and strife in the fold of Bosniak political
parties, did not show any readiness for such-themed serious talks, let alone
willingness to respect the Bosniak claims. And

Belgrade and Podgorica persist in that stance
even now. Hence the division of Bosniaks is a logical result of the failed
policy of Bosniak political parties since 1990.

 

After the 2000
changeover, whose true character has been the subject-matter of polemics for
quite some time now, a sense of relief has settled in. Added to that there is
more breathing space. Status of human and minority rights in Serbia has
improved with respect to the previous period, but discrimination against
minority national communities remains the most frequent form of violation of
human rights. Minority communities are no longer exposed to systematic
pressures, but are still exposed to various forms of discrimination and
intolerance. On legislative plane a certain progress has also been made thanks
to adoption of the Act on Rights of National Minorities, and
ratification of the Framework Convention of Council of Europe on Respect of
Rights of Minority National Communities. However, in implementation of both the
Act on Minorities and the Framework Convention numerous problems were noted. In
some Sandzak municipalities-Priboj, Prijepolje- some provisions of the Convention
on the Official Use of Language, are yet to be implemented, though it was
both an international and domestic law binding committment. In fact Acts on
Rights of Minority Communities are passed more because of committments taken on
before the international community than because of desire to implement them.
Much-hyped and much-publicized Federal Act on Minorities, was thought to be
able to genuinely promote human rights, but the reality proved otherwise on
several grounds (political problems, relations between the two countries).
Special attention should be paid to the cadres structure, and national balance
in Sandžak.

 

In the aforementioned
and in other municipalities little progress was made with respect to full
implementation of the Framework Convention. There are indications that
participation of Bosniak representatives in local administrative bodies is
still conditioned by a series of compromises to which they must agree.

 

According to the
findings of a survey by the Sandzak Committee for Human Rights, national
structure in some municipalities is extremely unfavourable, and
non-corresponding to the population structure. Sandžak Committee for Human
Rights researched the structure of cadres in municipalities of Novi Pazar,
Sjenica, Tutin, Priboj i Prijepolje, and its conclusion was that national
representation is totally upset in the state institutions (the police, courts
of law, prosecution offices, the army) at the expense of Bosniaks. A departure
from the last-decade practice is yet to be made. For example, municipal
prosecution office in Sjenica doesn’t employ a single Bosniak.

 

Concerns in Sandžak and about Sandžak are
quite justified, having in mind the general state of affairs, that is, forcibly
reduced needs, a deepening economic crisis manifest in all areas of life, and
the area's obvious lagging behind the rest of the country. Novi Pazar, the city
which aspires to be the Bosniak political and national seat, shows little
interest in Bosniaks in Nova Varoš,
Priboj or Prijepolju. Due to their small size they seem to be forgotten. On the
other hand they are most frequently mentioned in NGO resports, notably those of
the Sandzak Committee for Human Rights. Bosniak migrations towards
Bosnia , notably towards

Sarajevo , continue. That seemingly never-
ending process of emigration from Priboj, Prijepolje, Sjenica and Tutin
commenced long time ago. Serbs are also leaving Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin.
These complex topics should not be glossed over. Many problems are of common
nature, but some frequently assume a national character. Population census
poses numerous questions, notably does the

Republic of
Serbia
want an end to Bosniak emigration. Many generations of Bosniaks face that
dilemma. If the answer is affirmative, then a different policy line should be
toed towards Sandzak, a more pro-active, sincere, concrete policy. That policy
should assume a transparent and institutional form. Today, on several grounds,
more investments are made in the three municipalities in
South
Serbia (Preševo, Bujanovac…), than in Sandzak, though the latter
deserves the state’s care and all kinds of aid.

 

Even before
disintegration of the socialist Yugoslavia Sandžak was considered as one of the
most undeveloped areas in that state. Investments are stubbornly bypassing that
area. Because of that thousands of people have emigrated, and they continue to
do so. Diaspora Sandžak is much more populous than the geographical one.
Political and marketing rhetoric cover up and sideline essential problems of
the area: lack of prospects, underdevelopment, a series of deviant phenomena
(criminal, corruption, prostitution, drug-smuggling and trafficking). Sandžak
is in a deep social and economic crisis felt in all areas of life. Grey
economy, drugs, prostitution, thefts, murders, political conflicts are almost a
daily fact of life.

 

On the other hand in
Sandzak we are witnessing a host of problems which may affect the total state
of affairs in the area: omnipresent «hate speech» in the media, incidents in
sport competitions and matches, writing of nationalistic slogans and grafitti,
excessive statements by politicians, frequent clashes between members and
loyalists of different parties, potentially dangerous strife within the
framework of the Islamic community. What we need to do is to explain the above
phenomena, place them in realistic framework, instead of simply condemning
them.

 

Sandzak is still
presented in very black-and-white terms, which only clouds its complex reality.
The Serb media, in line with political needs, continue to support the image of
Islam as a hostile and very dangerous religion. Majority of the print media
resumed using propaganda terms and allegations from the early 90’s, such as,
the Islamic danger, Islamic terrorists, etc. Stereotypes and prejudices show a
great vitality. Articles about the „Green Transversal“, „Islamic danger“,
„White al-Qaeda“ are commonplace. Occasionally they are supplemented with other
“dangers.” The size of Bosniak population is either inflated or decreased,
according to political needs. As regards the issue of human rights Bosniaks are
depicted as a small minority, but as regards the Bosniak faith, Bosniaks are
sometimes treated as a danger for the Balkans and the whole region. The truth
is however known only by journalists and politicians. Stories about “Islamic
danger” are produced by journalists, in total disregard of numerous facts to
the contrary. Some incidents do not belong to the category of general,
widespread phenomena threatening the stability and peace in this area, and
wider, in the region. In some sensationalistic articles the print media even go
as far as to portray Sandžak as a new potential flashpoint, and the breeding
ground of terrorists. Thus the media spread Islamophobia and try to instill
fear of the Bosniaks in the whole region and in
Europe
.

 

Novi Pazar is
omnipresent on criminal pages. Journalists seem to be interested only in such
news. But it bears saying that Novi Pazar, like other municipalities, is
weighted by other, long-standing problems. Little is said about the fact that
Novi Pazar infrastructure lags behind the one in place in Kraljevo or Čačak.
Locals in Sandzak want to enjoy living conditions similar to those in other
cities. As regards appalling living conditions in Sandzak village, I’d rather
not touch on that issue on this occasion. But I must underscore the need for a
more careful balancing act in state institutions on local level (courts of law,
police, prosecution offices.) In other words, they should employ more Bosniaks,
in view of their size. The issue of underrepresentation and passivity of
Bosniaks in the republican institutions should be also raised.

 

Bosniaks must attain
in an institutional way all the rights to which they are entitled, and they
must overcome numerous divisions, and improvisations on many levels, if they
want to ensure prosperous future for Sandzak. If the foregoing does not come to
pass, what is left of Sandzak shall continue its partition, and will be totally
sidelined. One should also bear in mind that the

Belgrade authorities in settling of intra
Bosniak disputes are guided primarily by their own interests.

 

 

 

Meho Omerović,
Member of Parliament of Serbia

 

I would like to
express my gratitude to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and
to Ms. Sonja Biserko for having raised at the right moment and in the right way
the issue of Sandzak, for complexity of that issue necessitates continued
tackling of causes and consequences of everyday life in that specific
territory. In my very brief expose I shall point out only one aspect, which is
not only the consequence, but rather the gist of a kind of perfidious policy,
which part of the state, unfortunately embodied in its high representatives,
pursues vis a vis part of the country, Sandžaku, its people, or minority
community, Bosniaks and their religious community, the Islamic religious
community. At yesterday's parliamentary session of the Security and Defence
Committee, Director of Security-Information Agency, Mr. Rade Bulatović, stated,
I quote:» Tensions within the framework of the Islamic commnity are one of the
factors threatening the stability of Serbia.»! In the case of intra -Islamic
community strife the state of Serbia showed how a responsible state should not
behave.

 

What compels me
to make such an assertion? My answer-which should serve also as a warning- is
very simple and well-known to public at large: Competent minister, Minister for
Religions in the government of Serbia, Mr. Naumov, breached the law. Namely he
sided with one of the protagonists of intra-Islamic community strife, which, in
my mind, and you shall agree, is –impermissible. Mr. Naumov even indulged in an
implausible explanation, to the effect that the state recognizes both Islamic
communities, the one in Belgrade and the one in Novi Pazar. According to him
«there is room for both Meshihat and Riaset…»! He added that the state
recognized «various forms of one Islamic community!». However what Mr. Naumov
failed to say- is why a lower organizational form, in this case Muftihood, that
is, only part thereof, bypassed the authority of the superior form, the one
above it, and formed the highest authority, namely Riaset. Mr, Naumov is yet to
provide us with an answer to that question. It shall be interesting to watch
Mr. Naumov's position on another, similar problem. Several days ago the
Montenegrin Orthodox Church submitted an application for the entry in the
register of church, or religious organizations. So will Mr. Naumov now have an
identical stand, that is, approve of the existence of the two Christian
Orthodox Churches in Serbia?

 

By all
appearances, the foregoing may help us to draw the conclusion that some
politicians in Serbia would like to see the formation of a kind of the «Serb
Islamic Community». For the thesis that Bosniaks are invented people, that they
are in fact Serbs of Muslim faith, is of late much hyped. Such a stance of the
state and its highest body amply indicates the existence of today's topic,
namely, a repressive state policy towards a whole reigon. Explanation of the
reasons for that may be thus summed up: at play is obviously return of favours
to the coalition partner. It seems that the state, or at least, its part
co-participates in the attempt of creating a private or party-based Islamic
community. The foregoing is confirmed by the fact that the highest
representatives of the newly-formed Islamic community are in fact MPs and
officials of the Democratic Action Party, a coalition partner of the party to
which Minister for Religions, Mr. Naumov belongs. I would like to remind you
that last year the party to which Mr. Naumov belongs in Novi Pazar, introduced
in an unlawful way provisional measures and sided with one party involved in
the conflict between the two leading Bosniak parties. In the case of the intra-Islamic
religious community strife that party also sided with one protagonist thereof.
All the evidence points to the fact that the said side, was the one spearheaded
by Mr. Sulejman Ugljanin.

 

It seems that the
biggest problem for all of us in Serbia is the fact that the said party, party
of Prime Minister of Serbia, which has the greatest coalition capacity, or
«potential» in Serbia, as they like to say, unfortunately has only
disturbance-prone partners. In Montenegro it is the Democratic Serb Party, and
Popular Party, in Republika Srpska it is the Serb Democratic Party with which
they have a coalition agreement in place, and we can see that in Sandžak, it is
a party at whose helm is Mr. Sulejman Ugljanin.

 

 

 

Sonja Biserko: Now it is Mr.Vukomanovic's turn. In view
of your expertise I hope that you shall tell us something about Wahabis. In any
case Wahabism is a legal and legitimate religious movement which cannot be
banned under Constitution, the Act on Churches and Religious Communities, and
other international documents. However, at the same time I would like to quote
the following statement of Mufti Zukorlić: «I consider them a group of
militants, of extremists, and they gain prominence only if someone misuses
them. In Sandzak they absolutely don't have a foothold among people, hence they
don't constitute a long-term danger. We have information about them, but we
don't want to divulge them. That is the task of investigating bodies!»! I would
like to ask you to touch on that phenomenon in the Balkans, since their
presence has evidently caused such an uproar.

 

 

 

Milan
Vukomanović, professor of sociology

 

Just a brief
explanation… I have already spoken about Wahabis, and my words on that
phenomenon have been covered by our press. So, to put it briefly, it is an
essentially marginal phenomenon within the fold of Islam, marginal, because it
has never taken root in the Balkans. It has not taken root either in Bosnia, in
Kosovo, and in Sandzak. Yes, there were some incidents, for that is a phenomenon
which may be misused. At any rate Wahabism as such represents a kind of abuse
of Islam. To sum it up, it is above all a movement with strong missionary
ambitions, perhaps even global ambitions, but contrary to its design it remains
the leading political ideology, the religious ideology only in Saudi Arabia.
Historically speaking, in fact Saudi Arabia is its domicile country, for
Wahabism was spawned there as a kind of ideology. As much I have monitored that
phenomen I can say that in the Balkans Wahabism did not have a fertile soil for
indoctrination, simply because here we are traditionally used to one Imam, a
much more moderate and liberal religous dignitary in terms of the preaching of
his religious-legal school. Added to that the local Islam is much more under
influence of the Sufi tradition, spiritual Islamic tradition. Therefore that
kind of «import» could not have a major impact, could not transform the
domestic Islam.

 

But independently
of this islamological debate, and of those possibilities for misuse of various
movements in the area, I would like to touch on something which is perhaps less
related to Islam proper, but is definitely related to the behaviour of our
state towards the two serious, broader problems, concerning the three branches
of power in Serbia, mostly the executive one. I am primarily referring to the
threat to freedom of religious expression, of both faithfulls and atheists in
our country. Jeopardized are both the freedom of religious expression, and
freedom from religion. In fact both elements are threatened. Thus at play is an
attack on religious freedoms, to paraphrase the title of the book of a
colleague of mine, who put that issue in the context of Protestant communities.
Secondly, a serious problem are periodic waves of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic
conduct and actions to which the state does not respond adequatelly. In both
cases therefore at play is not an intra-Muslim split in Sandzak, but rather
something which should concern also non-Muslims. Total status of inter-religious
relations, and also relations between church and state, has worsened during the
two mandates of Kostunica-led government. We are also witnessing another
phenomenon, an enhanced status of the Serb Orthodox Church, but, small or
minority religious communities are by extension experiencing a veritable
state-engineered stranglehod. Though, unlike in the Milosevic era, we now have
a pertinent Act, the state, that is the government of the Republic of Serbia
threatens religious freedoms of all its citizens. The same hold true of the
ruling parties, notably those tasked with dealing with religious communities,
or in the case in point, the one which supervises the Ministry for Religion-
Democratic Party of Serbia. Let me just list some generally known facts, for if
we percive them in their continuity we shall grasp the gist of the problem:
former Minister for Education tried to suppress Darwinism and affirm
creationism in public schools curricula, former Minister for Religions, Mr.
Radulovic submitted a scandalous first draft of the Act on Religious Freedoms,
legal provisions on immunity of clerics were also suggested-that indicated
cleary the Ministry's siding with the majority religious community in our
country-, the eruption of moral indignation or uproar vis a vis some alleged
actions of smaller religious communities, the most notorious being the linkage
made by the Interior Secretary between a Novi Banovic heinous murder and a
smaller sect. In consequence of such attacks on smaller religious communities,
their priests are vilified and their property is oft confiscated. These
communities are discriminated against by the very Act, for it envisages a
different procedure for their registration as compared to the one required by
so-called traditional religious communities. All the aforementioned is
compounded by racism in the Serb parliament, and some more recent problems,
notably rulings of our courts of law relating to the Serb Orthodox Church
clerics, rulings which even requred an intervention by the Justice Ministry.
Frequent constitutional breaches are also noteworthy. In other words, the state
violates its own laws, the ones proposed by the government and the Ministry for
Religions. In this Sandzak case there was a blatant breach of Article 7 of the
Act on Churches and Religious Communities spellling out «… the state cannot
obstruct enoforcement of autonomous provisions of churches and religious
communities». Therefore if the Islamic community in Serbia held an
unification-minded conference and passed a corresponding constitution, then the
state bodies should not have contested both events by openly marking out their
favourite in that dispute, for that was tantamount to violation of the state
law proper. Sandzak mufti rightfully and publicly cautioned against the foregoing.
And that is a serious objection if the leader of a traditional religious
community pinpoints violations by the state proper. The whole situation, in my
mind, is a kind of throwback to claims laid by the Russian religious dissidents
during the Soviet, Brezhnev era. It is a similar level of communication.

 

 A local
politician, president of municipality, Mr. Ugljanin, was harshly criticized for
suggesting that the Islamic Community be abolished and that the Bosniak
National Council be placed under firm control. Therefore we face a direct
political interfering into religious structures affairs, and this government,
though a non-Muslim one, seems to be cultivating a kind of political Islam by
forcibly imposing politics on those religious structures. And finally, as the
Sandzak Mufti oft indicated, we should seriously consider allegations about
collusion between some priests and imams with the intelligence services in this
country. I would not underestimate such statements. Recently in Bosnia and
Herzegovina books with names of priests, imams and representatives of other
churches and religious communities-so-called «blue», «green» and «red» books-
known to have been collaborators of such services in the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, were published. Therefore the state should show more
concern for such accusations by looking seriously into them.

 

First the
executive authorities, notably the Ministry for Religions, muddy the waters,
and then they decide to sit on the fence, while the crisis-left to us to
handle- continues to simmer; I would like to know the feelings and opinions of
other religious communities in Serbia on such inter-religious relations, on the
induced split in the Islamic Community, indicative of the state protection of
its favourites. I wonder about the consequences thereof vis a vis the Christian
Orthodox, vis a vis the Roman Catholic Church? What shall they do if invited to
an event or reception organized by the newly-emerged Islamic Community? How
shall NGOs organize schools, for example schools in Sandžak? Are they to expect
attendance of the official representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church, of the
Roman-Catholic Church, when there is much division, and fear of people that
such an attendance would be highly politicized? How can we at all work in such
circumstances? Has anyone in muddying the situation thought about the secondary
consequences of his action?

 

Independently
from those divisions in the Islamic community, I would like to bring to your
attention a mindless, but not accidental, article of the Act on Churches and
Religious Communities, and that is the Article 19, which spells out: «…into
the register cannot be entered any religious organization whose name or part
thereof expressing the identity of a church, religious community or religious
organization, has been already entered into that register or whose registration
application has already been submmited». Of course that article shall be
activated in case of registration application of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.
That article was probably devised to prevent registration of both the
Macedonian and Montenegrin Orthodox Church. But I must explain the lack of
sense of that article: in our political life we are all witnessing the
emergence of new parties whose names have prefixes or adjectives, or bear
hallmarks, like democratic, liberal, Social-Democratic. And such an
occurence is simply inevitable, for those prefixes or adjectives or hallmarks
are symbols of identity, political leanings or ideology of such parties. And
the foregoing is even more important in a sensitive religious life, which is
characterized by frequent emergence of new religious communities,
denominations, as well as by fragmentations of the existing ones, notably in
the Protestant Church realm. For example, you have the Christian Adventist
Church, the 7th Day Adventist Church, various Baptist churches, etc. The above
article in fact prevents the free choice of name and free actions of religious
communities. From such a principled standpoint, such a legal article is totally
mindless and useless, but it obviously makes sense in the current political
context characterized by strong wish to control all inter-religious,
inter-church relations. And precisely those inter-religious, inter-church
relations directly impact and mar inter-state relations. Due to the case of the
Macedonian Orthodox Church, Monetenegrin Orthodox Church, and the most recent
one of the Islamic Community, our relations with Macedonia, Montenegro and now
with Bosnia and Herzegovina have worsened. It is paradoxical that the said
souring of relations happened with the two majority Christian orthodox
societies, that is, societies in which Christian Orthodoxy is a dominant
religious community.

 

Secondly, I would
like to indicate that the ongoing anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim campaigns and
actions in Serbia were mounted by the higest state institutions notably the
army and police, since 2004. Consequently one wonders if at play is a tacit,
and peaceful continuity of the 90's ethnic conflicts, for sometimes that
anti-Islamism is latent, and sometimes it is very pronounced. Symbolically I
could place it in the timeframe starting with the mosque-torching in Belgrade,
Nis and Novi Sad, destruction of valuable exhibits in the Kalemegdan Military
Museum in Belgrade to recent police raids on the Sjenica mosque. That is the
framework of anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic actions which I would like to underscore
on this occasion. We remember lenient sentences handed down in the case of Nis
perpetrators. It was a farce, and not a genuine trial. They scheduled hearings
so many times, and the response to the ruling…such a shameful conduct of
those convicted of minor offences. Or, by extension, the parliamentary
statement of the then official of Democratic Party of Serbia, Obren Joksimović
about «Mujaheddin party« in the Serb National Assembly, and his fear that, as
he put it then, «we may face al-Qaeda and Hommeini in our parliament as
transmitters of the Muslim fundamentalist idea…»! Of course those, so-called
mujaheddins enabled the political survival of Vojislav Kostunica as Prime
Minister, and later the government introduced an emergency rule in municipality
of Novi Pazar and thus saved Ugljanin from referendum related to his most
probable resignation.

 

We face anew,
like in Milosevic era, the crisis-production. By such behaviour the state just
keep generating new problems both on the domestic and international plane. We
may also wonder if during the late March meeting between President Tadic with
Reis Ceric, in presence of Rasim Ljajic and Mufti Zukorlic, the topmost topic
was the historical and moral right of the Islamic community in Serbia to
maintain its spiritual links and alliance with the Islamic community in Bosnia
and Herzegovina? As much as I recall they also discussed the launching of a new
Serb-Bosniak dialogue, a much-needed after the 90's crimes and conflicts?! And
what shall this state do now? Shall it quarrel with Lajchak in Bosnia, shall it
push us into new crises and problems? Let me remind you that in the meantime
instead of Milosevic pictures Putin's pictures and posters are carried at
various rallies in this region.

 

 

 

Mirko
Ðorðević, publicist:

State and
religious communities have poor communication

 

On another
occasion – when a broader discussion on the current state policy on churches
and religious communities is organized -it would be wortwhile to explain in
detail relations between the church and state in Serbia on the one hand and
religious communities on the other hand. Problems are either covered up or
intentionally bypassed. Only when incidents happen we get a chance to glimpse
the true nature of those relations. Such incidents and misunderstandings, which
we in this country euphemistically call «poor communication lines» generate the
new ones and reveal a high inconsistency of the state policy. In other words
the state moves depend on certain political moments, and as such are haphazard
and oft mismanaged. The best example of the latter were developments
surrounding the split among the ranks of the Islamic Community in Serbia. Now
we have two Islamic communities and those tensions are reflected elsehwere. It
is obvious that the fissure was generated by some politicians. The foregoing is
best explained by the Belgrade Islamic Community Mufti, Efendi Jusufspahić:
«Boris Tadić and Democratic Party, Vojislav Koštunica and Democratic Party of
Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić and the Serb Radical Party, and all other parties back
the concept of the Islamic Community of Serbia because it is state-forming. No
evidence of the Islamic Community's disloyalty to the state of Serbia was
produced. ». This problem is rather of organizational and not of dogmatic
nature: all religious communities are equal and the state, under the Act on
Churches and Religious Communities, recognizes only one, unified Islamic
Community, organized in line with the spirit of the Islamic tradition. This
time around the state sided with one community, which was contrary to the
aforementioned Act and Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. Added to that it
is a well-known fact that a modern state-a legal state-is not entitled to found
any church or religious community. The state has only the prerogative to
protect the autonomy of churches and religious communities and to provide for
their freedom of actions. The current situation indicates that due to bad state
policy on religious comunities in general those faithful to half-moon in Serbia
are now in a deep political shadow. The state also toes a bad line on churches,
for the principle that some may be specifically recognized and others
sidelined-or manipulated, is built into the aforementioned Act. This is the
right occasion to show that we rightly had warned that the aforementioned Act
was contrary to the Serb Constitution and therefore would be difficult to
enforce.

 

All other issues
in the dispute- though much hyped by the mass media-notably the true spiritual
centre of churches and religious communities- are indeed inconsequential.

 

I would like to
mention a much-hyped allegation, that all the aforementioned developments were
also engineered by the state security services. That could be discussed only if
one had enough hard evidence, but, alas, we have only verbal allegations. But
as the saying goes, there's no fire without smoke. As early as in April 2007,
Mufti Zukorlić repeatedly warned of the foregoing[1] and
wrote such-themed letter to Tadic and Kostunica: – «Of special concern are
numerous information relating to anti-Islamic Community activities carried out
by the security and intelligence services of Serbia.» That is all we know about
those developments, and the general public still waits for a broader and
transparent explanation thereof by the highest state officials. There's
another-oft overlooked- document originating from the cabinet of the very head
of secret police, the Security-Informative Agency, Mr. Rade Bulatovic, which,
inter alia, included the following stance[2], -and such
stances are not usually publicly espoused by heads of secret services-: -« To
put i concretely, we are now searching for three files of high church clerics,
which had disappeared in the post-2000 period. We have assumptions with respect
to the reason behind that theft and the end-recipient of those files. ».

 

We cannot go into
detail now, but the aforementioned indicates that the state deals with churches
and religious communities, and vice versa, in a bad way and that it interferes
into affairs which should not be its concern. It would be possible to explain
developments related to the Islamic Community turmoil and to other churches-and
they are inter-related- only through some researches, and they are currently
lacking.

 

I would say that
some conclusions impose themselves, firstly an undisputable accountability of
the Minister for Religions in Kostunica-led government. Even if we lived in a
legal state-and we don't-that minister should resign. Is it possible to have in
this state several Christian Orthodox Churches, and only one Roman Catholic? Is
it possible to have in this state the two Islamic communities-the answer is
–yes it is. Every church or religious community organizes itself in keeping
with its tradition, and the state in that respect should maintain a neutral
stand. But things stand differently in Serbia. The room for political
manipulations has been created, as the Wahabi case amply indicated. In order to
learn more about that case we shall have to wait for the end of judicial
proceedings. The media responses should be also taken into account. Majority of
them are tightly controlled by power centres, some are prone to side-taking,
and some feign total ignorance. The other side of the coin are relations within
the fold of the Islamic Community proper, often saturated by the leaders’
rivalry. That smacks of the Eastern parabole on the biggest and most beautiful
carpet in the mosque, which is often too small to accommodate the two Imams. At
play are also material interests. But the most dangerous aspect of the rift in
the midst of the Islamic community proper is its potential to pave the way to
violence, which in the Balkans is always a viable option. Moreover, the said
rift coincides with the final stages of settlement of the Kosovo issue and a
strong turmoil in the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, which should serve
as a warning that the repeat of mistakes is always possible and-dangerous for
all. In a nutshell the trouble is non-existance of a developed model or
relations between the state and church and religious communities in general, in
keeping with the rich European experience. The ruling parties instead apply
random solutions, in line with their needs.

 

 

 

Sonja Biserko: You have recently stated that «…
national revolutions frequently break out at the time when old injustices stop,
and internal unity of the rebelled parties, dissappears. It seems that Sandžak,
in that respect, is not an exception!» Could you explicate that view of yours
?!

 

 

 

Čedomir Antić,
historian

 

The fact is, and
history is replete with such examples, that uprisings and revolutions, as well
as creation of national states, begin at the time when age-old injustices which
prompted them in the first place, end. Here is one example from the 19th
century: large-scale uprisings against the Ottoman Empire coincided with the
major reform campaigns. And that it simply, a rule.

 

But let me go
back to the topic. I see it as a political and not a historical one. I was not
able to grasp, in view of the general character of the topic's title, whether
we would be dealing with developments in Sandžak in the past 2, or 4 or 20
years. I regret that lack of a better definition, but in view of an alleged
state repression, I say «alleged» having in mind the past 7 years, I think that
it would have better if you had invited some government representatives. This is
not one-party government. In fact it is composed of various parties, one
minister is of Bosniak descent. Therefore it would have been good to hear
things straight from the horse's mouth. Added to that, as Sandžak, the Serb
part of Sandžak, is a multi-ethnic region, it would have been good to have some
representatives of other nationalities from the area. However, it is difficult
to perceive the whole truth, it is difficult to gather or rally all actors, so
it is good that at least an attempt was made, in the shape of thus-organized
panel.

 

I would say that
in the last seven years Serbia has been going through a major reform attempt,
perhaps the most important ones in its history. And in my mind, the fact that
other nationalities take part in that attempt should be the source of
satisfaction for the majority of citizens of Serbia, that is, all the
citizens of Serbia. I did not want to use the term minority, for I
thought it it would be nonsensical. Therefore-all the citizens of Serbia. It is
especially good that in the grand DOS coalition and later, in succesive
governments, there were representatives of Bosniak parties. Here it was not
mentioned –even the post-24 period was assessed negatively- that the year 2000
saw adoption of amendments to a deficient electoral law, until then allowing
only over-5% census parties to get parliamentary seats. Thus for the first time
national communities, constituting only less then 5% of total population of the
Republic of Serbia, faced the opportunity to enter the Serb parliament.

 

One of the
panelists said that the building of the Bosniak nation in Serbia was necessary.
I must say that I see no connection between the process of nation-bulding and
the process of implementation of human and civil rights, for the experience
indicates that the nation-building is oft a harsh and unfortunately,
undemocratic process. When the majority of European nations was built in the
19th century, things stood differently: formation of a state and its
educational system within a territory, was followed by unification into a
nation of diverse ethnic groups. In early 21st century, at the time of
supremacy of electronic media, and nearly 100% literacy in Serbia, things are
not so simple, and we must act cautiously in order not to trample upon human
rights of some people, the undisputed right of some people to be members of
not-fully-built or constituted nations. Hence it is mindless first to take to
task a Serb official-and I am glad that such politicians no longer make part of
the government- for saying some time ago that Muslims from Bosnia are
Serbs-Mohammedans, and then back another official, a hold-over from the 2000
government, who said that Bunjevci were an invented minority group. Simply, if
a group of people feel like Bunjevci, then it is an undisputable fact, which
merits our full backing.

 

Here the issue of
religious communities was mentioned. I agree that we should put in place good
legal regulations. In my mind it is our fortune to be the last country to enter
the transition period, for thus we shall be able to compare our experience with
experiences of other European countries, notably the neighbouring ones which
have a large number of diverse rligious communities.

 

It is not a
disaster if a draft act is bad. What is important is that a proposal debated by
parliament was backed by several parties, and not only by one, monolithic
party, enjoying the absolute majority.

 

I am obviously
not an expert for religious issues, but I tried to get as much information as
possible when the crisis in Sandzak began. In that regard I found interesting
the opinion of one dignitary of the Islamic Religious Community-I shall not
tell you to which of the two he belongs-, who said that all Muslim faithfulls
in Serbia were not of Bosniak descent. And indeed if you look at the last
census statistics, you realize that in the area of historic Sandžak there are
6.35%, or over 27,000 citizens who claim that they are of Muslim nationality.
In the Serb part that percentage is somwhat lower, about 3.5%, while in the
Montenegrin one, it is 10%, or more precisely, 9.88%. I want to say that a
democratic state should neither prevent or encourage the building of a nation.
Both actions would be tantamount to violations of democratic rights.

 

Two Islamic
communities in Serbia were mentioned. I have recently heard a very
inspirational interview by Mr. Oliver Potežica. Namely he mentioned even five
Islamic religious communities in Serbia. We tend to forget that in area of
Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, there is an organized community of Albanian
Muslims, and that they have even two such communities, one of which is called
the Islamic Community of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveða. Its president
Džemaludin Hasani recently stated: «..those Communist times when the Sarajevo-based
Islamic community controlled everything, are well behind us»! He has an
opponent, a certain Tahir Mumin, who is, I think, President of the Islamic
Community for Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveða. And now, according to Mr.
Potezica, we have the Islamic community of Kosovo, which has recently joined
the Islamic Community of Serbia. Therefore the whole matter is very complex,
and it would be good if the politics did not interfere into such relations, if
politics just continued to provide its good services. The state should prevent
conflicts, misuses, and the best solution would be an agreement between the
faithfulls.

 

I am aware of the
fact, as you all are, that Sandžak is one of the most undeveloped areas in the
Republic of Serbia. However I would like to avoid a methodological mistake by,
for example, comparing living standard in Sandžak to the one in Čačak or in
Belgrade. It would not be fair. It is equally not fair to compare living
standard in Kraljevo to the one in Belgrade. We must acknowledge that fact that
in Serbia the poverty, which prevails in southernmost and westernmost areas, is
not evenly distributed in ethnic terms. And that is one of the paradoxes of
circumstances in Sandžak: economic progress was made during the 90's
repression. But that economic progress unfortunately took a downturn at the
outset of the reform process. And that fact should be carefully analysed. And
of course we cannot prevent the following: when a minority community is
threatened, or has internal problems, it calls on mobilization against the
third party. It is an age-old principle. And there is little to benefit from
such a move. At this moment of time it is very difficult to say whether the
state is engaged in an anti-Bosniak terror campaign, in a campaign against local
religious feelings or in a campaign targeting local political actors, both from
the two big and several smaller, power-sharing parties in Sandzak. We can
criticize the local elite, but the fact is that the said elite regularly drums
up support at the elections. So even if we say that Constitution is bad, and I
for one criticized that constitution from different positions than most of my
interlocutors, we must note that no MP voted against that constitution in the
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (only a number of them were
absent). The aforementioned attests to the fact that democratic principle was
applied in adoption of that Constitution. Bad solutions thereof should be
amended, but by and large we must say that the constitution in place is a democratic
one.

 

When discussing
the status of national minorities and constituent people rights we should
compare that status with the one in other states. Here someone touched on
pertinent circumstances in Montenegro. Though I am not an expert for the cannonic
law, I think that I am still entitled to say that it is the fundamental right
of all citizens to establish their religious organizations as they like.
However, in Montenegro situation is quite different, because it was Serbia
where the division within a regular hierarchy of the Islamic religious
community happened. As regards Montenegro, there a former priest, first against
the state will, and later with both the state and laymen assistance, founded
the church. That makes me say that circumstances are totally different in
Montenegro. There one or two church facilities were taken over by the Serb
Orthodox Church, though they did not start liturgical services or sent monks
there. Therefore the primary motive was to prevent one church to exercise its faith.
In Serbia things stand differently. Of course, if we accept my arguments that
does not mean that situation in Sandžak is good. In fact both economic and
political situation in Sandzak is not good. And it is true that there we should
build economic and cultural elite. The same applies to Belgrade, let alone Novi
Pazar, Nis or Leskovac. It is also true that we have not fully faced up to
recent past, to the 90's developments. But I regret to say that we haven't
faced the past in any area. We haven't owned up to the past in places where it
was not burdened by ethnic conflicts, controversies. I would like to remind you
that since the year 2000, the only progress in that facing process was made
when after our great tragedy, assassination of our first democratic Prime
Minister, a number of people were convicted of crimes clarified in the
post-Sword operation period. If that tragic event had not taken place, we would
not have seen dispensation of justice in any area, barring the case of Radio
Television of Serbia's bombardment, in which the RTS former director was
convicted.

 

 

 

Miroslav
Filipović, journalist

 

For several
decades now Sandžak has been in the grip of the Serb secret services, first the
Yugoslav ones, now the Serb ones. I would like to avoid speaking about what is
legitimate and legal, and what each state, including ours, is entitled to.
However I would like us to discuss a segment which may constitute a blatant
misuse of secret services in such a vulnerable area. Sandžak was
long-controlled by so-called «green» services, that is military secret
services, or counter-intelligence services. That fact gained much importance
when Sandžak became a border area of the newly-emerged state, of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. In fact after disappearance of the SFRY, Sandzak
interestingly enough found itself in the midst of continuity of distribution of
the Muslim, that is Bosniak people. Thus from the former border with the
Turkish state on riverlet Piloreta, when you leave Raška and head for Novi Pazar,
nearly up to Cazin area, we had the majority Bosniak-inhabited buffer zone.
That fact was proclaimed a terrible danger to the Serb national goal, and the
monstrous, no longer mentioned plan «Horseshoe» was first implemented on the
right bank of river Drina, in order to interrupt such a strip-like majority
spread of Bosniak people. The goal was also to prevent the Bosniak people from
laying territorial claims similar to the ones voiced by Milosevic-led
nationalists in Serbia. An over-riding concern was that Bosniaks might lay
claims similar those espoused by Serbs in Knin, Banija, etc. As far as I recall
that was precisely what in the early 90's Sulejman Ugljanin demanded. At the
time I interviewed him, and I remember very well one sentence of his, namely that
Sandzak Bosniaks want for Sandzak what the Serbs in Knin and Knin area want for
themselves. So the right bank of river Drina was totally cleansed of Bosniaks,
and believe it or not, consequences of that plan are still felt. Even today
someone prevents Bosniaks from those villages on the right bank of river Drina,
in Priboj municipality, to return to their homesteads. One must say that even
the best government we had, Ðinðić-led government, did nothing to annul the
consequences of that indeed monstrous, «Horseshoe» plan. Part of that plan were
the aforementioned abductions in Sjeverin and Štrpce. Their goal was to
intimidate the Bosniak people and make them flee. But that is a much broader
topic. I just hinted at it, deeming it the beginning of a new chapter in the
secret services interest in Sandžak.

 

Of course after
the disbanding of the Yugoslav People's Army and its secret services, so-called
«blue» secret services, that is, police services, gained primacy in that
respect. And those structures from the 90's onwards have been advising or
ordering the Belgrade authorities what to do in Sandžak. That means, that both
Prime Minister Živković and Education Minister Gašo Knežević went to Novi Pazar
to hand to Mufti Zukorlic the International University work licence, because
they were advised to do that by secret services, and perhaps that such a move
would be useful for the state of Serbia. If recently the founding of the new
Islamic Community, and I am referring to the Islamic Community of Serbia, was
greenlighted, it was due to someone's conclusion that Moamer Efendi's influence
was too great…so let us clip his wings. For the existence of 120 mosques, an
International University, the Islamic Studies Faculty, and preparations for
founding of an Islamic Arts and Sciences Academy, and an important role of Novi
Pazar and Sandžak in founding of an European al-Azhar, the highest Islamic
University with its seat in Cairo, denoted-too much influence of the
aforementioned Mufti.

 

When speaking
about influence of secret services, several interlocutors mentioned Moamer
Efendi's letter in which he requested from the state bodies files of
collaborators of the secret services in the Islamic Community. If I were Moamer
Efendi I would not be too sure that they would give me the right files! And the
tentacles of those services are everywhere. As a journalist covering Sandzak
for 20 years now I am aware of that. There were also allegations that Moamer
Efendi was a secret services collaborator. It was also said that the National
Bosniak Congress founded in the late 90's as a political party, and the
separatism-minded Islamic Community of Presevo, were founded on advice of
«services.» Rumour had it that the services appointed the then Mufti Nedzedin
Sacipaj. I want to say that secret services are present in Sandzak, but I also
say-so what? They are present everywhere, I would not be surprised if they were
present here too…here, among us. That is simly the way of life in the
post-communist societies, and when shall we be rid of such a practice, I truly
don't know. Whether those «services» and to which extent, misuse their duties,
it is a very complex, very complicated question, rife with mystifications.
Appearances can be often deceiving, but the fact is that those «services» have
their rights and duties, for they were founded in keeping with the laws of this
country.

 

Border line
between use and misuse is very delicate and most surely at meetings like this
we shall not be able to grasp the gist of the matter, However, I would not
place too much faith in allegations that some political opponents of mine work
for «services.» For they make similar allegations about my persona. And as
Muslims like to say: «Only Allah knows how things stand now, and what is
-true»!

 

 

 

MEŠA SLEZOVIÆ,
artist:

 

SANDŽAK:
CONSEQUENCES OF REPRESSIVE STATE POLICY

 

Minorities are
no longer the official policy topic

 

It is generally
believed that the minority status was in principle, pending an imminent
adoption of some minor legal acts, resolved in keeping with the highest
international standards. Recent spolighting of the Hungarian minority status,
and continuing negative image of Sandzak, due to a host of religious, political
and sports incidents, seem to deny such an assessment. In all likelihood minorities
remain the subject-matter of political strategies and genuine political
instrumentalizations. In that respect Sandzak reality is extremely interesting.

 

The very topic
indicates the extreme complexity of the area. It may be dealt with by various specialists,
ranging from psychiatrists, psychologists, economists, legal experts,
historians, political experts, and politicians. It can be also the
subject-matter of those dealing with spiritual questions, notably sociologists
of culture and religion, cultural experts and ethnologists. Aforementioned
testifies to the fact that Sandžak is a very interesting region, with distinct
features.

 

What makes this
theme very topical, is the fact that the state repression in Sandzak is a
constant, and not incidental political phenomenon. Its manifestations are
varied, pending on the current political situation and very sophisticated
strategies thereof, and on various state arrangements in certain historical
moments. But nonetheless those manifestations are rife with certain constant
stereotypes, which shaped the stances on this area.

 

Consequences of
that continuing repression are a continuing emigration from Sandzak, its
proverbial economic backwardness, and inadequate political solutions concerning
the area.

 

Sandžak is a
historical region. Because of its cultural and historical dimensions, it is a
multicultural, multi-denominational, and intra-cultural entity. That implies
that in the best of cases, cultural, religious and ethnic substrata or
dimensions in Sandzak intermingle and interweave, thus forming a general, joint
identity of the area and its population. That fact had a bearing on all the
political processes which had been unfolding here, on all the state projects
which frequently had been in fact very poor experiments, and on all the
political strategies which had been tested here. Sandzak was simultaneously
important and non-important. Those two co-ordinates of the paradox to a large
extent determined its fate and status.

 

In this
introductory part I would like to underscore several elements which set the
tone of any discussion on the urrent state of affairs. By extensions I shall
place a special emphasis on inter-active relations between local political
subjects and the state policy, that is its institutions, in the process of
creating the image of the present-day or contempory Sandzak and its denizens.
It is currently a very dynamic image. From the standpoint of the still
unresolved issue of identity of Bosniaks and Sandžak, one may perceive the processes
which call into question many standard appraisals.

 

Hyping of
Islamic paradigm and of its internal ferment

 

Problem lies in
failure of other paradigms-economic and political, and not in the Islamic
community. Other dimensions also manifest their failure and inefficiency.

 

Religion, as a
stratum of identity, but not as an institutional structure with broader
ambitions, found its place in that newly-emerged, broad vaccum. However,
cultural dimension of Bosniaks cannot in any terms be reduced only to this
paradigm. Between Bosniak national individualism and Islamic cosmopolitanism,
between the Bosniak pro-European leanings and Oriental Islamism, there is a
vast, empty spiritual space which is slowly and increasingly invaded by an
alien body-pseudoWahabism. I would like to bring your attention to an excellent
observation by Farid Zaccharia in his study „On the Future of Freedom“, namely
«The principal problem is rather the Middle East and not Islam, as Islam».
There is also a hypothesis, very much removed from the reality, that some
interests may try to plunge the European Muslim enclaves into the maelstrom of
the Middle East conflict. Until recently there was much talk about
re-islamization of Muslims. In those terms recent developments in the midst of
the Islamic community took on a much greater resonance and assumed different
repercussions. But in fact they are quite mundane, local, political claims and
demands which are detrimental and could have in the near future devastating
effects. Wise state policy would never foment dissention and rifts, would not
get entangled in them, would have a partner-like relations with this important
institution-the Islamic religious community- which is also a national and
cultural institution. The foregoing is advisable because all that internal
ferment only expands room for uncontrolled outbursts of all kinds of religious
and ideological teachings with may be consonant with some militant Islamic
trends. Therefore the game aiming at debilitating or destroying such an institution
may be very serious and dangerous.

 

Constitutional
framework

 

Adoption of a
non-European, essentially politicking, inconsitent supreme legal act. Though it
deals to a great extent with the minorities issues, that act created a
genuinely new legal position of national minorities. And that position is
unfortunately indicative of discontinuity with the policy towards national
minorities pursued before adoption of the new constitution.

 

Sandzak Bosniaks
cannot identify with any state as their domicile state, for they are not
considered a constituting element in the state which by definition is
simultaneously national and civil, and whose national minority they are. Added
to that by definition BOSNIA IS NOT A NATIONAL STATE OF BOSNIAKS. Sandzak Bosniaks
are in fact the national minority of their own state, which is not theirs by
NATIONAL definition, for in that state they are only citizens. Thus the
framework of their de facto inequality was created, and that inequality
shall produce many structural and legal consequences. It is important to bear
in mind that the ACT of constitution promulgation was the act of a clear
political diversification in the midst of political representatives of Bosniak
minority, that is, diversification between those supporting and those
boycotting the adoption of that act. It is thought that generally Sandzak
Bosniaks have not backed that constitution, and have not recognized it as an
adequate framework of their status.

 

Political
framework

 

Search for the
lost identity-schizophrenic situation of splitting the being and identity of
Sandzak Bosniaks through clear dichotomy East-West, Balkans and
Oriental-European, contemporary and past. What lacks is a CLEAR VISION in the
situation when cultural space is being increasingly emptied. Constructive
cultural policy is nearly non-extant. There is no clear vision of the future
national development and affirmation (dilemmas of multiculturalism and
interculturalism).

 

Democracy with
all characteristics of non-liberal democracy, autocracy, segregation,
partitocracy, totalitarianism on micro plane. Closing of framework, which is AN
EVIDENT EXAMPLE OF LOSS OF FREEDOM AND GHETTOIZATION BY LOCAL POWER-HOLDERS.

 

A genuine
experiment

 

From the
standpoint of the topic, namely repression and its consequences, the current
state of affairs could be called a genuine experiment. Since their placing in
the position of marginal groups, minorities are increasingly becoming a basis
of sure votes for political parties, and paradoxically, of the principal
parties in the political arena, and not of those which by definition are the
regional or minority ones. Regional or minority hallmark is only a
vote-garnering vehicle, while authentic minority interests are lost in some
ambiguous political horse-trading and particular interests. An odd co-operation
has been established between representatives of minority communities and state
representatives and even those political parties whose victims minorities have
been. At play is the phenomenon of the HERD and Shepherd. Hence unmasking of
such a policy, of such relations is of paramount importance for establishment
of liberal democracy. Political reality exposes undignified vassal relations.
Servility and vassal-style relations are reflected in the light of the maxim
that to serve means to rule. Hence the intention of using the individuals
instead of putting in place much-needed minority institutions. The foregoing
only worsens the situation, for those individuals are only false authorities
who only degrade genuine interests and status of minorities.

 

Numerous
on-the-ground facts, that is, facts closely related to Sandzak everyday life
indicate that UNWILLINGLY and disinterestedly Bosniaks were placed in the orbit
of anti-Western and anti-European policy, which is becoming manifest both
globally and-locally. As regards Sandzak it is becoming increasingly evident
that such a policy was well-prepared and conditional, and that recent years of
open repression, laid down the fertile foundations for such a policy. Hence the
role of some, until recently sacred cows of politics, is becoming increasingly
transparent. In other words their actions are increasingly seen in the negative
light, and assessed as compromising and problematic. The phenomenon of cuckoo's
egg is a time-proven mechanism. On the dark screen of Sandzak daily life the
true political profiles of some of those leaders are becoming increasingly
discernible. And their image is slowly being tarnished. Ordinary citizens
because of their growing disinterest in current political affairs, are becoming
passive observers. The foregoing consequently enables misuse or doctoring of
their unexpressed will. Sandžak is fast-aproaching the borderline which makes
nonsensical any democratic process. It seems that the ongoing process no longer
hinges on the will of voters, citizens, members of minority community, but
rather on the will of state, its services and efficiency of strategy of
servility and vassal-style links. So any shift in that process or the
continuity thereof is currently a major imponderable. Alas from continuity of
such a process shall benefit only representatives of political elite. On the
other hand that process shall most hurt citizenry, who in the current policy
and in this local modification of neoliberal democracy no longer recognize
their own framework of political expression. But perhaps that was the point to
which some power-holders strove, the point of ultimate degradation of the role
and status of minority communities and their share in politics in the state in
which they live. Serbia is an excellent example in that regard. But we should
not blame for the foregoing only the state and its government. In fact the
responsibility for such a sorry state of affairs rests primarily on alleged,
minority political representatives. Though they have been imposed such a
framework, they could still act otherwise. Minorities, notably Bosniaks, could
also rebel against such a status of theirs. It seems to me that the
turning-point is not far away.

 

Thus the issues
of identity are stripped of any genuine meaning and content, and well-known
verses «Every wolf is entitled to his sheep» are confirmed.»

 

Shall Aska the
Sheep manage to perform its whole dance or it shall fall into the jaws of
bloodthirsty wolf? Shall it recognize a well-intentioned shepherd or it shall
surrender? We shall see. Aska from Andrić's story clearly sets an instructive
example. However I would not like to go too far in the analysis of that
metaphor.

 

 

 

Ramiz
Crnišanin, lawyer

 

After war, an old
imam met Voja Lekovic. And he asked him: «Before the war you communists used to
say that Sandžak was a God's forsaken country, so is it now forsaken by you
too?!» And this is what Lekovic replied: «It shall not be forsaken anymore»!

 

But in reality
Sandzak remained forsaken.

 

However, some
stereotypes about Sandžak and Bosniaks ought to be changed. New Sandzak does
not resemble the old on. When I finished secondary school in 1941, only 28
Muslim children attended the Novi Pazar secondary school. Of 9 abolished
secondary schools, according to Sreten Vukosavljević, four were in Sandžak.
Thus both Serbs and Muslims had to go to secondary schools in other towns,
notably in Kraljevo. Muslims tended to enroll at secondary schools in the
Muslim-inhabited towns, mostly Prizren.

 

Today we have
nearly 100% literacy, Sandžak is reached at the most in 4-5 hours from the
remotest parts of Serbia, today we have hundreds of thousands of cell phones,
in Novi Pazar alone there are 30,000 cars, both the state and private
university, in fact there are three of them, including the one established by
Karic, there are over 6,000 students…so the picture is not so bleak, the
structure has changed, relations have changed, and we must reckon with all
that. Today we have political parties, and they are jockeying for power by all
means like political parties elsewhere. So why are conflicts among Bosniaks
dramatized so much? But what is really bad is the fact that in Serbia 40% of
Radical Party and Socialist Party voters consider us a nation invented by Josip
Broz Tito, and call us-Turks. But in fact vis a vis their nationality the
majority of Bosniaks have a united stand: they simply consider themselves
–Bosniaks. Some friends of mine, when I was an official during the Communist
era, told me: «What do you want? You are a Muslim, a Serb of Mohammedan faith.»
And I retorted: «So if I am a Serb of Muslim faith, why don't you curse me on
that ground, but rather call me derisively-a Turk.»!!?

 

And that
vilification campaign has now gathered momentum. All those books in
book-stores, their titles attest to that. There is a lot of anti-Muslim,
Islamo-phobic, anti-Bosniak sentiment. And it is continually fomented. We must
prevent it, not only, we, the Bosniaks, by our actions. I know that we cannot
blame for the aforementioned only the state, secret services…We must run
around, like Alice in Wonderland, in order to remain in the same place. That is
our fate. But the state must at least try to prevent the increase in those
differences. Try to reduce them, if possible. And there are significant
differences, different treatments, in the area of employment, in all other
areas…I would not like to repeat what has already been said.

 

Secondly, the
state should try to undo the wrongs done in recent past, notably mete out
justice in the case of abduction of Muslims in Sjeverin, house-torching in
Kukurovići, etc. We filed property compensation suits against the state. Damage
which families have incurred-and those families have lost everything, must be
compensated. And then the first municipal court handed down the ruling that the
case was –outdated. But how can a criminal offence become-outdated? In fact
they are not willing to undo the wrongs. And only will-power is needed for such
undoing. We have five MPs, two are from one party, three are from the other
party, but they all belong to the same coalition. Instead of accusing each
other, they should meet and decide on their future course of action in that
parliament. They should say: these are the national interests of Sandzak
Bosniaks, Sandzak Serbs, we must advocate them jointly…. We have a minister,
we have a vice President, and for the first time Vice President of the National
Assembly is of Bosniak descent. And thus we must stop complaining of
underrepresentation…because we are well represented. But we voters must
compel them to behave as they should.

 

And as regards
Bosniaks, the Bosniak identity, stereotypes should be dispelled too. And in
that regard I expect a much bigger support of the Serb intelligentsia, of the
Serb intellectual circles. Politika's editorial policy is now nearly
identical to the «Reactions and Echoe» it published during the Milosevic era.
We must get that support, for it is an established fact that in Bosnia differentiation
was effected on religious, and not on national grounds. Vuk Stefanović Karadžić
spoke about the Turkish law and the Serb law. Among Christians the line of
separation was not between Serbs and Croats, but rather between Cahtolics and
those of Christian Orthodox faith. Because of that Ilija Garašanin sent to
Orthodox churches over 100 agents disguised as priests to convince those of
Orthodox faith to declare themselves as Serbs. Franciscan monks did the same
thing for Croats. And then differentiation was put in place. And what remained
were the Muslims, who were proclaimed Turks, or Balias. In a nutshell, we
expect the Serb progressive public and intellectuals to work in terms of
decreasing the differences between religions, and not vice versa.

 

Let me give you
an example. For seven years Algeria waged a liberation struggle against the
French. And as soon as they reached their goal, that is, liberation, the
internal, internecine struggles erupted. Therefore, I want to say that we must
take care of the following: on the one hand, we must extend support to the
local institutions, schools, universities etc., while on the other hand,
development programs should not view Sandžak as a foreign body, as a disturbing
factor possibly causing the destruction of the Serb or the Montenegrin state.
As we have discussed the aforementioned extensively, I would only like to
underscore that Bosniaks in the state bodies, either in capacity of MPs, Vice
Presidents, officials, should work on resolving the aforementioned issues,
should take joint actions to that end. On the contrary, voters may strip them
of their trust. All the police forces in the world are glad when they can do
their job, and therefore would be only glad to exploit any internal strife.
Montenegrins divided the Bosniak population into three parts: the Muslims,
Bosniaks and Montengrins-Muslims. That was done because an independent
Montenegro would not have come into being if 15% of Muslims declared themselves
as Muslims, 9% of Albanians declared themselves as Albanians, and 30% of Serbs
declared themselves as Serbs. They had to create fissures and rifts. Of course
any state would do that. And that is precisely what this state is doing now.
Earlier Pavel Domonji explained why the Serb people failed to extend their
support to the Muslims during all those very violent years. In fact even before
the Eight Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of
Serbia an intense psychological priming of the Serb people for justification of
the upcoming violence began. Many radios in the early morning hours played the
song: «…I shall kill you, Muslim!» And how then can a child listening to such
songs from the early days, from kindergarten days, think differently!? Thus
spoke also Ljiljana Bulatovic, who even now writes similar Muslim
vilification-riddled articles. And even today nationalist rallies are held at
the Belgrade Law Faculty. The owner of «Jurišnik» was sentenced to death at the
Nurnberg trial. And he was hanged, because he spread anti-Semitism in his
paper. Not a single journalist in Serbia was convicted. Not even that Baletic
woman, not the others who in their articles spread hatred, demonized other
nations and nationalities.

What could I
possibly add!? We in Sandžak are combatting for those directions mentioned by
Slezović, by Mr. Mirko Ðorðević, Mr. Filipović and all others.
 

Beograd, 2007.