HomeAktuelnostiHelsinški odbor za zaštitu ljudskih prava o represivnoj politici države prema Sandžaku 24. Decembra 2007. Aktuelnosti 862 SANDŽAK: POSLEDICE REPRESIVNE POLITIKE DRŽAVE Sonja Biserko: Mislimo da je važno da u ovom trenutku razgovaramo o situaciji u Sandžaku. U ovom trenutku duboke društvene i političke krize u Srbiji, Sandžak nam se čini jednom od potencijalno najosetljivijih tačaka. Prvenstveno zbog toga što je Sandžak bio deo ratnog programa kada je reč o Bosni. Potvrda za ovu tezu je državna represija i teror koji su u Sandžaku provoðeni početkom devedestih, a naročito tokom rata u Bosni. SANDŽAK: POSLEDICE REPRESIVNE POLITIKE DRŽAVE Panel Sonja Biserko: Mislimo da je važno da u ovom trenutku razgovaramo o situaciji u Sandžaku. U ovom trenutku duboke društvene i političke krize u Srbiji, Sandžak nam se čini jednom od potencijalno najosetljivijih tačaka. Prvenstveno zbog toga što je Sandžak bio deo ratnog programa kada je reč o Bosni. Potvrda za ovu tezu je državna represija i teror koji su u Sandžaku provoðeni početkom devedestih, a naročito tokom rata u Bosni. Odsustvo političkog kapaciteta aktuelnog državnog vrha Srbije da se suoči sa stvarnim problemima ovog društva, izemðu ostalog, i onim što je država činila u Sandžaku, motiviše nas da otvorimo suštinu problema Sandžaka kao vrlo specifične regije Srbije. Na žalost, i demokratske vlasti su organizovano radile na sprečavanju konstituisanja bošnjačke zajednice. Otuda je Sandžak poslednjih goidna u konstatnoj krizi. Da podsetim – Bošnjaci su nova manjina u Srbiji nakon raspada Jugoslavije i ima veoma male kapacitete u konstitusanju vlastite infrastrukture, odnosno identiteta. S druge strane, te nedostatke Beograd je veoma koristio i uspeo je da razbije sandžačku političku i društvenu scenu. Zbog toga je religija bila jedini kohezioni element koji je Beograd, zahvaljujući slabostima koje sam spomenula, takoðe podelio. Preko fenomena vehabija obnovljena je teza o opasnosti od islamskog fundamentalizma za koji je Milorad Ekmečić nedavno potvrdio potvrdio da je srušio Jugoslaviju. Spinovanje opsanosti od vehabija dobilo je razmere koje ne odgovaraju stvarnosti. Ta kampanja je završila sa optužnicom protiv 15 vehabija kojima se sada sudi. Nije slučajno da se ponovo javljaju tekstovi koje piše Ljiljana Bulatović pod naslovom “Muslimani, islam, džihad, mudžahedini na Balkanu”. Uloga službi bezbednosti u Sandžaku ima kontinuitet permanentnog destabilizovanja regiona. Ne samo da je to radila kroz zavaðanje bošnjačkih lidera, već je, naročito tokom rata u Bosni, radila i na etničkom čišćenju regiona u skladu sa tezom o “zelenoj transverzali”. Nakon odlaska Miloševića, ni demokratska vlada nije napravila nikakav napor da ih poništi. I na kraju, postavlja se i pitanje kako Evropa tretira islam koji je ravnopravna evropska religija. Istorijski gledano na islam se gledalo kao na političkog neprijatelja na kome je Evropa gradila svoj politički identitet. Odnos Evrope prema muslimanima generalno (onim evropskim posebno) bitno će uticati i na položaj muslimana na Balkanu. Pavel Domonji: Sandžak: Posledice represivne politike Represivna politika je, po definiciji, politika koja se snažno oslanja na nepolitička sredstva i proizvodi užasne posledice, jer iza sebe ostavlja pustoš, mrtve, strah i nesigurnost. Podsetimo se da su Bošnjaci Sandžaka tokom raspada Jugoslavije bili izloženi teroru, otmicama, likvidacijama – dakle, raznim oblicima nasilja, šikaniranja i maltretiranja, kao i destrukciji imovine. Kada govorimo o posledicama represivne politike onda ne smemo smetnuti sa uma nekoliko činjenica, prvo, nasilni raspad Jugoslavije doveo je do promene statusa Muslimana koji su od naroda postali nepriznata i obespravljena nacionalna manjina, sa svim problemima koji iz takvog statusa proizilaze; drugo, etnički motivirano nasilje je produbilo etnokulturalne rascepe u Sandžaku i dovelo do problema u meðuetničkim odnosima i, treće, eliminacionističke politike na jednoj, i brutalne negacije identiteta na drugoj strani, naterali su Bošnjake da jače naglase distinktivna obeležja svog identiteta što je, kao posledicu, otvorilo i pitanje integracije same bošnjačke zajednice. Osim pomenutih, postoje i drugi problemi koje ovom prilikom treba, barem, notirati. To se, pre svega, odnosi na, recimo, problem privrednog zaostajanja Sandžaka, zatim na problem medijskog stigmatiziranja regiona kao mračnog mesta kriminalnih i ilegalnih aktivnosti, te problem političke kriminalizacije zahteva za ureðenjem Sandžaka kao posebne teritorijalno-političke jedinice. Kada je o poslednjem problemu reč treba reći da o ovom zahtevu nikada nije povedena otvorena i ozbilja rasprava sa političkim vlastima, niti je meðu stanovnicima Sanžaka postignut konsenzus o ovom pitanju. Nakon Petog oktobra došlo je do stanovitog psihološkog rasterećenja i uverenja Bošnjaka da će, participirajući u izgradnji demokratskog poretka, lakše ostvarivati neke svoje fundamentalne interese. To se, pre svega, odnosi na procese «izgradnje nacije», ali isto tako i na zahteve za ostvarenjem pravde i kažnjavanjem ne samo počinilaca, nego i inspiratora i organizatora zločina nad Bošnjacima. U razgovorima koje su članovi Helsinškog odbora svojevremeno vodili sa predstavnicima Bošnjaka naglašeno je da će Bošnjaci preko zahteva za ostvarenjem pravde prosuðivati koliko je srbijansko društvo spremno da ide daleko u rasvetljavanju zločina, odnosno da li se i koliko emancipovalo od Miloševićeve politike. Neću pogrešiti ako kažem da Bošnjaci u svim dosadašnjim suðenjima nisu prepoznali političku volju da se sudi svima koji su, na ovaj ili onaj način, upleteni u zločine, niti je jasno i odlučno manifestovana volja da se osudi državna politika etničkog čišćenja, kako je tu politiku nazivao pokojni Šefko Alomerović. Kada je reč o «izgradnji nacije», pripadnici Bošnjačke manjine suočeni su sa nizom problema svojstvenih, uzgred rečeno, svim novonastalim manjinama. Reč je, pre svega o manjku institucija neophodnih za očuvanje i razvoj kulture i nacionalnog identiteta. Deficit institucija se može objasniti tragičnim iskustvom Bošnjaka, jer je u uslovima snažnog nacionalšovinizma i etničkog čišćenja pitanje opstanka potisnulo sva druga pitanja, pa i ona koja se tiču institucionalne izgradnje bošnjačke zajednice. U «izgradnji nacije» ključnu ulogu imaju elite, kulturna i politička, pre svega. I jedna i druga artikulišu odnos pripadnika vlastite grupe prema pitanjima koja zadiru u vitalne nacionalne interese. Kulturna elita sandžačkih Bošnjaka je, po mom sudu, a on je, napominjem, ograničen, slaba i marginalizovana, lišena čvrstih i stabilnih institucionalnih uporišta. U Sandžaku, recimo, nema nezavisnih časopisa, preko kojih bi, kako kulturna elita, tako i inteligencija Sandžaka, kritički reflektirala zbivanja u vlastitoj zajednici, zbivanja na Sandžaku, ali i u samoj Srbiji. Javnim prostorom potpuno dominira politička elita. Problem sa političkom elitom je u tome što je ona potpuno antagonizovana, podeljena, opterećena sukobima, sujetom i ambicijom lidera da govore kao jedini i pravi predstavnici svoje nacije. Tamo gde stranke i stranačke voðe isključivo sebe vide kao jedine, prave i autentične zagovornike i predstavnike nacionalnih interesa, tamo gde lideri i njihove stranke nisu u stanju da se ophrvu zovu autoritarnosti, tamo nema ni volje, ni prostora, ni mogućnosti da se stranke konstituišu, ne samo kao liberalni i tolerantni akteri, nego i kao akteri koji se groze upotrebe nepolitičkih sredstava. Dakle, želja političkih aktera da maksimalizuju svoj uticaj i svoju moć proizvodi niz nekoliko negativnih posledica. Produbljivanjem i radikalizacijom sukoba otvaraju se vrata upotrebi nasilja u politici. Sukobi izmeðu političkih aktera postoje i u drugim etničkim zajednicama, ali ono po čemu se sukobi unutar bošnjačkog političkog društva izdvajaju jeste brutalnost. Pošto se u tim sukobima koriste rekviziti svojstveni jednoj drugoj vrsti sukoba ne iznenaðuju predlozi nekih civilnih organizacija da se bošnjačkim političkim strankama na 10 godina zabrani rad, zato što „primenjuju nasilje i koriste govor mržnje“. Drugo, dolazi do pomeranja i prelivanja sukoba izvan političke sfere i to je ono čemu već izvesno vreme svedočimo. Sukobi se, naime, prelivaju i prenose na islamsku versku zajednicu. Pojava vehabija samo dodatno komplikuje ove probleme, jer dodatno zaoštrava antagonozovane oponentske opcije. Napokon, sukobi unutar bošnjačke zajednice omogućuju i akterima, kako izvan bošnjačke zajednice, tako i izvan Sandžaka, da se involviraju u sukobe i da ih, u skladu sa svojim interesima, doziraju, usmeravaju ili preusmeravaju. Vrlo često, na primer, sukobljene strane nastoje da diskredituju jedna drugu meðusobno se optužujući da deluju kao eksponenti tajnih, neformalnih struktura i centara moći, BIA i raznih kabineta. Te primedbe nisu bez osnova, jer državne agencije nisu neutralne ni u sukobima koje se odvijaju i na drugim stranama. Podsetimo se samo, ilustracije radi, optužbi koje postoje izmeðu Bunjevaca i Hrvata. Sukobi i naročito njihova brutalizacija proizvode niz štetnih posledica: 1. otežavaju proces integracije bošnjačke zajednice (unutar sebe, kao i u globalno društvo); 2. otežavaju njeno konstituisanje u zrelu naciju; 3. usporavaju procese modernizacije; 4. snaže predrasude o Sandžaku kao regionu sklonom radikalizaciji i nesposobnom za demokratiju. Sukobi ne odgovaraju običnim Bošnjacima i sirotinji na tržištu rada, ali odgovaraju stranačkim oligarhijama i političkoj klasi u Beogradu, jer slabe pritisak koji bi iz regije išao u pravcu brže decentralizacije, otresitijeg sprovoðenja reformi, bržih evrointegracija, suočavanja sa prošlošću, odlučnije saradnje sa Haškim tribunalom, itd. Ako je ranije od strane države dolazila represivno motivirana praksa, od koga treba da doðe podsticaj ka demokratizaciji? U postkomunizmu odgovornost je za to «pripisana» civilnom društvu. Svoju herojsku ulogu civilno drustvo je u Srbiji odigralo obaranjem Miloševića, sada predstoji dug, uporan, mukotrpan rad na, ne samo u izgradnji demokratije, nego i odgoju naroda za demokratiju. Civilno društvo u Sandžaku je slabo, potisnuto, suočeno sa hroničnom nestašicom novca i nerazumevanjem državnih organa. No, i takvo kakvo je, opterećeno brojnim problemima, civilno društvo u Sandžaku je još uvek bolje od svog pojmovnog para – političkog društva – i zaslužuje svaku vrstu podrške. Samiha Kačar, Sandžački odbor za ljudska parava: Sandžak, koji se sada nalazi u dvije samostalne države, zauzima posebno mjesto u istoriji raspada jugoslavenske državne zajednice. Imajući u vidu blisku prošlost, kao i sve ono što se dešavalo na tom neuralgičnom prostoru, posebno u periodu od 1991. do 1995., ali i kasnije, može se reći da su zbivanja u Sandžaku (ubistva, pljačke, otmice nedužnih graðana, topovsko–tenkovsko okruženje gradova, masovna iseljavanja stanovništva, razni oblici diskriminacije, sudsko–politički procesi, brojni “informativni razgovori”, preventivna represija, itd.) ostala u sjeni onoga što se tragično dešavalo u Hrvatskoj, BiH i na Kosovu. Zaštita narušenih ljudskih prava i sloboda putem institucija sistema, na osnovu dosadašnjih iskustava, ne daje pravo za veći optimizam. Brojne krivični postupci žrtava policijske torture su, zbog sudske neažurnosti, odugovlačenja i brojnih opstrukcija, već zastarjele. Iseljavanje iz Sandžaka i dalje se nastavlja. U Hagu se podižu optužnice za zločine počinjene u Hrvatskoj, BiH, na Kosovu, kao i u Vojvodini. Mnogi zločini počinjeni u Sandžaku su jednostavno prepušteni zaboravu, iako su trebali biti predmet interesovanja države i sudskih organa. Sandžak takoðer ima pravo na istinu i njeno institucionalno priznavanje. O svemu onome šta se zbivalo u njemu u proteklom periodu, uz ostalo, dokumentovano svjedoče i brojne publikacije Sandžačkog odbora za zaštitu ljudskih prava i sloboda, kao i drugih nevladinih organizacija (Fonda za humanitarno pravo, Helsinškog odbora za ljudska prava u Srbiji). Rezultati referenduma u Crnoj Gori 2006. označili su konačan raspad državne zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore, ostatka nekadašnje Jugoslavije, a samim tim i razdvajanje bošnjačke zajednice u Sandžaku, koja sada, podijeljena, živi u dvije odvojene samostalne države. Referendum u Crnoj Gori je pokazao duboke podjele izmeðu predstavnika bošnjačke zajednice u «srpskom» i «crnogorskom» dijelu Sandžaka. Novi Pazar se, sa uvoðenjem višestranačja, kao bošnjački svakoliki centar nije pokazao doraslim vremenu i svim iskušenjima u proteklom periodu. On je, nakon svega, definitivno prestao biti bošnjački «centar» odakle su pojedini politički predstavnici mislili koordinirati radom bošnjačkih institucija i stranaka, bez obzira na republičke granice, na prostoru Sandžaka. Iskazana je znatna politička nezrelost bošnjačkih predstavnika, praćenih političkim neiskustvom. Politički ciljevi su bili artkulisani smušeno, više propagandno, ali neprimjereno vremenu i okruženju. Pod terminom Sandžak danas se sve više govori o onom dijelu Sandžaka koji se nalazi u granicama Republike Srbije, dok se o onom drugom dijelu koji se nalazi u Republici Crnoj Gori sve manje govori. I ovaj veći dio u Srbiji se, ne samo terminološki, sve više svodi samo na tri opštine: na Novi Pazar, Sjenicu i Tutin. O Sandžaku se neosporno može govoriti višeznačno, iz više uglova. Tu se i vide razlike izmeðu političara i predstavnika nevladinih organizacija. Svim njegovim problemima treba pristupiti obazrivo. U Srbiji danas Bošnjaci čine manje od dva posto stanovništva. Iseljavanja traju i iz „srbijanskog“ kao i iz „crnogorskog“ dijela Sandžaka. Mnogi problemi su, bez obzira na odvajanje Crne Gore, ostali isti. Treba takoðe još više raditi na afirmaciji bošnjačke duhovnosti, nacionalne svijesti. Ukoliko se tome ozbiljno ne priðe, prisutna je zebnja da će se Bošnjaci svesti na minornu vjersku zajednicu, bez razvijenih nacionalnih institucija. Bošnjački pokret u Sandžaku nikada se nije uspio adekvatno i realno institucionalizovati. Bošnjački političari uskih vidika nisu uspjeli u proteklih 16 godina da na pravi način artikulišu potrebe bošnjačke zajednice, niti da ih realno postave, zaklanjajući se brojnim «memorandumima» i demagoškim tiradama. Na polju kulture, jačanja nacionalne svijesti, razvijanju ozbiljnih projekata koji bi uticali na jačanje bošnjačke nacionalne svijesti, istraživanju sopstvene kulture, jezika, istorije, tradicije postignuti su veoma skromni rezultati. Iako je bošnjačko stanovništvo u Sandžaku bilo podijeljeno izmedju dvije republike, nisu ostvareni značajniji rezultati na njegovom duhovnom, kulturnom i obrazovnom povezivanju. Nikakve propagandne floskule nisu mogle pomoći u prevazilaženju brojnih problema, osim što su maskirali pravo, poražavajuće stanje stvari. Meðusobna gloženja, stalna unutrašnja trvenja, umnožavanja papirnatih institucija samo su pokazali da u tom razdoblju Bošnjaci nisu imali ni političkog, ali ni intelektualnog potencijala da naðu prava rješenja za budućnost. Jednonacionalni zahtjevi za autonomijom Sandžaka iskazani 1991. bili su u startu problematični zbog odbojnosti ne samo političkih centara u Beogradu i Podgorici, već i odbojnosti srpskog i crnogorskog življa u Sandžaku. Maksimalistički zahtjevi su bili potpuno suprotni pravom intelektualnom, ekonomskom, kulturnom potencijalu Bošnjaka Sandžaka. Beograd i Podgorica, svjesni brojnih slabosti i trvenja unutar bošnjačkih političkih predstavnika, nisu pokazali nikakvu značajniju spremnost ni za ozbiljnije razgovore, a kamoli za uvažavanje bošnjačkih zahtjeva. Takva praksa Beograda i Podgorice je bila i ostala konstanta. Zato je i podjela Bošnjaka logična posljedica promašene politike bošnjačkih stranaka još od 1990. godine. Nakon promjena 2000. oko čijeg se karaktera u Srbiji odavno polemiše, svakako se lakše diše. Stanje ljudskih i manjinskih prava u Srbiji pokazuje pomak u odnosu na predhodni period, ali diskriminacija prema manjinskim nacionalnim zajednicama i dalje je najčešći oblik kršenja ljudskih prava. Manjinske zajednice nisu više predmet sistematskog pritiska, ali su i dalje izložene različitim oblicima diskriminacije i netrpeljivosti. Na zakonodavnom planu je takoðe, napravljen odreðeni pomak, pogotovo usvajanjem Zakona o pravima nacionalnih manjina, kao i ratifikovanjem Okvirne konvencije Savjeta Evrope o poštovanju prava manjinskih nacionalnih zajednica. Meðutim, pri implementaciji Zakona o manjinama i Okvirne konvencije uočeni su brojni problemi. U nekim sandžačkim opštinama još uvek nisu implementirane odredbe Konvencije o službenoj upotrebi jezika, iako je to bila obaveza na samo po meðunarodnom pravu, već i po domaćem zakonodavstvu (Priboj, Prijepolje). Zakoni o pravima manjinskih zajednica se više donose zbog preuzetih obaveza pred meðunarodnom zajednicom, a ne da bi se praktično primenjivali. Svojedobno se mnogo govorilo o Saveznom zakonu o manjinama, koji je donet uz veliki publicitet, da je to nešto što će znatno i istinski unaprediti ljudska prava, a u stvarnosti je bilo drugačije iz više razloga (politički problemi, odnosi izmeðu dvije države). Pitanja kadrovske strukture, nacionalne izbalansiranosti u Sandžaku zaslužuje posebnu pozornost. U ovim, ali i drugim opštinama još uvijek nema značajnih pomaka kada je u pitanju primjena Okvirne konvencije. Ima indicija da je učešće bošnjačkih predstavnika u lokalnim organima vlasti uslovljeno nizom kompromisa na koje moraju pristati. To je slučaj u nekoliko sandžačkih opština. Prema podacima na osnovu istraživanja Sandžačkog odbora, nacionalna i kadrovska struktura u pojedinim opštinama ove regije je i dalje izuzetno nepovoljna, ne odgovara sastavu stanovništva. Sandžački odbor je istražio stanje u kadrovskoj strukturi u opštinama Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin, Priboj i Prijepolje Nacionalna zastupljenost je potpuno poremećena u državnim instucijama (MUP, sudovi, tužilaštva, vojska) na štetu Bošnjaka. Praksa koja je postojala u prošloj deceniji još uvijek nije napuštena. U Sjenici, u opštinskom tužilaštvu, od ukupnog broja zaposlenih, ne radi nijedno lice bošnjačke nacionalnosti. Zabrinutost u Sandžaku i za Sandžak je doista opravdana, imajući u vidu sveopšte stanje, prisilne reducirane potrebe, kao i sve izraženiju, tešku privrednu krizu koja se manifestira u svim ravnima života, njegovo sve još očitije zaostajanje u odnosu na druge dijelove zemlje. Malo se u Novom Pazaru, gradu koji želi da bude bošnjačko političko i nacionalno središte, govori o Bošnjacima u Novoj Varoši, Priboju ili Prijepolju. Oni kao da su, zbog svoje relativne malobrojnosti, jednostavno zaboravljeni. Ovi Bošnjaci su najprisutniji u izvještajima nevladinih organizacija, i meðu njima posebno Sandžačkog odbora. Seobe ka Bosni, bolje rečeno ka Sarajevu, traju i dalje iz Priboja, Prijepolja, ali iz Sjenice, Tutina. Taj proces je davno započeo. Kao da mu nema kraja. Iz Novog Pazara, Sjenice, Tutina, odlaze Srbi, ali i Bošnjaci. To su složene teme koje se ne mogu prećutkivati. Mnogi su problemi zajednički, iako oni nerijetko dobijaju isključivu nacionalnu formu. Popisi stanovništva traže odgovore na brojna pitanja. Jedno od njih je i da li Republika Srbija želi da konačno prestane iseljavanje Bošnjaka. To je dilema pred kojom su se našle zatečene mnoge generacije Bošnjaka. Ukoliko je odgovor potvrdan onda se mora primjenjivati sasvim drugačija politika prema ovim krajevima, mnogo iskrenija, mnogo operativnija. Ona mora imati institucionalnu i transparentnu formu. Danas se, iz više razloga, dosta ulaže i govori o tri opštine na jugu Srbije (Preševo, Bujanovac…), nego o ovom prostoru, mada on zaslužuje brigu države i svakoliku pomoć. Sandžak je i prije raspada socijalističke Jugoslavije, slovio kao jedna od najzaostalijih oblasti u toj državi. Investicije uporno zaobilaze sandžačke krajeve. To je inače i na hiljade ljudi odvelo i odvodi sa ovog prostora. Raseljeni Sandžak je mnogo brojniji od onog pravog. Političkom i marketinškom retorikom prekrivaju se i marginaliziraju njegovi suštinski problemi: nerazvijenost i besperspektivnost, nizovi devijantnih pojava (kriminal, korupcija, prostitucija, droga). Sandžak se nalazi u dubokoj društvenoj i ekonomskoj krizi koja se osjeća u svim ravnima života. Siva ekonomija, droga, prostitucija, pljačka, ubistva, politički sukobi, takoðe čine dio stvarnosti. Jedan problem nadrasta drugi. Svjedoci smo takoðer, s druge strane, postojanja čitavog niza problema u sandžačkoj sredini koji mogu imati neželjene posljedice po ukupno stanje: «govor mržnje» u medijima, incidenti na sportskim susretima, ispisivanje nacionalističkih parola i grafita, pojedine neodmjerene izjave političara, učestali sukobi članova i simpatizera pojedinih stranaka i slično, sukobi, unutar islamske zajednice koji mogu biti veoma opasni. Neke pojave nije dovoljno samo osuditi, treba ih svakako pokušati i objasniti, staviti u realne okvire. Ovaj prostor se, meðutim, i dalje predstavlja u crno-bijelim šemama, što je nastavak zamagljivanja njegove složene zbilje. I dalje se uporno u srbijanskim medijima, ali i po potrebi politike, podržava slika o islamu kao neprijateljskoj religiji i sveopštoj opasnosti. Znatan dio printanih glasila je ponovo vratio u svakodnevno korišćenje propagandne termine poput onih sa početka devedesetih godina prošlog stoljeća, o islamskoj opasnosti, teroristima i slično. Stereotipi i predrasude pokazuju izuzetnu vitalnost. Novinski članci o nekakvoj „zelenoj transferzali“, „islamskoj opasnosti“, „Beloj Al-kaidi“ i slično su još uvijek prisutni, a po potrebi, se i dopunjuju novim „opasnostima“. Mediji o Bošnjacima govore povremeno kao da se oni mjere u brojkama od više stotina hiljada. Po potrebi, oni su u medijima tek neznatna manjina, ali, kada zatreba, oni postaju opasnost za Balkan i region u cjelini. Istinu, meðutim, znaju i novinari i političari. Islamsku opasnost proizvode oni koji o njoj najviše i pišu, ignorišući brojne činjenice koje govore suprotno od onoga što plasiraju putem medija. Pojedinačni incidenti koji se dešavaju nisu pravilo, niti se može raditi o opštim pojavama koje ugrožavaju mir i stabilnost na ovom prostoru. Mediji, po potrebi, uvijek senzacionalistički apostrofiraju Sandžak kao novo, moguće krizno žarište, otkrivaju povremeno potencijalne teroriste i slično. Na ovaj način se širi islamofobija i plaši cijeli region i Evropa od Bošnjaka. Novi Pazar skoro da ne izlazi iz „crnih hronika“. Novinare ovdje zanimaju samo takve, nikako drugačije vijesti. A treba reći da Novi Pazar, kao i druge opštine pritiskaju dugogodišnji problemi. Poreðenje infrastrukture izmeðu Novog Pazara, Kraljeva ili Čačka daje porazne rezultate. O tome se malo, ili nikako ne govori. I ovdje žive ljudi, koji traže da imaju slične uslove života kakvi postoje u drugim gradovima. O sandžačkim selima i tamošnjim prilikama da i ne govorim. Moram svakako ukazati da je neophodno ukazivati na potrebu nacionalnog balansiranja u državnim institucijama na lokalnom nivou (sud, policija, tužilaštvo) gdje bi Bošnjaci, shodno svom broju, trebali biti još prisutniji. Posebno je pitanje učešće i prisutnost Bošnjaka u republičkim institucijama. Bošnjaci se moraju institucionalno izboriti za sva prava koja im pripadaju, moraju prevazići brojne podjele, kao i improvizacije na mnogim nivoima, kako bi osigurali ovom prostoru prosperitet i budućnost. Ukoliko do toga ne doðe, ovo što je ostalo od Sandžaka još više će se dijeliti, ali i marginalizovati. Vlast u Beogradu redovno prosuðuju u bošnjačkim sporovima, rukovodeći se prije svega, svojim interesima. Meho Omerović, narodni poslanik Zahvaljujem se Helsinškom odboru i gospoði Sonji Biserko što su, čini mi se, u pravom trenutku otvorili pitanje Sandžaka na ovakav način, jer, kompleksnost problema Sandžaka zahteva i kontinuirano bavljenje i uzrocima kao i posledicama i naravno onim što čini svakodnevni život kada je u pitanju ovaj veoma specifičan prostor. Ja ću u veoma kratkom izlaganju ukazati samo na jedan aspekt koji nije samo posledica.nego je, rekao bih, i neka vrsta perfidne politike koju deo države, koji je, na žalost, oličen u visokim predstavnicima vlasti vodi prema jednom delu zemlje, Sandžaku, prema jednom narodu odnosno manjinskoj zajednici, Bošnjacima, i prema njihovoj verskoj zajednici, Islamskoj verskoj zajednici. Juče je u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srbije, na sednici odbora za bezbednost i odbranu, direktor BIA gospodin Rade Bulatović, rekao, citiram:»Da su jedan od faktora ugrožavanja bezbednosti Srbije i tenzije unutar Islamske zajednice»! Upravo na primeru sukoba unutar Islamske zajednice, država Srbija je pokazala kako ne bi trebalo da se ponaša odgovorna država. Zašto to kažem i zašto to tvrdim? Iz jednostavnog razloga koji je veoma poznat javnosti, a na koji doista svakodnevno treba podsećati i upozoravati, jer je resorni ministar, ministar vera u Vladi Republike Srbije, gospodin Naumov, prekršio Zakon. Stavio se na jednu od strana unutar sukoba Islamske verske zajednice što je, složićete se, nedopustivo. Gospodin Naumov se upustio čak i u objašnjenja, pa je tako govorio kako država priznaje obe, i onu u Beogradu, i onu u Novom Pazaru, kaže gospodin Naumov da «ima mesta i za Mešihat ima mesta i za Rijaset…»! Ne priznaje država Srbija, kaže Naumov, samo jednu islamsku versku zajednicu, on kaže da «jeste jedna islamska zajednica, ali su ovo različite forme!». Meðutim, ono što gospodin Naumov nije rekao i za šta nam od tog trenutka, prošlo je skoro 20 dana, duguje odgovor to je, kako to da jedna niža organizaciona forma, u ovom slučaju muftijstvo i to samo jedan njen deo, preskače onu iznad sebe i formira najvišu, a to je Rijaset. E, sada će biti jako interesantno videti kako se gospodin ministar Naumov ponaša prema jednom drugom, iliti sličnom problemu. Naime, pre nekoliko dana Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva je podnela zahtev, u skladu sa Zakonom o crkvama i verskim zajednicama, da se upiše u registar crkvenih odnosno verskih organizacija. Dakle, da li će gospodin Naumov sad imati isti stav kao u slučaju islamske zajednice, da mogu postojati dve pravoslavne crkve u Srbiji. Po svemu sudeći, iz svega ovoga izvlači se zaključak da bi neki u Srbiji želeli da se formira neka vrsta «srpske islamske zajednice». Jer, teza da Bošnjaci predstavljaju izmišljen narod, da su oni Srbi, ustvari, muslimanske veroispovesti, je u poslednje vreme čak veoma rasporostranjena. Ovakav odnos države i njenih najviših organa nas dovodi i do ovoga što je i današnja tema, a to je taj vid represivne politike države koju deo države vodi prema jednom celom regionu. Zašto je to tako mislim da nam je ponuðen samo jedan jedini odgovor: naime, očigledno je na delu vraćanje dugova koalicionom partneru. Izgleda da, evo, država ili bar jedan njen deo, saučestvuje u pokušaju pravljenja privatne ili partijske islamske zajednice. Jer, nikako drugačije se ne može protumačiti činjenica da su najviši predstavnici novoformirane islamske zajednice u stvari bili odbornici ili su i dan-danas funkcioneri Stranke demokratske akcije, koalicionog partnera partije kojoj pripada i ministar vera gospodin Naumov. Ja bih vas podsetio, prošle godine, ta ista partija kojoj pripada gospodin Naumov, je nezakonito u Novom Pazaru uvela privremene mere i u sukobu dve bošnjačke političke partije se, kao i u slučaju sukoba unutar islamske verske zajednice, stavila na jednu stranu. Sticaj okolnosti je pokazao da je to uvek jedna te ista strana, strana koju vodi gospodin Sulejman Ugljanin. Čini mi se da je problem za sve nas u Srbiji to što ta partija, partija predsednika Vlade Republike Srbije, koja ima najveći koalicioni kapacitet, ili «potencijal» u Srbiji, kako oni to vole da kažu, na žalost, ima samo remetilačke partnere. U Crnoj Gori su to Demokratska srpska stranka i Narodna stranka, u Republici Srpskoj je to Srpska demokratska stranka sa kojom imaju potpisan i koalicioni sporazum, a evo, vidimo u Sandžaku, to je partija koju vodi gospodin Sulejman Ugljanin. Sonja Biserko: Dajem reč sada g.Vukomanoviću. Nadam se da ćete nam nešto reći o vehabijima, pošto ste upućeni u to šta je to vehabizam. Radi se o verskom pokretu koji je i legalan i legitiman i ne može se zabraniti niti po Ustavu niti po Zakonu o crkvama i verskim zajednicama, kao i drugim meðunarodnim dokumentima. Meðutim, želela bih istovremeno da citiram i muftiju Zukorlića koji kaže: «Za mene je to grupa ekstremista i oni su bitni samo ako ih neko zloupotrebi. Oni ovde nemaju apsolutno uporište meðu narodom i zato dugoročno ne mogu da budu opasnost. Mi imamo informacije o tome, ali ne želimo da ih iznosimo već to treba da urade istražni organi»! Ja bih zamolila da se osvrnete na ovu pojavu na Balkanu s obzirom da očigledno njihovo prisustvo izaziva takvu pozornost. Milan Vukomanović, profesor sociologije Evo, kratko samo… Ja sam o vehabijama i ranije govorio i to je prenošeno u javnosti našoj, ali ukratko, suština toga je da je kod nas to jedna marginalna pojava unutar islama, marginalna, utoliko što nikad nije uhvatila korena na Balkanu. Ni u Bosni, ni na Kosovu ni ovde u ovom sandžačkom slučaju, iako je bilo odreðenih incidenata, ali jeste pojava koja se može zloupotrebiti. Vehabizam kao takav predstavlja jednu vrstu zloupotrebe islama. Znači, (pod 1) to je jedan pokret koji ima snažne misionarske ambicije, možemo reći, globalne ambicije, ali nije uhvatio korena svugde onako kako je kao vodeća politička ideologija, verska ideologija, imao temelje u Saudijskoj Arabiji, u matičnoj zemlji iz koje je ponikao kao jedna vrsta ideologije, znači, tu je jedan istorijat. Ali, ovde kod nas, te misionarske tendencije, bar na Balkanu koliko sam ja imao prilike to da ispratim, zaista nisu imale pogodno tle iz prostog razloga što ovde na Balkanu tradicionalno živimo zajedno sa jednim islamom koji je mnogo umereniji, koji je liberalniji u smislu versko-pravne škole, koji je, na kraju krajeva, islam koji je prilično pod uticajem surfijske tradicije, duhovne tradicije u islamu, i jednostavno, ta vrsta «importa» nije nikad mogla da na bitniji način utiče, u smislu transformacije onoga što jeste domaći islam. Ali, nezavisno od ove islamološke debate, i nezavisno, naravno, od tih mogućnosti zloupotrebe pojedinih pokreta ovde, ja bih se osvrnuo na nešto što možda nema toliko veze sa samim islamom, ali ima veze sa ponašanjem naše države u odnosu na dve stvari koje su po meni mnogo širi i ozbiljniji problemi, oba se tiču vlasti u Srbiji, sve tri grane vlasti, najviše, naravno, izuvršne. Ja tu mislim, najpre, na ugrožavanje slobode veroispovesti, kako verujućih tako i neverejućih graðana u našoj zemlji. Ugrožena je sloboda vere, ali ugrožena je i sloboda od vere, dakle, oba elementa su ovde na udaru, to je jedan vrsta udara na verske slobode, da se izrazim tako, parafraziram naslov knjige jednog mog kolege kada je to stavio u kontekst prostestantskih zajednica. Druga stvar koja predstavlja zbiljan problem jesu periodični talasi antimuslimanskog i antiislamskog ponašanja i delovanja bez adekvatne reakcije državnih institucija. U oba slučaja nije dakle, samo reč o nekakvoj unutarmuslimanskoj podeli u Sandžaku, već o nečemu što treba da se tiče i nemuslimana. Ukupno stanje meðureligijskih odnosa pa i odnosa crkva – država, se pogoršalo sa Koštuničinom vladom, kako onom prošlom tako i ovom sadašnjom, položaj Srpske pravoslavne crkve je tu svakako bolji, svi smo toga svedoci, nego što je bilo u Miloševićevo vreme, ali su zato mnogo više na udaru male verske zajednice, ili manjinske verske zajednice ovde. Iako sada imamo zakon, a tada ga nije bilo, država. odnosno, Vlada Srbije, ugrožava verske slobode svojih graðana, i to pre svega čine vladajuće stranke u ime države, naročito one kojima je poveren odnos sa verskim zajednicama, to znači one koje supervizira ministarstvo vera, a to je u ovom slučaju Demokratska stranka Srbije. Da ilustrujem samo i podsetim vas na opštepoznate stvari ali kada ih sagledamo u kontinuitetu onda vidimo gde leži stvarni problem. Podsetiću na nastojanja bivše ministarke prosvete da se potisne darvinizam i afirmiše kreacionizam u javnim školskim programima, zatim, podsetiću na skandaloznu prvu verziju prednacrta Zakona o verskoj slobodi tadašnjeg ministra Radulovića, na one stavke o imunitetu sveštenika i čitav niz drugih stvari, gde se jasno videlo da se Ministrastvo vera stavilo uz većinsku versku zajednicu u našoj zemlji, zatim, slučajeve moralne panike oko malih verskih zajednica, gde najviše kumuju neke strukture u samoj policiji, pa i sam ministar policije je davao vrlo neodgovorne izjave u slučaju, recimo, Novih Banovaca, gde se olako i ishitreno dovode nekakva grozna ubistva sa delovanjem malih verskih zajednica. Za posledicu onda redovno imamo i napade na te male verske zajednice, potpuno nedužne ovde, dakle, religijske zajednice nalaze se na udaru sveštenici, njihova imovina i tako dalje. Onda imamo diskriminaciju tih zajednica u samom Zakonu samim tim što je procedura za njihovu registraciju drukčija od procedure za registraciju tzv. tradicionalnih verskih zajednica, pa kad tome dodamo još i rasizam u skupštini Srbije i niz nekih problema u novije vreme, recimo, predrasude u našim sudovima, tužilaštvima kada je reč o presudama i procesima vezanim za kler Sprske pravoslavne crkve, gde je moralo sada u novije vreme da reaguje i Ministarstvo pravde oko toga, onda imamo puno slučajeva u različitim sektorima gde se ovakva teza može potvrditi. Tu dolazi često do ustavnih prekoračenja, država krši svoje vlastite zakone, one zakone koje je predložila vlada i Ministarsvo vera, na kraju krajeva, prekršen je sada, u ovom sandžačkom slučaju, i član 7. Zakona o crkvama i verskim zajednicama gde se kaže «… da država ne može ometati primenu autonomnih propisa crkava i verskih zajednica». Znači, ako je postojao nekakav objediniteljski sabor Islamske zajednice u Srbiji i donet je nekakav ustav Islamske zajednice u Srbiji, onda ne mogu državni organi da se priklanjaju nekakvom drugom carstvu i da daju signale koga oni podržavaju u celom tom sporu, jer time krše i svoj vlastiti zakon. Na to je, na kraju krajeva, s pravom, upozoravao i sandžački muftija u više nastupa u javnosti, to je ozbiljan prigovor kada vam lider jedne tradicionalne verske zajednice u Srbiji skrene pažnju na to da država krši svoje sopstvene zakone. Meni to znate, pomalo liči na one zahteve ruskih religijskih disidenata, sovjetskih, iz Brežnjevljevog vremena, otprilike to je taj nivo komunikacije. Iznete su takoðe ozbiljne optužbe u pogledu «cezaropapizma» jednog lokalnog političara, predsednika opštine, to je stvar koja takoðe treba da nas zabrine, tu mislim pre svega, na Ugljaninov zahtev za ukidanjem Islamske zajednice i stavljanjem pod kontrolu bošnjačkog nacionalnog veća. Dakle, tu imamo direktnu umešanost politike u verske strukture, ova vlada, iako nemuslimanska, kao da neguje neku vrstu političkog islama pa gura politiku u te religijske strukture. Najzad, o tome je više puta govorio i sandžački muftija, mi zaista ozbiljno treba da uzmemo u obzir ove optužbe za saradnju nekih sveštenika i imama sa obaveštajnim službama u ovoj zemlji. Ja ne bih potcenio takvu jednu izjavu. U Bosni i Hercegovini nedavno su objavljene knjige sa imenima sveštenika, imama i predstavnika drugih crkava i verskih zajednica, tzv. «plava», «zelena» i «crvena» knjiga gde se ukazuje na tu saradnju u SFRJ i docnije, Dakle, to je nešto što se ozbiljno mora ispitati i država o takvim optužbama mora da povede računa. Izvršna vlast ovde, dakle, zamuti stvari, zamuti do kraja, naročito Ministarstvo vera, onda se, tobože, oni ne mešaju, ostaju van toga, znači, proizvedu krizu i ostave nam je; ja bih se zapitao sada kako se osećaju druge verske zajednice u Srbiji, kada je reč o ovim meðureligijskim odnosima, kada imamo indukovanu podelu u islamskoj zajednici, gde se vidi čija je i gde leži državna naklonost. Kakve to sada posledice ima na odnose sa, recimo, pravoslavnom crkvom, katoličkom crkvom, kako će se sada predstavnici tih verskih zajednica ponašati kada budu pozvani, recimo, na neki dogaðaj ili prijem, nešto što organizuje Islamska zajednica, kako nevladine organizacije sada da organizuju škole, recimo u Sandžaku, a da očekuju da će im prisustvovati, recimo, ako je reč o interetničkim i meðureligijskim odnosima, da će im prisustvovati zvanični predstavnici Srpske pravoslavne crkve, Rimokatoličke crkve kada imaju takvu podelu i strah ljudi da će to biti ispolitizovano na ovaj ili onaj način. Kako sada uopšte da radimo u tim uslovima? Da li je bilo ko, ko je takve stvari zamućivao, vodio računa i o tim sekundarnim posledicama? Nezavisno od ovih podela u islamskoj zajednici, ja bih rekao da se u sadašnjem Zakonu o crkvama i verskim zajednicama, nalazi jedan ipak besmisleni, ali ne slučajni član, to je član 19. u kome se kaže, ja ću ga navesti: «…da se u registar ne može upisati verska organizacija čiji naziv sadrži naziv ili deo naziva koji izražava identitet crkve, verske zajednice ili verske organizacije koja je već upisana u registar ili koja je ranije podnela zahtev za upis». Naravno, ovaj član će biti aktiviran u slučaju prijave za registraciju Crnogorske pravoslavne crkve. Verovatno tu i stoji da se ne bi omogućila registracija Makedonske pravoslavne crkve i Crnogorske pravoslavne crkve, ali moram da objasnim zašto je besmislen takav član: mi smo svi svesni da se u političkom životu, pojavljuju stalno nove i nove stranke koje u svom imenu sadrže deo imena ili nekakav prefiks kao što je demokratski, kao što je liberalni, kao što je socijaldemokratski i tako dalje, to je prosto neizbežno, jednostavno to je neka vrsta amblema, identiteta stranke i njene političke orijentacije ili ideologije. Još je to važnije i osetljivije u religijskom životu. Tu stalno nastaju nove religijske zajednice, denominacije, dolazi do fragmentacije postojećih, naročito u protestantizmu one se odvajaju od svojih matičnih crkava i osnivaju kao nove. Imate, ne znam, Hrišćansku adventističku crkvu ali imate i Adventističku crkvu sedmog dana, imate baptiste ove ili baptiste one i tako dalje. Jednostavno to znači onemogućiti uopšte verske zajednice da slobodno deluju i da se nazivaju onako kako one s pravom žele da se nazivaju u vezi sa religijskom zajednicom porekla, da tako kažem. Dakle, s te strane, principijelno gledano, ovakav član u zakonu je potpuno besmislen i nepotreban, ali ima smisla, naravno, u jednom ovakvom političkom kontekstu želje da se ti meðureligijski, meðucrkveni odnosi, kontrolišu. Nama ti meðureligijski, meðucrkveni odnosi direktno utiču i kvare meðudržavne odnose. Kad vi pogledate od slučaja sa Makedonskom pravoslavnom crkvom, pa Crnogorskom pravoslavnom crkvom, pa sada ovaj slučaj sa Islamskom zajednicom, nama su se vodnosi, meðudržavni, sa Makedonijom, sa Crnom Gorom, sada i sa Bosnom i Herccegovinom, znatno pogoršali: u dva prva slučaja reč je o većinski pravoslavnim društvima, odnosno, društvima gde je pravoslavlje dominantna religijska zajednica. To je potpuno paradoksalno. Druga stvar na koju sam hteo da ukažem jeste ovo antiislamsko i antimuslimansko delovanje u Srbiji u periodu od 2004. do 2007. godine naročito, i to možda u najvišim državnim institucijama kao što su policija i vojska, možemo se zapitati da li je tu reč o nekakvom tihom, prećutnom, kontinuitetu sa prethodnim etničkim sukobima iz devedesetih, jer, nekada je to antiislamstvo latentno, nekad je vrlo naglašeno, ja bih ga simbolički mogao staviti u onaj vremenski okvir od paljenja džamija u Beogradu, Nišu, u Novom Sadu i uništavanju nadgrobnih spomenika izuzetno retkih i izuzetno vrednih u Vojnom muzeju na Kalemegdanu, pa do upada u policijskim čizmama u džamiju u Sjenici ove godine. Dakle, to je jedan okvir antimuslimanskog, antiislamskog delovanja koji bih ovde želeo da naglasim. Sećamo se da su kazne za prestupnike u Nišu bile više nego simbolične, to je bila jedna farsa od suðenja, gde je trebalo deset puta zakazivati ročišta. Sećamo se, na kraju krajeva, i reakcije na te presude, to je bilo besprizorno ponašanje optuženih za blage prestupe, što je, naravno, direktna posledica i na same presude. Ili da spomenem izjavu tadašnjeg funkcionera Demokratske stranke Srbije Obrena Joksimovića o «mudžahedinskoj stranci» u skupštini Srbije, bojazni da ćemo imati, kako je on tada rekao, Al Kaidu i Homeinija u skupštini kao «..transmitere muslimanske fundamentalističke ideje…»! Naravno, ti tzv. mudžahedini su omogućili opstanak na vlasti Vojislavu Koštunici docnije, a Vlada je uvela prinudnu upravu u opštini Novi Pazar i spasla Ugljanina od opoziva na referendumu. Imamo sada opet proizvodnju kriza kao u Miloševićevo vreme, ovakvim ponašanjem nas država samo gura u nove probleme, kako na domaćem tako i na meðunarodnom planu, možemo se zapitati da li se predsednik Tadić susreo sa reisom Cerićem krajem marta ove godine, uz prisustvo Rasima Ljajića i muftije Zukorlića, da li se tu zaista govorilo o istorijskom i moralnom pravu Islamske zajednice u Srbiji da bude u duhovnoj vezi, u savezu sa Islamskom zajednicom u Bosni i Hercegovini, da li je to bilo ili nije bilo? Govorilo se tu, koliko se ja sećam i o pokretanju novog srpsko-bošnjačkog dijaloga, koji je preko potreban nakon sukoba i zločina devedesetih, šta će sada ova država da uradi povodom toga? Hoće li ona da se svaða sa lajčakom u Bosni, da nas gura u nove krize i probleme, u meðuvremenu, samo da vas podsetimo, umesto Miloševićevih slika na raznim skupovima ovde u regionu, počele su uveliko da se nose Putinove slike. Mirko Ðorðević, publicist: Država i verske zajednice – smetnje na vezama U nekoj prilici – u široj raspravi o trenutnoj državnoj politici prema crkvama i verskim zajednicama – valjalo bi temeljnije objasniti odnos Crkve i države i verskih zajednica u Srbiji. Problemi se ili prikrivaju, ili se svesno zaobilaze i tek u incidentnim situacijama se vidi o čemu se radi. Incidenti i nesporazumi koje mi ovde blago nazivamo «smetnje na vezama» izazivaju nove i otkrivaju da u državnoj politici nema doslednosti – od prilike do prilike i po potrebi političkog momenta država se odreðuje i sama se loše snalazi u svemu. Videlo se to i na primeru zbivanja oko Islamske zajednice u Srbiji koja je razdeljena, imamo dve – koje tvrde da su jedine – a napetosti se reperkutuju u najširim državnim i društvenim okvirima. Iza ovog raskola stoji politika i to je uglavnom jasno. Da je to tako najbolje objašnjava muftija Islamske zajednice iz Beograda, efendija Jusufspahić – Boris Tadić i Demokratska stranka, Vojislav Koštunica i Demokratska stranka Srbije, Tomislav Nikolić i Srpska radikalna stranka i sve druge stranke podržavaju koncept Islamske zajednice Srbije zato što je on državotvoran. Ne navodi se ni jedan dokaz da Islamska zajednica u Srbiji nije lojalna državi. Problem nije dogmatske prirode već čisto organizacione – sve verske zajednice su jednake i država prema Zakonu o crkvama i vrskim zajednicama priznaje jednu jedinstveno organizovanu u duhu islamske tradicije. Ovoga puta država se opredelila za jednu, što se protivi pomenutom Zakonu i Ustavu Republike Srbije, a poznato je da moderna država – pravna država – sigurno nema pravo da osniva ni crkve ni druge verske zajednice, njena je funkcija da štiti autonomiju i slobodu delovanja. Situacija u kojoj su se našli vernici pokazuje da je polumesec na Srbijom zašao u duboku političku senku i krivica je u lošoj državnoj politici prema verskim zajednicama uopšte. Naravno i crkvama, jer je princip da jedne budu posebno priznate a druge marginalizovane – ili manipulisane – ugraðen u sam pomenuti Zakon. Ovo je prilika da se pokaže kako smo bili u pravu kada smo upozoravali da se pomenuti Zakon kosi sa Ustavom i da će ga biti teško primeniti. Sve ostalo u sporu – u medijima – o tome gde je duhovni centar crkava i verskih zajednica – zaista je nebitno. Pomenuću i problem koji se «vrti», da su navodno, u sve ovo umešane ne samo država i već i bezbednosne službe. U dubljem smislu o ovome se može razgovarati samo ako imamo dovoljno sigurnih dokaza, a mi ih, osim verbalnih tvrdnji, nemamo. No, bilo kako bilo, tu nečeg ima. Još u aprilu ove godine muftija Zukorlić je u više navrata upozoravao[3] na to i obratio se pismom Tadiću i Koštunici: – «Posebno brinu brojne informacije o aktivnoj umešanosti obaveštajnih i bezbednosnih službi Srbije u navedenim aktivnostima protiv Islamske zajednice». To je sve što znamo, a odgovor najviših državnih činovnika javnosti – šire i jasnije – nije poznat. Postoji još jedan dokument na koji se zaboravlja, a potiče od samog šefa tajne policije BIA, gospodina R. Bulatovića u kojem stoji[4] i ovakav stav, kakve bar javno, šefovi tajnih službi retko izriču: -«konkretno, sada tragamo za tri dosijea crkvenih velikodostojnika, koji su nestali u periodu posle 2000. godine. Imamo i pretpostavku zbog čega su uzeti i gde su završili». U detalje ovde ne možemo ulaziti – manjkaju kao takvi – ali se iz ovoga vidi da se država bavi crkvama i verskim zajednicama, kao i one državom, na loš način i da upliće prste i tamo gde joj sigurno nije mesto. Ono što se dogaða sa Islamskom zajednicom i sa nekim crkvama nije moguće objasniti bez istraživanja kojih za sada nema – a svi dogaðaji su u vezi sa nečim sličnim. Neki se zaključci, reklo bi se, sami nameću – najpre tu je nesporna krivica ministra vera u kabinetu Vojislava Koštunice i da je kako nije – da živimo u pravnoj državi – ministar bi trebalo da podnese ostavku. Da li u državi može postojati nekoliko pravoslavnih crkava, a ne može više katoličkih i da li mogu postojati dve islamske zajednice u Srbiji to nije nepoznato – svako se organizuje prema svojoj tradiciji, a država bi tu trebalo da bude neutralna. Ovako, kako se sada čini, otvara se prostor za političke manipulacije kakve su se nazrele oko vehabija, o čemu još ne znamo mnogo – čeka se kraj sudskog postupka. Nije bitno ni reagovanje medija, jer su uglavnom pod kontrolom sfera moći – ili se svrstavaju na jednu stranu, ili se prave da im nije jasno o čemu se radi. Postoji još i druga strana medalje a to su odnosi u samoj islamskoj zajednici gde se ne isključuje rivalstvo voða. Navodila se istočnjačku parabolu o najvećem i najlepšem ćilimu u džamiji koji često biva tesan za dvojicu imama. Reč je i o materijalnim interesima. Najopasnije je što podele u krilu bošnjačkog naroda u regiji, dakle, odnosi u samoj islamskoj zajednici, mogu biti otvaranje vrata nasilju koje na Balkanu nikad nije isključeno. Stoga je ovaj raskol i karakterističan i dolazi u vreme kada se oko Kosova forsira snažna diplomatska akcija širom sveta i kada se i u susednoj BiH osećaju previranja koja bi trebalo da opomenu da je ponavljanje grešaka opasno za sve. Jednom reči, nevolja je u tome što ne postoji izgraðen model odnosa crkve i države i verskih zajednica uopšte izveden iz bogatog evropskog iskustva, već se nešto slično otvara od prlike do prilike i uvek po potrebi paretija koje drže vlast u Srbiji. Sonja Biserko: Nedavno ste rekli da «… nacionalne revolucije često izbijaju u vreme kada su stare nepravde prestale, a unutrašnje jedinstvo pobunjenih nestalo. Sandžak, izgleda, nije izuzetak!» Ako biste mogli nešto o tome da nam kažete?! Čedomir Antić, istoričar Činjenica je da, u istoriji se pokazalo, vrlo često pobune i revolucije, stvaranje nacionalnih država počinju u vreme kada su te drevne nepravde zbog kojih su navodno počele, prestale. Dakle, evo jedan primer iz XIX veka, najveće pobune protiv osmanskog carstva dešavale su se upravo u vreme velikih reformskih pokušaja, i to je, prosto, jedno pravilo. Meðutim, da se vratim na ovu sadašnju temu, ja je ne vidim kao istoriografsku već kao političku, meni je žao, pošto je naslov ovako širok, ne može se reći da li je reč o dogaðanjima u oblasti Sandžaka u protekle 2, 4, ili 20. godina, žao mi je što to nije do kraja definisano, a potom, pošto je reč o, navodno, državnoj represiji, kažem «navodno» misleći na protreklih 7 godina, mislim da bi bilo dobro da je neko pozvan prosto i od predstavnika vlade. Ova vlada nije jednostranačka, u njoj postoje različite stranke, jedan ministar je Bošnjak, tako da bi bilo dobro da čujemo i od nekoga, da tako kažem, sa izvora, o svemu tome. Potom, Sandžak, ovaj srpski deo Sandžaka, je multietnička regija, mislim da bi bilo dobro da je došao neko i od predstavnika drugih nacionalnosti iz te oblasti, ali, teško je sagledati celokupnu istinu, teško je skupiti sve aktere, tako da je dobro makar što je izvršen jedan pokušaj, i sa ovakvim panelom ovako kako je organizovan. Ja bih rekao da u proteklih 7 godina Srbija prolazi kroz veliki reformski pokušaj, možda jedan od najvećih u svojoj istoriji i mislim da treba da predstavlja zadovoljstvo za većinu graðana Srbije, odnosno za sve graðane Srbije, što u njemu učestvuju i druge nacionalnosti. Neću da iskoristim onaj naziv manjinske, mislim da je to besmisleno, dakle, učestvuju svi graðani. Posebno je dobro što u velikoj koaliciji DOS i kasnije u svim vladama koje su usledile, je bilo i predstavnika bošnjačkih stranaka. Ovde nije spomenuto, čak ovaj period od 2004. godine je vrlo loše ocenjen, meðutim, eto, upravo 2004. godine je promenjen onaj, ja ću reći manjkav izborni zakon, koji je omogućavao samo onim strankama koje preðu census od 5 odsto da dobiju poslanike u parlamentu. Tako da, po prvi put su i nacionalne zajednice koje u ukupnom stanovništvu Republike Srbije broje manje od 5 odsto, dobile priliku da se naðu u parlamentu. Ovde je jedan od govornika spmenuo potrebu da bude izgraðena bošnjačka nacija u Srbiji. Ja moram da kažem da proces izgradnje nacija ne vidim u vezi sa pitanjem sprovodjenja ljudskih i graðanskih prava, zato što iskustva pokazuju da izgradnja nacija nije nimalo blag proces i vrlo često, nažalost, nije demokratski proces. Tako da, kada je većina evropskih nacija graðena u XIX veku, stvari su bile drugačije: i onda, kad u nekom prostoru bude formirana država, i formiran prosvetni sistem, onda bi se razne etničke grupe unifikovale u naciju. Početkom XXI veka, u vreme elektronskih medija, u vreme, ‘ajde neću da kažem stoprocentne pismenosti u Srbiji, ona nije stoprocentna, ali visokoprocentne pismenosti, stvari nisu tako jednostavne i moramo da budemo oprezni da ne prekršimo ljudska prava nekih ljudi, pravo ljudi da budu pripadnici do kraja neizgradjenih nacija, koje je sada neosporno. Dakle, besmisleno je kritikovati nekog srpskog funkcionera koji bi, srećom, ih više nema u vlasti, nekad rekao da su Muslimani iz Bosne Srbi – muhamedanci, a onda podržati drugu osobu koja je posle 2000. godine bila na vlasti u Srbiji, koja kaže da su Bunjevci izmišljena grupa. Jednostavno, svako ima pravo da, ako ima odreðeni broj graðana koji se osećaju kao Bunjevci, mislim da je to nesporno i mislim da to treba podržati. Ovde je spomenuto pitanje verskih zajednica. Ja sam saglasan da kod nas tek treba da bude izgraðena dobra zakonska regulativa i mislim da je to možda sreća u nesreći što poslednji ulazimo u tranzicioni period, pošto možemo da uporedimo naše potrebe sa uspešnim iskustvima drugih evropskih zemalja, naročito onih koje su nam susedne i koje imaju veliki broj raznih verskih zajednica organizovanih meðu svojim graðanima. Dakle, ne bih video neku veliku katastrofu u tome što je neki prednacrt zakonskog akta bio loš, važno je da je u skupštinu došao predlog koji nije podržala samo jedna monolitna stranka koja ima apsolutnu većinu, već je više stranaka taj zakon podržala. Ja nisam, naravno, stručnjak za verska pitanja, meðutim, malo sam se obavestio kada je počela ova kriza u Sandžaku, i zanimljivo je razmišljanje jednog velikodostojnika Islamske verske zajednice, neću reći koje od ove dve, koji je rekao da svi vernici muslimani u Srbiji, nisu Bošnjaci. I zaista, ako pogledate statistike sa prošlog popisa, vi će te videti da u oblasti istorijskog Sandžaka postoji čak 6,35 odsto, to je malo više od 27.000 graðana, koji tvrde da su Muslimani po nacionalnosti. U ovom srpskom delu je malo manji to procenat, negde je to oko 3,5 odsto, u crnogorskom je skoro 10 odsto, tačnije 9,88 odsto. Želim da kažem da, jedna demokratska država ne treba da sprečava izgradnju jedne nacije, ali ne treba ni da je podstiče. I jedno i drugo bi bilo kršenje demokratskih prava. Spomenute su dve islamske zajednice u Srbiji. Ja sam nedavno slušao vrlo inspirativan intervju koji je dao gospodin Oliver Potežica, on spominje, ja o tome zaista nisam razmišljao, čak pet islamskih verskih zajednica u Srbiji, mi zaboravljamo da u oblasti Preševa, Bujanovca i Medveðe postoji jedna organizovana zajednica Albanaca koji su muslimani, i recimo, oni imaju čak dve zajednice, jedna se zove Islamska zajednica Preševa, Bujanovca i Medveðe, njen predsednik Džemaludin Hasani je svojevremeno izjavio, kako su, citiram: «…prošla ona komunistička vremena kada je Islamska zajednica iz Sarajeva sve kontrolisala»! Opet, on ima svog protivnika, izvesnog Tahira Mumina, koji je, čini mi se, predsednik Islamske zajednice Kosova za Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveðu i sad, zamislite, to je Islamska zajednica Kosova koja je nedavno pristupila Islamskoj zajednici Srbije prema, opet, ovom citatu gospodina Potežice. Prema tome, stvari vezane za verske zajednice su vrlo složene i bilo bi najbolje kada se politika u njih ne bi mešala osim kao dobar servis. Dakle, država treba da spreči sukobe, treba da spreči zloupotrebe, a najbolje bi bilo kada bi, meðu vernima došlo do odreðenog sporazuma, jer, o suština je u tome da se verni meðu sobom dogovore. Ja sam svestan činjenice i mislim da ne postoji niko u ovoj prostoriji ko se sa mnom ne bi složio, da oblast Sandžaka predstavlja jednu od najnerazvijenijih oblasti Republike Srbije. Meðutim, ne bih voleo da metodološki pogrešimo pa da standard u Sandžaku poredimo sa, recimo, standardom u Čačku ili sa standardom, recimo, u Beogradu. Kao što nije pošteno porediti standard u Kraljevu sa standardom u Beogradu, tako i to, nije pošteno. Mi moramo da shvatimo, da u Srbiji siromaštvo koje je, nažalost, preovlaðujuće naročito u oblastima na krajnjem jugu i zapadu zemlje, nije etnički rasporeðeno. I to je opet jedan od paradoksa prilika u Sandžaku, ekonomski napredak ostvaren je u vreme političke represije devedesetih godina. Taj ekonomski napredak na žalost, njegovo zaustavljanje koincidira sa početkom reformi i to je nešto o čemu treba razmišljati. Mi to naravno nećemo sprečiti ako primenimo taj stari princip koji se primenjuje a to je kada imate jednu zajednicu koja je ugrožena, koja je manjinska, ona uvek kada je ugrožena i kada ima unutrašnje probleme, ona poziva na mobilizaciju protiv nekoga trećeg. To ne može da donese neke velike koristi. U ovom trenutku vrlo je teško reći da država sprovodi teror nad Bošnjacima, nad verskim osećanjima u Sandžaku, ili nad političkim aketrima u sandžaku zato što obe velike bošnjačke partije, ja mislim i nekoliko manjih su u vlasti. E, sad, mi možemo kritikovati elitu, meðutim, ta elita ipak redovno dobija podršku na izborima. Tako, ako kažemo da je Ustav loš, ja sam, recimo, kritikovao ovaj ustav, sa drugih nekih pozicija u odnosu na većinu mojih predgovornika, meðutim, u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srbije, koliko se sećam, niko nije glasao protiv tog ustava, već je jedan broj poslanika bio odsutan, što govori o tome da ipak, ako je demokratsko najvažniji argument za donošenje tog ustava, to je postignuto. Ustav treba menjati tamo gde je loš, ali ne možemoi reći da je to jedan nedemokratski ustav. Želim da kažem i da, kada je reč o pravima nacionalnih manjina ili konstitutivnih naroda, treba razmišljati o poreðenju sa drugim situacijama. Ovde je izneto poreðenje sa prilikama u Crnoj Gori, ja spadam u ljude koji nisu stručnjaci za kanonsko pravo, i mislim da me to ne lišava prava da kažem nešto i o tome, mislim da je osnovno pravo savih graðana da se verski organizuju kako god žele. Meðutim, u Crnoj Gori situacija nije ista kao u Srbiji. Nije ista iz vrlo jednostavnog razloga: pre svega, u Srbiji je došlo do podele unutar jedne regularne hijerarhije Islamske verske zajednice. Kada je reč o Crnoj Gori, tamo je jedan bivši svešttenik, u prvo vreme protiv volje države kasnije uz pomoć države, uz pomoć laika, uz pomoć ljudi koji nisu u verskim strukturama bili prethodno pravoslavne crkve, stvorio crku i ono što mene navodi na to da kažem da su drugačije prilike, to je činjenica da su, čini mi se, jedan ili dva crkvena objekta preuzeta od strane Srpske pravoislavne crkve odnosno mitropolije Crnogorsko-primorske, a potom, tamo niti je počela liturgija, niti su, kada je reč o manastiru, tu došli neki monasi. Prema tome, suština je bila u političkoj potrebi da se spreči jedna crkva da ispoveda svoju veru. Ovde to nije tako. Naravno, ako prihvatimo ove argumente koje sam izneo, to ne znači da je stanje u Sandžaku dobro. Ne samo ekonomsko, političko stanje nije dobro. A tačno je, treba izgraditi i ekonomsku i kulturnu elitu, pa nju treba izgraditi u Beogradu, a kamoli u Novom Pazaru, ili u Nišu, ili u Leskovcu. Takoðe je tačno da se nismo do kraja suočili sa dogaðajima iz devedesetih godina, meðutim, moram, ja ne znam da li da kažem, reći ću u stvari, sa žalošću da primetim da mi nismo se nigde suočili sa prošlošću. Dakle, tamo gde ona nije opterećena etničkim sukobima, tamo gde ona nije opterećena kontroverzama, mi se nismo sa njom suočili. Podsetiću, od 2000. godine do danas, jedini iskorak je učinjen posle one naše velike tragedije kada je ubijen prvi demokratski premijer, tada je jedan broj ljudi osuðen za neka dela koja su do kraja rasvetljena posle operacije «Sablja». Inače, da se nije taj nesrećni slučaj dogodio, verovatno ne bismo imali pravdu gotovo nigde, osim kada je reč o žrtvama u RTS-u i činjenice da je osuðen bivši direktor RTS-a. Miroslav Filipović, novinar Sandžak je u poslednjih nekoliko decenija u veoma čvrstom zagrljaju srpskih tajnih službi, najpre jugoslovenskih a sada srpskih, s tim što bih ja tu izbegao, jer nema potrebe da govorim o onome što je legalno i legitimno i na šta svaka država ima pravo, pa i ova naša, dakle, ja bih da mi govorimo o onom segmentu koji može da predsatavlja neku zloupotrebu korišćenja tajnih službi na jednom ovakvom području. Sandžak je dugo bio pod dominantnom kontrolom tzv. «zelenih» službi, odnosno vojnih službi bezbednosti, odnosno kontraobaveštajne službe. To je naročito postalo značajno, govorim o Sandžaku, kada se Sandžak našao na granici nove države, dakle, kada je bivša socijalistička Jugoslavija prestala da postoji pa je onda postojala Savezna Republika Jugoslavija i Sandžak više nije bio u sredini nego se našao na kraju i, što je posebno interesantno, našao se usred kontinuiteta rasporostranjenosti muslimanskog, odnosno bošnjačkog naroda. Tako da ste, od one bivše granice sa turskom državom na rečici Piloreta kad se izaðe iz Raške i krene ka Novom Pazaru, maltene do Cazinske krajine imali tampon većinski nastanjen Bošnjacima. To je proglašeno strašnim remetilačkim faktorom za srpski nacionalni cilj, i onaj čudovišni plan «potokovica» o kome se nekad više, nekad manje a nekad uopšte ne govori, upravo je započet na desnoj obali Drine, da bi se prekinuo, da bi se ta traka većinske rasprostranjenosti bošnjačkog naroda, prekinula, pa da neko slučajno ne zatraži za bošnjački narod isto ono što su nacionalisti u Srbiji, predvoðeni Miloševićem, naravno, tražili za srpski narod, znači, ono gde su Srbi većina da to bude Srbija. Nema veze da li je to Knin, da li je to Banija, znači, sve osim Slovenije, pretpostavilo se da će možda postojati mogućnost da to traže i Bošnjaci, a koliko se ja sećam, Sulejman Ugljanin je početkom devedesetih to isto i tražio. Ja sam tada radio jedan intervju sa njim i znam da je on, vrlo se dobro sećam te rečenice, da Bošnjaci Sandžaka traže isto ono što Srbi traže za Knin i za Kninsku krajinu. Dakle, desna obala Drine je potpuno očišćena od Bošnjaka i, verovali ili ne, posledice tog plana i tog čišćenja i danas postoje. I danas neko ne dozvoljava Bošnjacima iz tih sela na desnoj obali Drine u opštini Priboj da se vrate u svoja sela. Dakle, čak i ona najbolja vlast koju smo imali, vlast Zorana Ðinðića, nije gotovo ništa uradila da se to poništi, te posledice tog zaista čudovišnog plana «potkovica». Delovi tog plana su i ove otmice o kojima govorimo, Sjeverin, Štrpce, kada je trebalo zastrašiti bošnjački narod da bi on jednostavno pobegao glavom bez obzira. Ali, to je jedna jako široka tema, jedna druga tema, samo sam je napomenuo kao početak novog poglavlja u interesovanju tajnih službi za Sandžak. Naravno, kada je JNA prestala da postoji a sa njom i njena tajna služba, onda su na neki način primat preuzele tzv. «plave» tajne službe, odnosno poilicijske, i gotovo sve što je svaka vlast počev od devedesetih godina, pa do dan danas radila u Sandžaku, govorim o vlasti iz Beograda, radi se po savetu, nekad i po diktatu, iz tih struktura. Znači, ako su premijer Živković i ministar Gašo Knežević otišli na noge muftiji Zukorliću i odneli mu dozvolu za rad Internacionalnog univerziteta, onda su to učinili zato što im je iz tajnih službi savetovano da to tako treba i da je to korisno za, šta ja znam, državu Srbiju. Ako je sada dozvoljeno da se osnuje nova islamska zajednica, govorim o Islamskoj zajednici Srbije za razliku od Islamske zajednice u Srbiji onda je to zato što je neko zaključio da je uticaj Moamer efendije do te mere porastao da mora malo da mu se nešto uskrati jer, znate, 120 džamija, pa onda Internacionalni univerzitet, pa onda Fakultet za islamske studije, pa se navodno priprema islamska akademija nauka i umetnosti, pa se navodno priprema važno mesto za Novi Pazar i za Sandžak u osnivanju nekog evropskog Al-Azhara, najvišeg Islamskog univerziteta sa sedištem u Kairu. Kad govorimo o uticaju tajnih službi, ovde je više govornika pomenulo pismo Moamer efendije u kome on od državnih organa traži dosijea ljudi iz Islamske zajednice koji rade za «službu». Da sam na mestu Moamer efendije ne bih se ja previše hvatao za to, jer, može tu da dobije razna dosijea, naravno, neće ih dobiti, a ustvari hoću da kažem da «služba» podjednako radi svugde. Jer, ja znam, pošto sam 20. godina kao novinar u Sandžaku, «pokrivam» Sandžak, da se isto to pričalo i za njega, pa za onaj Nacionalni kongres Bošnjaka koji je negde krajem devedesetih osnovan kao politička partija, pa, onda, za ovu islamsku zajednicu Preševa, ovu seperatističku, da je takoðe osnovana po savetu «službe», čak je «služba» navodno i tadašnjeg muftiju Nedžedina Saćipija postavila za muftiju… Hoću da kažem da su tajne službe tamo prisutne, ali isto kažem – pa šta ako su prisutne? One su prisutne svugde, ne bih se iznenadio da su i ovde, meðu nama prsutne, to je jednostavno način života u postkomunističkim društvima, da li ćemo se mi i kada ćemo se toga osloboditi ja zaista ne znam, da li «službe» i u kojoj meri zloupotrebljavaju svoju funkciju, to je sad jedno jako komplikovano, jako složeno pitanje, ima tu puno mistifikacije, nije sve to tako kao što izgleda: na kraju, «služba» ima i pravo, ona je osnovana po zakonima ove zemlje, ona ima svoje mesto. Granica izmeðu upotrebe i zloupotrebe je jako delikatna i sigurno se na ovakvim vrstama skupova nećemo približiti svemu tome, ali, ne bih se mnogo hvatao za to da neki moji politički protivnici rade za «službu». Jer, isto to oni i tvrde za mene, a kakve Muslimani vole da kažu, «jedino Alah zna kako to sve stoji i šta je sve tačno»! MEŠA SLEZOVIÆ, umetnik: SANDŽAK – POSLEDICE REPRESIVNE POLITIKE DRŽAVE Manjine, više nisu tema zvančne politike Opšte uverenje da je pložaj manjina u načalu rešen uz neka sitnija zakonska akta koja treba da budu donesena i da je taj položaj u skladu sa najvišim meðunarodnim standardima. Nedavna aktualizacija položaja maðrske manjine, permanentna slika crnih hronika u Sandžaku kao da demantuje ove ocene. Po svoj prilici, manjine su i dalje predmet političkih strategija i svojevrsnih političkih instrumentalizacija. Sanðačka stvarnost je više nego zanimljiva u tom pogledu. Već iz same teme, jasno je, koliko je to jedno kompleksno područje. Njime se mogu baviti specijalisti različitih struka od psihijatara i psihologa, preko ekonomista i pravnika, do istoričara, politikologa i političara. Ostaje iprostora i za one koji se bave pitanjima duha, dakle recimo sociologa kulture, religije, do kulturnih stvaralaca i etnologa. I to sa posebnim razlogom, jer je Sandžak jedan izrazito zanimljiv region, sa vrlo osobenim karakteristikama. Ono što, ovoj temi, daje posebnu aktuelnost jeste činjenica da se represija države ovde pojavljuje ne kao incident već više konstanta politike. Naravno u različitim oblicima, i sa vrlo sofisticiranim straregijama u zavisnosti od trenutne političke situacje, oblika države u odreðenom istorijskom trenutku, do izvesnih stereotipa ali i konstanti koje su oblikovale odnos prema ovom prostoru. Jedna stvar nedvosmisleno potvrðuje ove stavove: permanentno iseljavnje iz ove oblasti, njegova već poslovična zabačenost i zapuštenost kao i konstanta neadekvatnog političkog rešenja za ovaj prostor. Sandžak je istorijska regija. Po svojim kulturnim i istorijskim slojevima ne samo da je multikulturan i multikonfesionalan već i inerkulturalan, što bi značilo da se kulturni religijski i etnički supstrati ovde u najboljem smislu prožimaju gradeći i jedan opšti, zajednički identitet ovog prostora i njegovih žitelja. Ova činjenica je značajna za ve političke procese koji su se ovde odvijali, za sve državne projekte koji su uglavnom loše eksperimentisali sa ovim prostorom, za sve političke strategije koje se su se ovde isprobavale. Istovremeno je i važan, ali isto tako i bez važnosti. Ove koordinate paradoksa, u velikoj meri odreðivale su njegovu sudbinu i položaj. U ovom uvodnom delu, naglasio bih nekoliko elemenata koji daju ton aktuelnom stanju, pri čemu hoću posebno naglasiti interaktivan odnos lokalnih političkih subjekata i državne politike, odnosno njenih institucija u procesu današnjeg, iliti savremenog izgleda Sandžaka i njegovih žitelja. Danas je to jedna veoma dinamična slika. Sa pozicije pitanja identiteta Bošnjaka i identiteta Sandžaka koje još uvek nije skinuto sa dnevnog reda moglo bi se reći, da se uočavaju procesi koji idu za tim da dovode u pitanje mnoge već standardne ocene i osobenosti. Prenaglašavanje islamske paradigme i unutarnjih procesa vrenja unutar nje Nije problem u islamskoj zajednici, koliko je problem u neuspešnosti drugih paradigmi – ekonomskoj ali i političkoj. Drugi slojevi pkazuju svoju neuspešnost i neifikasnost . Stvoren je širok vakum u koji je uskočila religija, kao sloj identiteta, ali i kao institucionalna struktura sa širim ambicijama. Kulturna dimenzija Bošnjaka se ne može ni u kom smislu svesti samo na ovu paradigmu, ali svim prvidima uprkos ni islamski sloj kulturnog identiteta ne pogaða srž problema. Izmeðu bošnjačkog nacionalnog individualizma i islamskog kosmopolitizma, izmeðu bošnjačkog evropejstva i orjentalnog islamstva, zjapi prazan duhovni prostor u koji se sve više uvlači strano telo – pseudovehabizam. Podseto bih na briljantnu opservaciju Farida Zakarije u njegovoj studiji „O budućnosti slobode“, u kojoj on pokazuje da islam kao islam nije globalni problem već da je to Bliski istok. U nekoj odviše hipotetičkoj i od stvarnosti dalekoj opservaciji, moglo bi se razmišljati i o izvesnim namerama izvesnih interesa da se i ove evropske muslimanske enklave uvuku u vrtlog bliskoistočnog koflikta. Do nedavno se govorilo o reislamizaciji muslimana. Nije se govorilo ni o kakvoj reislamizaciji. U tom smislu i novija dešavanja u okviru islamske zajednice dobijaju kudikamo šire i ozbiljnije rezonance i reperkusije iako se radi o nekim sasvim banalnim, lokalnim političkim zahtevima, koji, naravno imaju vrlo štetne posledice i koji vremenom mogu izazvati veoma ozbiljne i razorne efekte. Mudra državna politika, nikako ne bi podsticala raskole, ne bi učestvovala u njima, imala bi partnerski odnos sa ovom vrlo značajnom institucijom koja je i verska i nacionalna i kulturna po svom sadržaju. Iz jednostavnog razloga, što sva ta previranja samo proširuju prostor za nekontrolisanu provlu svakovrsnih verskih i ideoloških učenja koja mogu biti vrlo saglasna sa nekim ekstremnim islamističkim tendencijama. Dakle, igra oko urušavanja jedne ovakve institucije može biti vrlo ozbiljna i opasna. Ustavni okvir Usvajanje jednog neevroskog, u suštini dnevnopoitičkog, nekonzistentnog najvišeg zakonskog akta, koji se, uprkos činjenici da se dobrim delom bavi pitanjima manjina, kreirala sasvim nova pravna pozicija položaja nacionalnih manjina. Ona se više može posmatrati u svetlu diskontinuiteta, nego li kontinuiteta sa politikom prema nacionalnim majinama do trenutka donošenja novog ustava. U kojoj su meri konstituent u državi koja je po definiciji istovremeno i nacionalna i graðanska, a u kojoj meri su i, čija su nacionalna manjina, jer po definiciji BOSNA NIJE NACIONLNA DRŽAVA BOŠNJAKA, sandžački Bošnjaci koji se ne mogu identifikovati ni sa jednom državom kao matičnom. Oni su time nacionalna manjina sopstvene države koja nije njihova po NACIONALNOJ definiciji i u kojoj su samo graðani. Ovim je stvoren okvir njihove de facto neravnopravnosti iz koje će proizaći mnoge strukturane i pravne konsekvence. Važno je podsetiti da je ČIN donošenja ustav bio čin jasne političke diversifikacije unutar političkih subjekata bošnjačke manjine, na one koji su pozivali na podržavanje i onih koji su bojkotavali ovaj čin. Uverenje je da narod nije podržao ovaj ustav i da ga nije prepoznao adekvatnim okvirom svog statusa. Politički okvir Potraga za izgubljenim identitetom–šizofrena situacija cepanja bića i identiteta sandžačkih Bošnjaka kroz dihotomije istočno-zapadno-balkansko-orjentalno-evropsko, savremeno i prošlo, nedostaje JASNA VIZIJA u situaciji kada se kulturni prostor sve više duhovno prazni, aspekti konstruktivne kulturne politike gotovo i ne postoje. Ne sagledava se ni jasna vizija budućnosti nacionalnog razvoj i afirmacije (dileme multikulturalizma i interkulturalizma). Demokratija sa svim obeležjima neliberalne demokratije, autokratija, segregacija PARTIOkratija, totalitarizam na mikroplanu. Zatvaranje okvira, što je OČIT PRIMER GUBLJENA SLOBODE I GETOIZACIJE PRED LOKALNIM VLASTODRŠCIMA. Svojevrsni eksperiment Sa stanovišta označene teme, represije i posledica, aktuelna slika stanja ocrtavala bi konture svojevrsnog eksperimenta. Postavljene u položaj marginalnih grupa, manjine sve više postaju poligon značajan kao baza sigurnih glasova pojedinih političkih stranaka, i to, paradoksalno, ne onih koje po definiciji jesu manjinske i regionalne već onih glavnih aktera na plitičkoj sceni. Regionalni ili manjinski predznak samo je kulisa za prikupljanje glasova, dok se autentični interesi gube u nekim nejasnim računicama i partikularnim interesima. Uspostavljena je čudna saradnja izmeðu predstavnika manjinskih zajednica i reprezenata države, pa čak i onih politika, čije su manjine bile žrtve. Radi se o fenomenu STADA i Pastira. Otuda je razobličavanje ove politike, i ovih relacija, veoma važno za uspostavljanje liberalne demokratije. Politička realnost demaskira vazalnost ispod granica dostojanstva. Servilnost i vazalstvo pokazuje se u svetlu sentence da služiti znači vladati. Otuda i intencija da pojedinci budu zmena za preko potrebne mnjinske institucije. Tim gore, jer se radi o lažnim autoritetima koji su samo degradacija i stvarnih interesa manjina i njihovog realnog položaja. Iz brojnih fakata sa terena sandžačke svakodnenice, nameće se utisak da su sandžački Bošnjaci, stavljeni u orbitu, NIMALO SVOJOM VOLJOM NITI SVOJIM INTERESOM, antizapadne i antievropske politike, koja se globalno pokazuje, a lokalno aktualizuje, da je pažljivo pripremana i uslovljena, i da su protekle godine otvorene represije, pripremile plodno tle. Zato sve više postaje vidljiva uloga nekih do skora neprikosnovenih političkih autoriteta, u vrlo problematičnom svetlu, koje ih sve više kompromituje kao aktivne sudionike takve politike i njihove instrumentalizacije. Fenomen kukavičijeg jajeta ostaje oprobani mehanizam. Na tamnom ekranu sandžačke svakodnevnice, sve se jasnije oslikava politički profil nekih od ovih lidera, što čini da njihova do skoro neprikosnovena svetla slika sve više tamni. Zaziranje od aktuelnih dešavanja, običnog graðanina sve više stavlja u poziciju pasivnog posmatrača, da se njegova neiskazana volja sve jasnije krivotvori. Sandžak sve više klizi graničnim tačkama koje obesmišljavaju svaki demoratski proces. Hoće li ovaj proces dovesti do promena postojećeg stanja ili će se produžiti u beskraj, čini se i nije više volja glasača, graðana, pripadnika manjinske zajednice, već političke volje države, njenih službi i delotvornosti strategije servilnosti i vazastva, koja se, kako se vidi, dobro pokazala. U dobrobit i ličnu korist predstavnika političke elite a sve na štetu graðana, koji više u politici i ovoj lokalnoj modifikaciji neliberalne demokratije ne prepoznaju svi okvir političkog ispoljavanja. Nije li to tačka kojoj se i težilo, krajnje ponižavanje uloge, mesta i položaja, manjinskih zajednica i njihovog udela u politici država u kojima žive. Čini se da primer Srbije to odlično pokazuje. Ali, ne treba prevashodno kriviti DRŽAVU I NJENU VLADU. Biće da je odgovornost mnogo veća samih navodnih manjiskih političkih prestavnika.Oni se ne moraju tako ponašati, iako im je nametnut takav okvir. A i manjina, koje se ne moraju saglasiti sa ovakvim položajem. U slučaju Bošnjaka, pogotovo ne. Čini mi se ipak da tačka preokreta i nije tako daleko. Time se i pitanja identiteta lišavju svakog stvarnog smisla i sadržaju, a potvrðujuoni poznati stihovi ,,Vuk na ovcu svoje pravo ima’’. Hoće li Aska, odigrati svoj ples do kraja ili će pasti u čeljusti krvožednog vuka, hoće li prepoznati naći dobronamernog pastira, ili će se predati, videćemo. ASKA IZ Andrićeve pripovetke poučna je u svakom pogledu. Ali ne bih baš da idem tako daleko u analizi ove metafore . Ramiz Crnišanin, advokat Posle rata, Drugog svetskog rata, jedan naš stari adžo, sretne Voju Lekovića i kaže: «Vi komunisti ste prije rata govorili da je Sandžak bogu iza leða. Kome je sad on, kad vi ne verujete u boga, kome je sada iza leða?» A on (Leković) kaže: «Neće više biti iza leða»! A stvarno je ostao i dalje iza leða. Ipak, treba promijeniti neke stereotipe i o Sandžaku i o Bošnjacima. Nije Sandžak ono što je nekada bio. Kad sam ja završio malu maturu 1941. godine, samo je 28 bošnjačke, tada muslimanske dece bilo u gimnaziji novopazarskoj. Sreten Vukosavljević je pisao, od devet ukinutih gimnazija, četiri su iz Sandžaka. Tamo ih nije ni bilo dosta, više gimnazija je ukinuto, tako da su morali i Srbi i Muslimani, da idu u druge gradove, Kraljevo, naravno, Muslimani su išli u Prizren i tamo gde ima muslimanskog življa. Danas mi imamo gotovo stoprocentnu pismenost; u Sandžak se stiže iz najudaljenijih krajeva Srbije za 4-5 sati, danas ima mobilnih telefona na stotine hiljada, ima samo u Novom Pazaru 30.000 automobila ima dva univerziteta i privatni i državni, tri zapravo, ima i Karićev, ima više od 6.000 studenata, ima… kažem, da ne bi slika bila crna… struktura se promenila, promenili su se odnosi i mora sa time da se računa. Danas postoje političke stranke i zašto bi Bošnjaci bili nešto drugo od drugih i zašto se dramatizuju sukobi meðu Bošnjacima kad tih sukoba ima kod svih naroda? Ali, ono što ne valja – u Srbiji 40 odsto birača koji glasaju za socijaliste i za radikale, kažu da smo mi izmišljena brozovska nacija. I zovu nas Turcima. E, to je ono što kod Bošnjaka, većine, nema više problema jesu li ili nisu Bošnjaci. Ja sam nekim mojim prijateljima, još u ono komunističko doba, ja sam tada bio funkcioner, pa mi kažu … «… ma šta ‘oćeš ti, Musliman, ti si Srbin muslimanske vere» a ja velim: «.. pa kad sam Srbin muslimanske vere, što mi ne psuješ srpsku majku muslimanske vere, nego sve tursku ti majku»!!? Izvinjavam se što to kažem. Ali to je činjenica. Pogledajte, molim vas, naslove knjiga u knjižarama, pogledajte koliko ima islamofobije i antimuslimanstva, antibošnjaštva, a to mora da se sprečava, ne samo našom akcijom, bošnjačkom. Ja znam da ne možemo mi kriviti samo «udbu», državu…. Mi moramo da trčimo k'o Alisa u zemlji čuda da bi stajali na istom mestu. To je naša sudbina. Ali, ono što država mora da čini to je da se te razlike bar ne povećavaju. Da se one smanjuju, ako je moguće, ili bar da se ne povećavaju. A razlike su i u pogledu zapošljavanja i u pogledu svega ostalog – ne bih ponavljao ovo što je već rečeno. Drugo – treba ispraviti one nepravde koje država može da ispravi. Evo, recimo, otmica Muslimana u Sjeverinu, paljevina kuća u Kukurovićima i tako dalje. Mi smo podneli tužbu protiv države da se nadoknadi šteta porodicama koje su sve izgubile. Prvi opštinski sud doneo presudu, kaže – zastarelo. A to je izvršeno krivičnim delom, ne može da bude zastarelo. Ono zastareva za ono vreme za koje krivično delo zastareva. Meðutim, nisu voljni da isprave očigledne činjenice. E, to su te stvari za koje ne treba mnogo, treba samo volje. E, sada, tu mi imamo pet poslanika u skupštini, dva s jedne strane, dva s druge, obe su u istoj koaliciji, oni moraju da sednu pa da vide šta će da rade u toj skupštini. Da se sastanu, ne da optužuju jedni druge, nego da kažu: ovo je nacionalni interes Bošnjaka iz Sandžaka, ne samo Bošnjaka nego i Srba i drugih, tu moramo da budemo zajedno, tu da radimo. Imamo ministra, imamo potpredsednika, potpredsednik narodne skupštine Republike Srbije nikad nije bio Bošnjak. I mi više ne možemo da se žalimo da nismo zastupljeni – jesmo. Ali mi birači treba da ih nateramo da se ponašaju onako kako treba. E, sad, ja kad govorim o Bošnjacima, o tom identitetu, treba da se razbijaju stereotipi, ja očekujem jednu daleko veću podršku inteligencije u Srbiji, srpske inteligencije, srpskih naučnih krugova. Politika sada gotovo da je ista kao i onda kada smo imali «odjeke i reagovanja» za vreme Miloševića. Molim vas lepo, tu moramo da dobijemo podršku. Jer, zna se da u Bosni nije bila izvršena diferencijacija na nacionalnoj, nego na verskoj osnovi. Vuk (Stefanović Karadžić) je govorio o turskom zakonu i o hrišćanskom zakonu. Meðu hrišćanima nije bilo razlike na Srbe i na Hrvate, nego na katolike i pravoslavce. Pa je Ilija Garašanin poslao sto i nešto agenata preobučenih u popove da agituju za izjašnjavanje da se u pravoslavnim crkvama pravoslavci izjašnjavaju kao Srbi, a franjevci su to uradili za Hrvate i tu se izvršila diferencijacija. Ostali su muslimani koji su proglašeni Turcima, balijama i tako dalje. To je to, što se očekuje od naučne, stručne, kulturne i druge javnosti srpske, progresivne, da u tom smislu rade, a ne da proglašavamo ove ili one verske zajednice. Da napomenem, sedam godina je Alžir vodio borbu protiv Francuza. Francuzi nisu mogli da naðu nikog da im ubace u oslobodilački pokret. Čim su se oslobodili, oni, evo, šta rade, biju se k'o žuti mravi. Prema tome, hoću da kažem, da se mora voditi računa, s jedne strane, da se pruži podrška ovim institucijama koje su nikle tamo a to su škole, univerziteti… S druge strane, da se pruži podrška da se u programima razvoja ne gleda se Sandžak kao neko telo, strano telo, kao neko remetilačko telo koje će sada da dovede do uništenja srpske ili crnogorske države. O tome smo govorili dosta, da se ja ne bih ponavljao, nego da se zajedničkim akcijama i državnih organa a u prvom redu Bošnjaka koji su tamo i zastupljeni u državnim institucijama, bilo kao poslanici, bilo kao predsednici bilo kojih tela, da tamo rade, a ako ne treba, neka im birači otkažu poverenje na izborima, pa neka ostanu tamo. Svakoj policiji na svetu je drago kad naðe da radi nekog posla, kako da joj neće biti drago da iskoristi sukobe. Crnogorci su podelili bošnjačko telo na tri dela: na Muslimane, na Bošnjake i na Crnogorce-Mmuslimane. Jer, tamo je bilo 15 odsto Muslimana koji su se izjašnjavali, 15 odsto Muslimana, 9 odsto Albanaca, 30 odsto Srba i nema samostalne Crne Gore. Morali su da stvaraju razdore. Naravno da će to da radi svaka država. To rade i sada. Još pre, neko je govorio (Pavel D.) zašto nije došlo do podrške, šire srpskog naroda Muslimanima onih godina kad je bilo nasilja: pa nije jer je još od prije, Osme sednica (CK SKS), počela je jedna intenzivna psihološka priprema srpskog naroda da bi se opravdalo nasilje koje će se vršiti posle. On rano ujutro pusti pesmu «…ubiću te Mujo!» I kako onda da to dete koje sluša od obdaništa takve pesme da drugačije misli. Na taj način je govorila ona Ljiljana Bulatović, i danas ona dobija mesto, i danas na Pravnom fakultetu u Beogradu drže zborove. Pa onaj vlasnik «Jurišnika» osuðen je na Nirnberškom procesu na vešala i presuda je izvršena, zato što je širio antisemitizam u svom listu. Niko od naših novinara ni zašta nije dosad osuðen, ni ona Baletić, ni iko drugi. A samo uzmite naslove, šta je tada pisano, što ni pas s maslom ne bi pojeo. Šta da vam kažem još!? Mi se tamo, u Sandžaku, borimo se za ove pravce o kojima je govoro Slezović, o kojima je govorio gospodin Mirko Ðorðević, gospodin Filipović i svi. SANDŽAK: CONSEQUENCES OF REPRESSIVE STATE POLICY Panel Discussion Sonja Biserko: We think that it is very important to discuss the situation in Sandzak at this moment of time, for Sandzak seems one of the potentially most vulnerable spots, in view of a continuing, deep political and social crisis in Serbia . This is primarily due to the fact that Sandžak made part of Bosnia-related war progam. Such a thesis is confirmed by the state terror campaign in and its stranglehold on Sandzak in the early 90’s, and especially, during the war in Bosnia . Absence of political capacity of the incumbent Serb state leadership to face up to the genuine problems of this society, including the state wrongdoing in Sandžak, has motivated us to raise the gist of issue of Sandžak, as a very specific region in Serbia. Unfortunately, democratic authorities also worked in a very organized way on thwarting a more solid constituting of the Bosniak community. Hence a perpetual crisis in Sandžak in recent years. Let me remind you that Bosniaks are a new minority in Serbia . They have emerged in the post-SFRY disintegration, and have very little capacity to build/constitute their own infrastructure, that is, identity. On the other hand, Belgrade deftly used that shortcoming of theirs to break-up the Sandžak political and social scene. Though religion was the only cohesive element among the Bosniaks, Belgrade also managedt to divide them along those religious lines, thanks to the aforementioned weaknesses. The Wahabi phenomenon served to renew the thesis of a dire danger of the Islamic fundamentalism, which, according to recent reiteration of Milorad Ekmecic, had caused the break-up of Yugoslavia . Hyping and spinning of the Wahabi danger has gotten out of proportion. Such vilification campaign peaked by the filing of indictment against 15 Wahabis to face trial soon. In view of the foregoing a resurgence of the anti-Muslim articles, like the one penned by Ljiljana Bulatović, “Muslims, Islam, Jihad, Mujaheddins in the Balkans” is not surprising. Security services in Sandžak were and are still tasked with a continued destabilizing of the region. That task is carried out through generating strife between Bosniak leaders, while during the war in Bosnia , it was actively engaged in ethnic-cleansing of the region in line with the thesis of a “Green Transversal”. After ouster of Milosevic, the new, democratic governments did very little to neutralize the effects of work of those services. And finally there is also the issue of Europe ’s treatment of Islam, which in our view should be on an equal footing with other religions. Historically Islam was perceived as a political foe, and on that view Europe also built its political identity. Europe ’s position on Muslims in general (and on the European Muslims in particular) shall have a major impact on the position of the Balkans Muslims. Pavel Domonji: Sandžak: Consequences of repressive policy Repressive policy is by definition a policy with a strong reliance on non-political means, which as such leaves in its wake terrible consequences, notably devastation, casualties, fear and uncertainty. Let me remind you that Sandzak Bosniaks during the period of disintegration of Yugoslavia were exposed to a veritable terror campaign: abductions, liquidations, various forms of violence, intimidation, harassment and destruction of their property were commonplace. When speaking about consequences of that repressive policy we must have in mind several facts, notably that a forcible break-up of Yugoslavia led to the change of status of Muslims, who from the people, morphed into an unrecognized and disenfranchised national minority, with all the problems stemming from such a status; secondly, ethnically motivated violence deepened ethnic-cultural fissures in Sandžak and provoked inter-ethnic tensions, and thirdly, elimination-minded policy on the one hand, and brutal denials of their identity on the other hand, made Bosniaks strive to emphasize strongly distinct features of their identity. In consequence the issue of integration of the Bosniak community proper emerged. Aside from those there are other note-wothy problems, notably the economic lagging-behind of Sandžak, the media vilification of the region as «a legal wilderness» in which all criminal and illegal activities are rife, and the problem of political criminalization of the demand that Sandzak be arranged as a distinct territorial-political unit. As regards this last problem, one should underscore that no serious and open discussion with political authorities has been initiated on this issue, and that no consensus on that issue was reached among Sanžak inhabitants. The post-5 October period brought significant psychological relief and strengthened the Bosniak conviction that participation in building of democratic order would help them attain in an easier way their fundamental interests. The foregoing primarily concerned the process of nation-bulding and meeting of demands that justice be dispensed, that is, that masterminds and organizers of crimes against Bosniaks be punished. In talks which members of the Helsinki Committee had some time ago with Bosniak representatives, the latter underscored that they would measure the Serb society's readiness to fully clarify crimes- and thus make a clean break with Milosevic era policy- by the extent to which Bosniak claims for justice were met. I think it would be only right to conclude that Bosniaks in trials held so far did not see the Serb political readiness to try all those involved in crimes. They also did not see a manifest and resolute will on part of Serbia or its politicians to condemn the state policy of ethnic-cleansing, as it was called by the late Šefko Alomerović. As regards «nation-building», members of the Bosniak minority face a host of problems , by the way, typical of all the newly-emerged minorities. The most salient problem is shortage of institutions necessary for preservation and development of culture and national identity. This deficit may be explained by a tragical experience of Bosniaks, for in circumstances of full-blown nationalism, chauvinism and ethnic-cleansing, the survival issue suppressed all the other issues, even those relating to the building of the Bosniak community. Cultural and political elites play a key role in «nation-building». Both elites articulate position of members of their own group on issues encroaching on the vital national interests. My limited assessment is that the cultural elite of Sandžak Bosniaks is weak and sidelines, devoid of stable and firm institutional strongholds. In Sandžak. For example, there are no independent magazines, through which both the local cultural elite and intelligentsia would critically reflect develoments within the local community in Sandžak, but also in Serbia proper. Public arena is totally dominated by the political elite. But the problem with that elite lies in the fact that it is totally antagonized, divided, burdened by conflicts, vanities and ambitions of leaders, who speak as the only and genuine representatives of their nation. And in places in which parties and their leaders see themselves as the only authentic representatives and advocates of national interests, in places in which parties and their leaders cannot resist the lure and call of authoritarianism, in such places there is no will, room or possibility for constituting of parties as liberal, and tolerant actors, above all averse to the use of non-political means. So the wish of political actors to maximalize their influence and power produces some negative spin-offs. Deepening and radicalization of conflicts opens the door to the use of violence in politics. In other ethnic communities there are also conflicts between political actors, but what marks out the conflicts within the Bosniak political body is their-brutality. In view of the use of tools characteristic of another kind of conflict by those parties, it is not surprising that some civil organizations suggest banning for ten years the work of Bosniak political parties, because „of their use of violence and hate speech.“ Secondly, the local political conflict is slowly being spilled out into other spheres of life, and we are increasingly witnessing that phenomenon. Emergence of Wahabis only compounds those problems, for it leads to escalation of clashes between already-antagonized options. And finally intra-Bosniak conflicts enable their protagonists both in and outside Sandzak to get involved to a lesser or greater degree in those conflicts, and channel, re-direct and dose them in line with their own, particular interests. For example, the confronted sides very frequently try to discredit each other by launching smear campaigns, that is, by labelling each other as exponents of secret, informal structures, power centres, the Security-Informative Agency, and various cabinets. However, those remarks are to a certain extent grounded, for the state security and information agencies are not neutral in conflicts taking place elsewhere. Let me remind you of accusations of similar kind which Bunjevci and Croats hurl at each other in Vojvodina. Conflicts and brutalization thereof produce a host of detrimental consequences: 1. they make more difficult the process of internal and external –in the global society- integration of Bosniak community; 2. they make more difficult the constituting of the Bosniak community as a mature nation; 3. they slow down modernization process; 4. they strengthen prejudices about Sandžak as a radicalization-prone and democracy-negating region. Conflicts do not favour ordinary Bosniaks and the poor in the labour market, but they are useful for the party oligarchies and political class in Belgrade, for conflicts decrease the local pressure for an accelerated decentralization, more efficient implementation of reforms, swifter European integrations, facing up to the past, a more resolute co-operation with the Hague Tribunal, etc. If the state earlier generated repression, who should then give democratization incentives in this moment of time? In the post-communist times civilian society has taken on that task. In Serbia civilian society played that role well by ousting Milosevic. However, it now faces a long, painstaking work on democracy-building, and also in education of the general populace for democracy. But on this point it bears stressing that civilian society in Sandžak is weak, repressed, faced with chronic shortage of funds, burdened by numerous problems, and misunderstanding of the state bodies. But even such civilian society in Sandzak is still better than the political society and hence deserving of all kinds of support. Samiha Kačar, Sandžak Committee for Human Rights: Sandžak, which is currently located in the two independent states, played a special role in the history of disintegration of Yugoslavia . Having in mind recent past, and all developments in that neuralgic area, notably in 1991-1995 period, and even later, one may say that murders, robberies, thefts, abductions of innocent citizens, armed seiges of towns, mass emigration of locals, various forms of discrimination, political trials, numerous “informative talks”, preventive repression, etc, were overshadowed by the simultaneous developments in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Protection of human rights and liberties by the system institutions to date was so lacking that there is no ground for any future optimism in that regard. Numerous complaints filed by victims of the police torture due to the judicial inefficiency, procrastrination, and numerous obstruction, have become cold cases. Emigration from Sandžak continues. The Hague Tribunal has filed indictments relating to crimes committed in Croatia , Bosnia and Herzegovina , Kosovo and Vojvodina, while many crimes committed in Sandžaku have simply sunk into oblivion, though they should have been dealt with by the state and its judicial bodies. Sandžak is also entitled to truth and its institutional recognition. Numerous publications of the Sandzak Committee for Protection of Human Rights and Liberties and of other NGOs (the Humanitarian Law Fund, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia ) in a well-documented way testify to the aforementioned crimes. Results of the 2006 Montenegrin referendum marked the end of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro , of the remainder of former Yugoslavia , and consequently brought about division of the Bosniak community in Sandzak, which now lives in two, separate, independent states. Referendum in Montenegro showed a wide rift between representatives of the Bosniak community in the «Serb» and «Montenegrin« part of Sandžak. Novi Pazar, after introduction of multi-party system, did not live up to its reputation, as a Bosniak centre. In fact it ceased to be a Bosniak «centre» from which some political representative intended to co-ordinate the work of Bosniak institutions and parties in Sandzak, regardless of the republican borders. Bosniak political representatives moreover manisfested a great degree of political inexperience and immaturity. Their political goals were articulated clumsily, out of sync with the times and broader environment. Under the term Sandžak is increasingly understood the part thereof which is located in the Republic of Serbia and within its borders, while the other part of Sandzak, which lies in the Republic of Montenegro is rarely mentioned. And in fact that larger part in Serbia may be reduced to only three municipalities: Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin. Sandžak may be discussed from various angles, and therein lies the difference between politicians and representatives of NGOs. We should have a very cautious tack to all Sandzak problems. In the present-day Serbia Bosniaks make up less of 2% of population. Their emigration continues both from the „Serb“, and the „Montenegrin“ part of Sandžak. Regardless of separation of Montenegro many problems have remained unresolved. Added to that concerted efforts should be made to affirm the Bosniak spirituality, national self-awareness. Unless that objective is seriously pursued, there are concerns that Bosniaks may be reduced to a minor religious community, without developed national institutions. Bosniak movement in Sandžak has not managed to adequately and genuinely morph into an institutional movement. Due to their narrow-mindedness Bosniak political leaders have not managed in the last 16 years to genuinely articulate the needs of the Bosniak community, to realistically position them. Instead they simply engaged in numerous demagogical diatribes and claimed their committments to various «memoranda». In the fields of culture-strengthening, development of various projects contributing to the national awareness-strengthening, research of Bosniak culture, language, history and tradition, very modest results have been achieved. No spiritual, educational, cultural linkage was made between Bosniaks living in the two republics. Much-used propagande phrases failed to solve genuine problems, and by extension only masked a genuinely distressing state of affairs. Internal strife and multiplication of bureaucratic institutions only showed that Bosniaks lacked a genuine political and intellectual potential to find solutions for the near future. One-nation claims for autonomy of Sandžaka made in 1991, from the very outset were problematic, both because of resistance and resentment of the Serb and Montenegrin population in Sandzak, and political centers in Belgrade and Podgorica. Those maximalist claims were totally contrary to the genuine, intellectual, economic, and cultural potential of Sandzak Bosniaks. Thus Belgrade and Podgorica, aware of numerous weaknesses of and strife in the fold of Bosniak political parties, did not show any readiness for such-themed serious talks, let alone willingness to respect the Bosniak claims. And Belgrade and Podgorica persist in that stance even now. Hence the division of Bosniaks is a logical result of the failed policy of Bosniak political parties since 1990. After the 2000 changeover, whose true character has been the subject-matter of polemics for quite some time now, a sense of relief has settled in. Added to that there is more breathing space. Status of human and minority rights in Serbia has improved with respect to the previous period, but discrimination against minority national communities remains the most frequent form of violation of human rights. Minority communities are no longer exposed to systematic pressures, but are still exposed to various forms of discrimination and intolerance. On legislative plane a certain progress has also been made thanks to adoption of the Act on Rights of National Minorities, and ratification of the Framework Convention of Council of Europe on Respect of Rights of Minority National Communities. However, in implementation of both the Act on Minorities and the Framework Convention numerous problems were noted. In some Sandzak municipalities-Priboj, Prijepolje- some provisions of the Convention on the Official Use of Language, are yet to be implemented, though it was both an international and domestic law binding committment. In fact Acts on Rights of Minority Communities are passed more because of committments taken on before the international community than because of desire to implement them. Much-hyped and much-publicized Federal Act on Minorities, was thought to be able to genuinely promote human rights, but the reality proved otherwise on several grounds (political problems, relations between the two countries). Special attention should be paid to the cadres structure, and national balance in Sandžak. In the aforementioned and in other municipalities little progress was made with respect to full implementation of the Framework Convention. There are indications that participation of Bosniak representatives in local administrative bodies is still conditioned by a series of compromises to which they must agree. According to the findings of a survey by the Sandzak Committee for Human Rights, national structure in some municipalities is extremely unfavourable, and non-corresponding to the population structure. Sandžak Committee for Human Rights researched the structure of cadres in municipalities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin, Priboj i Prijepolje, and its conclusion was that national representation is totally upset in the state institutions (the police, courts of law, prosecution offices, the army) at the expense of Bosniaks. A departure from the last-decade practice is yet to be made. For example, municipal prosecution office in Sjenica doesn’t employ a single Bosniak. Concerns in Sandžak and about Sandžak are quite justified, having in mind the general state of affairs, that is, forcibly reduced needs, a deepening economic crisis manifest in all areas of life, and the area's obvious lagging behind the rest of the country. Novi Pazar, the city which aspires to be the Bosniak political and national seat, shows little interest in Bosniaks in Nova Varoš, Priboj or Prijepolju. Due to their small size they seem to be forgotten. On the other hand they are most frequently mentioned in NGO resports, notably those of the Sandzak Committee for Human Rights. Bosniak migrations towards Bosnia , notably towards Sarajevo , continue. That seemingly never- ending process of emigration from Priboj, Prijepolje, Sjenica and Tutin commenced long time ago. Serbs are also leaving Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin. These complex topics should not be glossed over. Many problems are of common nature, but some frequently assume a national character. Population census poses numerous questions, notably does the Republic of Serbia want an end to Bosniak emigration. Many generations of Bosniaks face that dilemma. If the answer is affirmative, then a different policy line should be toed towards Sandzak, a more pro-active, sincere, concrete policy. That policy should assume a transparent and institutional form. Today, on several grounds, more investments are made in the three municipalities in South Serbia (Preševo, Bujanovac…), than in Sandzak, though the latter deserves the state’s care and all kinds of aid. Even before disintegration of the socialist Yugoslavia Sandžak was considered as one of the most undeveloped areas in that state. Investments are stubbornly bypassing that area. Because of that thousands of people have emigrated, and they continue to do so. Diaspora Sandžak is much more populous than the geographical one. Political and marketing rhetoric cover up and sideline essential problems of the area: lack of prospects, underdevelopment, a series of deviant phenomena (criminal, corruption, prostitution, drug-smuggling and trafficking). Sandžak is in a deep social and economic crisis felt in all areas of life. Grey economy, drugs, prostitution, thefts, murders, political conflicts are almost a daily fact of life. On the other hand in Sandzak we are witnessing a host of problems which may affect the total state of affairs in the area: omnipresent «hate speech» in the media, incidents in sport competitions and matches, writing of nationalistic slogans and grafitti, excessive statements by politicians, frequent clashes between members and loyalists of different parties, potentially dangerous strife within the framework of the Islamic community. What we need to do is to explain the above phenomena, place them in realistic framework, instead of simply condemning them. Sandzak is still presented in very black-and-white terms, which only clouds its complex reality. The Serb media, in line with political needs, continue to support the image of Islam as a hostile and very dangerous religion. Majority of the print media resumed using propaganda terms and allegations from the early 90’s, such as, the Islamic danger, Islamic terrorists, etc. Stereotypes and prejudices show a great vitality. Articles about the „Green Transversal“, „Islamic danger“, „White al-Qaeda“ are commonplace. Occasionally they are supplemented with other “dangers.” The size of Bosniak population is either inflated or decreased, according to political needs. As regards the issue of human rights Bosniaks are depicted as a small minority, but as regards the Bosniak faith, Bosniaks are sometimes treated as a danger for the Balkans and the whole region. The truth is however known only by journalists and politicians. Stories about “Islamic danger” are produced by journalists, in total disregard of numerous facts to the contrary. Some incidents do not belong to the category of general, widespread phenomena threatening the stability and peace in this area, and wider, in the region. In some sensationalistic articles the print media even go as far as to portray Sandžak as a new potential flashpoint, and the breeding ground of terrorists. Thus the media spread Islamophobia and try to instill fear of the Bosniaks in the whole region and in Europe . Novi Pazar is omnipresent on criminal pages. Journalists seem to be interested only in such news. But it bears saying that Novi Pazar, like other municipalities, is weighted by other, long-standing problems. Little is said about the fact that Novi Pazar infrastructure lags behind the one in place in Kraljevo or Čačak. Locals in Sandzak want to enjoy living conditions similar to those in other cities. As regards appalling living conditions in Sandzak village, I’d rather not touch on that issue on this occasion. But I must underscore the need for a more careful balancing act in state institutions on local level (courts of law, police, prosecution offices.) In other words, they should employ more Bosniaks, in view of their size. The issue of underrepresentation and passivity of Bosniaks in the republican institutions should be also raised. Bosniaks must attain in an institutional way all the rights to which they are entitled, and they must overcome numerous divisions, and improvisations on many levels, if they want to ensure prosperous future for Sandzak. If the foregoing does not come to pass, what is left of Sandzak shall continue its partition, and will be totally sidelined. One should also bear in mind that the Belgrade authorities in settling of intra Bosniak disputes are guided primarily by their own interests. Meho Omerović, Member of Parliament of Serbia I would like to express my gratitude to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and to Ms. Sonja Biserko for having raised at the right moment and in the right way the issue of Sandzak, for complexity of that issue necessitates continued tackling of causes and consequences of everyday life in that specific territory. In my very brief expose I shall point out only one aspect, which is not only the consequence, but rather the gist of a kind of perfidious policy, which part of the state, unfortunately embodied in its high representatives, pursues vis a vis part of the country, Sandžaku, its people, or minority community, Bosniaks and their religious community, the Islamic religious community. At yesterday's parliamentary session of the Security and Defence Committee, Director of Security-Information Agency, Mr. Rade Bulatović, stated, I quote:» Tensions within the framework of the Islamic commnity are one of the factors threatening the stability of Serbia.»! In the case of intra -Islamic community strife the state of Serbia showed how a responsible state should not behave. What compels me to make such an assertion? My answer-which should serve also as a warning- is very simple and well-known to public at large: Competent minister, Minister for Religions in the government of Serbia, Mr. Naumov, breached the law. Namely he sided with one of the protagonists of intra-Islamic community strife, which, in my mind, and you shall agree, is –impermissible. Mr. Naumov even indulged in an implausible explanation, to the effect that the state recognizes both Islamic communities, the one in Belgrade and the one in Novi Pazar. According to him «there is room for both Meshihat and Riaset…»! He added that the state recognized «various forms of one Islamic community!». However what Mr. Naumov failed to say- is why a lower organizational form, in this case Muftihood, that is, only part thereof, bypassed the authority of the superior form, the one above it, and formed the highest authority, namely Riaset. Mr, Naumov is yet to provide us with an answer to that question. It shall be interesting to watch Mr. Naumov's position on another, similar problem. Several days ago the Montenegrin Orthodox Church submitted an application for the entry in the register of church, or religious organizations. So will Mr. Naumov now have an identical stand, that is, approve of the existence of the two Christian Orthodox Churches in Serbia? By all appearances, the foregoing may help us to draw the conclusion that some politicians in Serbia would like to see the formation of a kind of the «Serb Islamic Community». For the thesis that Bosniaks are invented people, that they are in fact Serbs of Muslim faith, is of late much hyped. Such a stance of the state and its highest body amply indicates the existence of today's topic, namely, a repressive state policy towards a whole reigon. Explanation of the reasons for that may be thus summed up: at play is obviously return of favours to the coalition partner. It seems that the state, or at least, its part co-participates in the attempt of creating a private or party-based Islamic community. The foregoing is confirmed by the fact that the highest representatives of the newly-formed Islamic community are in fact MPs and officials of the Democratic Action Party, a coalition partner of the party to which Minister for Religions, Mr. Naumov belongs. I would like to remind you that last year the party to which Mr. Naumov belongs in Novi Pazar, introduced in an unlawful way provisional measures and sided with one party involved in the conflict between the two leading Bosniak parties. In the case of the intra-Islamic religious community strife that party also sided with one protagonist thereof. All the evidence points to the fact that the said side, was the one spearheaded by Mr. Sulejman Ugljanin. It seems that the biggest problem for all of us in Serbia is the fact that the said party, party of Prime Minister of Serbia, which has the greatest coalition capacity, or «potential» in Serbia, as they like to say, unfortunately has only disturbance-prone partners. In Montenegro it is the Democratic Serb Party, and Popular Party, in Republika Srpska it is the Serb Democratic Party with which they have a coalition agreement in place, and we can see that in Sandžak, it is a party at whose helm is Mr. Sulejman Ugljanin. Sonja Biserko: Now it is Mr.Vukomanovic's turn. In view of your expertise I hope that you shall tell us something about Wahabis. In any case Wahabism is a legal and legitimate religious movement which cannot be banned under Constitution, the Act on Churches and Religious Communities, and other international documents. However, at the same time I would like to quote the following statement of Mufti Zukorlić: «I consider them a group of militants, of extremists, and they gain prominence only if someone misuses them. In Sandzak they absolutely don't have a foothold among people, hence they don't constitute a long-term danger. We have information about them, but we don't want to divulge them. That is the task of investigating bodies!»! I would like to ask you to touch on that phenomenon in the Balkans, since their presence has evidently caused such an uproar. Milan Vukomanović, professor of sociology Just a brief explanation… I have already spoken about Wahabis, and my words on that phenomenon have been covered by our press. So, to put it briefly, it is an essentially marginal phenomenon within the fold of Islam, marginal, because it has never taken root in the Balkans. It has not taken root either in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and in Sandzak. Yes, there were some incidents, for that is a phenomenon which may be misused. At any rate Wahabism as such represents a kind of abuse of Islam. To sum it up, it is above all a movement with strong missionary ambitions, perhaps even global ambitions, but contrary to its design it remains the leading political ideology, the religious ideology only in Saudi Arabia. Historically speaking, in fact Saudi Arabia is its domicile country, for Wahabism was spawned there as a kind of ideology. As much I have monitored that phenomen I can say that in the Balkans Wahabism did not have a fertile soil for indoctrination, simply because here we are traditionally used to one Imam, a much more moderate and liberal religous dignitary in terms of the preaching of his religious-legal school. Added to that the local Islam is much more under influence of the Sufi tradition, spiritual Islamic tradition. Therefore that kind of «import» could not have a major impact, could not transform the domestic Islam. But independently of this islamological debate, and of those possibilities for misuse of various movements in the area, I would like to touch on something which is perhaps less related to Islam proper, but is definitely related to the behaviour of our state towards the two serious, broader problems, concerning the three branches of power in Serbia, mostly the executive one. I am primarily referring to the threat to freedom of religious expression, of both faithfulls and atheists in our country. Jeopardized are both the freedom of religious expression, and freedom from religion. In fact both elements are threatened. Thus at play is an attack on religious freedoms, to paraphrase the title of the book of a colleague of mine, who put that issue in the context of Protestant communities. Secondly, a serious problem are periodic waves of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic conduct and actions to which the state does not respond adequatelly. In both cases therefore at play is not an intra-Muslim split in Sandzak, but rather something which should concern also non-Muslims. Total status of inter-religious relations, and also relations between church and state, has worsened during the two mandates of Kostunica-led government. We are also witnessing another phenomenon, an enhanced status of the Serb Orthodox Church, but, small or minority religious communities are by extension experiencing a veritable state-engineered stranglehod. Though, unlike in the Milosevic era, we now have a pertinent Act, the state, that is the government of the Republic of Serbia threatens religious freedoms of all its citizens. The same hold true of the ruling parties, notably those tasked with dealing with religious communities, or in the case in point, the one which supervises the Ministry for Religion- Democratic Party of Serbia. Let me just list some generally known facts, for if we percive them in their continuity we shall grasp the gist of the problem: former Minister for Education tried to suppress Darwinism and affirm creationism in public schools curricula, former Minister for Religions, Mr. Radulovic submitted a scandalous first draft of the Act on Religious Freedoms, legal provisions on immunity of clerics were also suggested-that indicated cleary the Ministry's siding with the majority religious community in our country-, the eruption of moral indignation or uproar vis a vis some alleged actions of smaller religious communities, the most notorious being the linkage made by the Interior Secretary between a Novi Banovic heinous murder and a smaller sect. In consequence of such attacks on smaller religious communities, their priests are vilified and their property is oft confiscated. These communities are discriminated against by the very Act, for it envisages a different procedure for their registration as compared to the one required by so-called traditional religious communities. All the aforementioned is compounded by racism in the Serb parliament, and some more recent problems, notably rulings of our courts of law relating to the Serb Orthodox Church clerics, rulings which even requred an intervention by the Justice Ministry. Frequent constitutional breaches are also noteworthy. In other words, the state violates its own laws, the ones proposed by the government and the Ministry for Religions. In this Sandzak case there was a blatant breach of Article 7 of the Act on Churches and Religious Communities spellling out «… the state cannot obstruct enoforcement of autonomous provisions of churches and religious communities». Therefore if the Islamic community in Serbia held an unification-minded conference and passed a corresponding constitution, then the state bodies should not have contested both events by openly marking out their favourite in that dispute, for that was tantamount to violation of the state law proper. Sandzak mufti rightfully and publicly cautioned against the foregoing. And that is a serious objection if the leader of a traditional religious community pinpoints violations by the state proper. The whole situation, in my mind, is a kind of throwback to claims laid by the Russian religious dissidents during the Soviet, Brezhnev era. It is a similar level of communication. A local politician, president of municipality, Mr. Ugljanin, was harshly criticized for suggesting that the Islamic Community be abolished and that the Bosniak National Council be placed under firm control. Therefore we face a direct political interfering into religious structures affairs, and this government, though a non-Muslim one, seems to be cultivating a kind of political Islam by forcibly imposing politics on those religious structures. And finally, as the Sandzak Mufti oft indicated, we should seriously consider allegations about collusion between some priests and imams with the intelligence services in this country. I would not underestimate such statements. Recently in Bosnia and Herzegovina books with names of priests, imams and representatives of other churches and religious communities-so-called «blue», «green» and «red» books- known to have been collaborators of such services in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, were published. Therefore the state should show more concern for such accusations by looking seriously into them. First the executive authorities, notably the Ministry for Religions, muddy the waters, and then they decide to sit on the fence, while the crisis-left to us to handle- continues to simmer; I would like to know the feelings and opinions of other religious communities in Serbia on such inter-religious relations, on the induced split in the Islamic Community, indicative of the state protection of its favourites. I wonder about the consequences thereof vis a vis the Christian Orthodox, vis a vis the Roman Catholic Church? What shall they do if invited to an event or reception organized by the newly-emerged Islamic Community? How shall NGOs organize schools, for example schools in Sandžak? Are they to expect attendance of the official representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church, of the Roman-Catholic Church, when there is much division, and fear of people that such an attendance would be highly politicized? How can we at all work in such circumstances? Has anyone in muddying the situation thought about the secondary consequences of his action? Independently from those divisions in the Islamic community, I would like to bring to your attention a mindless, but not accidental, article of the Act on Churches and Religious Communities, and that is the Article 19, which spells out: «…into the register cannot be entered any religious organization whose name or part thereof expressing the identity of a church, religious community or religious organization, has been already entered into that register or whose registration application has already been submmited». Of course that article shall be activated in case of registration application of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. That article was probably devised to prevent registration of both the Macedonian and Montenegrin Orthodox Church. But I must explain the lack of sense of that article: in our political life we are all witnessing the emergence of new parties whose names have prefixes or adjectives, or bear hallmarks, like democratic, liberal, Social-Democratic. And such an occurence is simply inevitable, for those prefixes or adjectives or hallmarks are symbols of identity, political leanings or ideology of such parties. And the foregoing is even more important in a sensitive religious life, which is characterized by frequent emergence of new religious communities, denominations, as well as by fragmentations of the existing ones, notably in the Protestant Church realm. For example, you have the Christian Adventist Church, the 7th Day Adventist Church, various Baptist churches, etc. The above article in fact prevents the free choice of name and free actions of religious communities. From such a principled standpoint, such a legal article is totally mindless and useless, but it obviously makes sense in the current political context characterized by strong wish to control all inter-religious, inter-church relations. And precisely those inter-religious, inter-church relations directly impact and mar inter-state relations. Due to the case of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, Monetenegrin Orthodox Church, and the most recent one of the Islamic Community, our relations with Macedonia, Montenegro and now with Bosnia and Herzegovina have worsened. It is paradoxical that the said souring of relations happened with the two majority Christian orthodox societies, that is, societies in which Christian Orthodoxy is a dominant religious community. Secondly, I would like to indicate that the ongoing anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim campaigns and actions in Serbia were mounted by the higest state institutions notably the army and police, since 2004. Consequently one wonders if at play is a tacit, and peaceful continuity of the 90's ethnic conflicts, for sometimes that anti-Islamism is latent, and sometimes it is very pronounced. Symbolically I could place it in the timeframe starting with the mosque-torching in Belgrade, Nis and Novi Sad, destruction of valuable exhibits in the Kalemegdan Military Museum in Belgrade to recent police raids on the Sjenica mosque. That is the framework of anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic actions which I would like to underscore on this occasion. We remember lenient sentences handed down in the case of Nis perpetrators. It was a farce, and not a genuine trial. They scheduled hearings so many times, and the response to the ruling…such a shameful conduct of those convicted of minor offences. Or, by extension, the parliamentary statement of the then official of Democratic Party of Serbia, Obren Joksimović about «Mujaheddin party« in the Serb National Assembly, and his fear that, as he put it then, «we may face al-Qaeda and Hommeini in our parliament as transmitters of the Muslim fundamentalist idea…»! Of course those, so-called mujaheddins enabled the political survival of Vojislav Kostunica as Prime Minister, and later the government introduced an emergency rule in municipality of Novi Pazar and thus saved Ugljanin from referendum related to his most probable resignation. We face anew, like in Milosevic era, the crisis-production. By such behaviour the state just keep generating new problems both on the domestic and international plane. We may also wonder if during the late March meeting between President Tadic with Reis Ceric, in presence of Rasim Ljajic and Mufti Zukorlic, the topmost topic was the historical and moral right of the Islamic community in Serbia to maintain its spiritual links and alliance with the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina? As much as I recall they also discussed the launching of a new Serb-Bosniak dialogue, a much-needed after the 90's crimes and conflicts?! And what shall this state do now? Shall it quarrel with Lajchak in Bosnia, shall it push us into new crises and problems? Let me remind you that in the meantime instead of Milosevic pictures Putin's pictures and posters are carried at various rallies in this region. Mirko Ðorðević, publicist: State and religious communities have poor communication On another occasion – when a broader discussion on the current state policy on churches and religious communities is organized -it would be wortwhile to explain in detail relations between the church and state in Serbia on the one hand and religious communities on the other hand. Problems are either covered up or intentionally bypassed. Only when incidents happen we get a chance to glimpse the true nature of those relations. Such incidents and misunderstandings, which we in this country euphemistically call «poor communication lines» generate the new ones and reveal a high inconsistency of the state policy. In other words the state moves depend on certain political moments, and as such are haphazard and oft mismanaged. The best example of the latter were developments surrounding the split among the ranks of the Islamic Community in Serbia. Now we have two Islamic communities and those tensions are reflected elsehwere. It is obvious that the fissure was generated by some politicians. The foregoing is best explained by the Belgrade Islamic Community Mufti, Efendi Jusufspahić: «Boris Tadić and Democratic Party, Vojislav Koštunica and Democratic Party of Serbia, Tomislav Nikolić and the Serb Radical Party, and all other parties back the concept of the Islamic Community of Serbia because it is state-forming. No evidence of the Islamic Community's disloyalty to the state of Serbia was produced. ». This problem is rather of organizational and not of dogmatic nature: all religious communities are equal and the state, under the Act on Churches and Religious Communities, recognizes only one, unified Islamic Community, organized in line with the spirit of the Islamic tradition. This time around the state sided with one community, which was contrary to the aforementioned Act and Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. Added to that it is a well-known fact that a modern state-a legal state-is not entitled to found any church or religious community. The state has only the prerogative to protect the autonomy of churches and religious communities and to provide for their freedom of actions. The current situation indicates that due to bad state policy on religious comunities in general those faithful to half-moon in Serbia are now in a deep political shadow. The state also toes a bad line on churches, for the principle that some may be specifically recognized and others sidelined-or manipulated, is built into the aforementioned Act. This is the right occasion to show that we rightly had warned that the aforementioned Act was contrary to the Serb Constitution and therefore would be difficult to enforce. All other issues in the dispute- though much hyped by the mass media-notably the true spiritual centre of churches and religious communities- are indeed inconsequential. I would like to mention a much-hyped allegation, that all the aforementioned developments were also engineered by the state security services. That could be discussed only if one had enough hard evidence, but, alas, we have only verbal allegations. But as the saying goes, there's no fire without smoke. As early as in April 2007, Mufti Zukorlić repeatedly warned of the foregoing[1] and wrote such-themed letter to Tadic and Kostunica: – «Of special concern are numerous information relating to anti-Islamic Community activities carried out by the security and intelligence services of Serbia.» That is all we know about those developments, and the general public still waits for a broader and transparent explanation thereof by the highest state officials. There's another-oft overlooked- document originating from the cabinet of the very head of secret police, the Security-Informative Agency, Mr. Rade Bulatovic, which, inter alia, included the following stance[2], -and such stances are not usually publicly espoused by heads of secret services-: -« To put i concretely, we are now searching for three files of high church clerics, which had disappeared in the post-2000 period. We have assumptions with respect to the reason behind that theft and the end-recipient of those files. ». We cannot go into detail now, but the aforementioned indicates that the state deals with churches and religious communities, and vice versa, in a bad way and that it interferes into affairs which should not be its concern. It would be possible to explain developments related to the Islamic Community turmoil and to other churches-and they are inter-related- only through some researches, and they are currently lacking. I would say that some conclusions impose themselves, firstly an undisputable accountability of the Minister for Religions in Kostunica-led government. Even if we lived in a legal state-and we don't-that minister should resign. Is it possible to have in this state several Christian Orthodox Churches, and only one Roman Catholic? Is it possible to have in this state the two Islamic communities-the answer is –yes it is. Every church or religious community organizes itself in keeping with its tradition, and the state in that respect should maintain a neutral stand. But things stand differently in Serbia. The room for political manipulations has been created, as the Wahabi case amply indicated. In order to learn more about that case we shall have to wait for the end of judicial proceedings. The media responses should be also taken into account. Majority of them are tightly controlled by power centres, some are prone to side-taking, and some feign total ignorance. The other side of the coin are relations within the fold of the Islamic Community proper, often saturated by the leaders’ rivalry. That smacks of the Eastern parabole on the biggest and most beautiful carpet in the mosque, which is often too small to accommodate the two Imams. At play are also material interests. But the most dangerous aspect of the rift in the midst of the Islamic community proper is its potential to pave the way to violence, which in the Balkans is always a viable option. Moreover, the said rift coincides with the final stages of settlement of the Kosovo issue and a strong turmoil in the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, which should serve as a warning that the repeat of mistakes is always possible and-dangerous for all. In a nutshell the trouble is non-existance of a developed model or relations between the state and church and religious communities in general, in keeping with the rich European experience. The ruling parties instead apply random solutions, in line with their needs. Sonja Biserko: You have recently stated that «… national revolutions frequently break out at the time when old injustices stop, and internal unity of the rebelled parties, dissappears. It seems that Sandžak, in that respect, is not an exception!» Could you explicate that view of yours ?! Čedomir Antić, historian The fact is, and history is replete with such examples, that uprisings and revolutions, as well as creation of national states, begin at the time when age-old injustices which prompted them in the first place, end. Here is one example from the 19th century: large-scale uprisings against the Ottoman Empire coincided with the major reform campaigns. And that it simply, a rule. But let me go back to the topic. I see it as a political and not a historical one. I was not able to grasp, in view of the general character of the topic's title, whether we would be dealing with developments in Sandžak in the past 2, or 4 or 20 years. I regret that lack of a better definition, but in view of an alleged state repression, I say «alleged» having in mind the past 7 years, I think that it would have better if you had invited some government representatives. This is not one-party government. In fact it is composed of various parties, one minister is of Bosniak descent. Therefore it would have been good to hear things straight from the horse's mouth. Added to that, as Sandžak, the Serb part of Sandžak, is a multi-ethnic region, it would have been good to have some representatives of other nationalities from the area. However, it is difficult to perceive the whole truth, it is difficult to gather or rally all actors, so it is good that at least an attempt was made, in the shape of thus-organized panel. I would say that in the last seven years Serbia has been going through a major reform attempt, perhaps the most important ones in its history. And in my mind, the fact that other nationalities take part in that attempt should be the source of satisfaction for the majority of citizens of Serbia, that is, all the citizens of Serbia. I did not want to use the term minority, for I thought it it would be nonsensical. Therefore-all the citizens of Serbia. It is especially good that in the grand DOS coalition and later, in succesive governments, there were representatives of Bosniak parties. Here it was not mentioned –even the post-24 period was assessed negatively- that the year 2000 saw adoption of amendments to a deficient electoral law, until then allowing only over-5% census parties to get parliamentary seats. Thus for the first time national communities, constituting only less then 5% of total population of the Republic of Serbia, faced the opportunity to enter the Serb parliament. One of the panelists said that the building of the Bosniak nation in Serbia was necessary. I must say that I see no connection between the process of nation-bulding and the process of implementation of human and civil rights, for the experience indicates that the nation-building is oft a harsh and unfortunately, undemocratic process. When the majority of European nations was built in the 19th century, things stood differently: formation of a state and its educational system within a territory, was followed by unification into a nation of diverse ethnic groups. In early 21st century, at the time of supremacy of electronic media, and nearly 100% literacy in Serbia, things are not so simple, and we must act cautiously in order not to trample upon human rights of some people, the undisputed right of some people to be members of not-fully-built or constituted nations. Hence it is mindless first to take to task a Serb official-and I am glad that such politicians no longer make part of the government- for saying some time ago that Muslims from Bosnia are Serbs-Mohammedans, and then back another official, a hold-over from the 2000 government, who said that Bunjevci were an invented minority group. Simply, if a group of people feel like Bunjevci, then it is an undisputable fact, which merits our full backing. Here the issue of religious communities was mentioned. I agree that we should put in place good legal regulations. In my mind it is our fortune to be the last country to enter the transition period, for thus we shall be able to compare our experience with experiences of other European countries, notably the neighbouring ones which have a large number of diverse rligious communities. It is not a disaster if a draft act is bad. What is important is that a proposal debated by parliament was backed by several parties, and not only by one, monolithic party, enjoying the absolute majority. I am obviously not an expert for religious issues, but I tried to get as much information as possible when the crisis in Sandzak began. In that regard I found interesting the opinion of one dignitary of the Islamic Religious Community-I shall not tell you to which of the two he belongs-, who said that all Muslim faithfulls in Serbia were not of Bosniak descent. And indeed if you look at the last census statistics, you realize that in the area of historic Sandžak there are 6.35%, or over 27,000 citizens who claim that they are of Muslim nationality. In the Serb part that percentage is somwhat lower, about 3.5%, while in the Montenegrin one, it is 10%, or more precisely, 9.88%. I want to say that a democratic state should neither prevent or encourage the building of a nation. Both actions would be tantamount to violations of democratic rights. Two Islamic communities in Serbia were mentioned. I have recently heard a very inspirational interview by Mr. Oliver Potežica. Namely he mentioned even five Islamic religious communities in Serbia. We tend to forget that in area of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, there is an organized community of Albanian Muslims, and that they have even two such communities, one of which is called the Islamic Community of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveða. Its president Džemaludin Hasani recently stated: «..those Communist times when the Sarajevo-based Islamic community controlled everything, are well behind us»! He has an opponent, a certain Tahir Mumin, who is, I think, President of the Islamic Community for Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveða. And now, according to Mr. Potezica, we have the Islamic community of Kosovo, which has recently joined the Islamic Community of Serbia. Therefore the whole matter is very complex, and it would be good if the politics did not interfere into such relations, if politics just continued to provide its good services. The state should prevent conflicts, misuses, and the best solution would be an agreement between the faithfulls. I am aware of the fact, as you all are, that Sandžak is one of the most undeveloped areas in the Republic of Serbia. However I would like to avoid a methodological mistake by, for example, comparing living standard in Sandžak to the one in Čačak or in Belgrade. It would not be fair. It is equally not fair to compare living standard in Kraljevo to the one in Belgrade. We must acknowledge that fact that in Serbia the poverty, which prevails in southernmost and westernmost areas, is not evenly distributed in ethnic terms. And that is one of the paradoxes of circumstances in Sandžak: economic progress was made during the 90's repression. But that economic progress unfortunately took a downturn at the outset of the reform process. And that fact should be carefully analysed. And of course we cannot prevent the following: when a minority community is threatened, or has internal problems, it calls on mobilization against the third party. It is an age-old principle. And there is little to benefit from such a move. At this moment of time it is very difficult to say whether the state is engaged in an anti-Bosniak terror campaign, in a campaign against local religious feelings or in a campaign targeting local political actors, both from the two big and several smaller, power-sharing parties in Sandzak. We can criticize the local elite, but the fact is that the said elite regularly drums up support at the elections. So even if we say that Constitution is bad, and I for one criticized that constitution from different positions than most of my interlocutors, we must note that no MP voted against that constitution in the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (only a number of them were absent). The aforementioned attests to the fact that democratic principle was applied in adoption of that Constitution. Bad solutions thereof should be amended, but by and large we must say that the constitution in place is a democratic one. When discussing the status of national minorities and constituent people rights we should compare that status with the one in other states. Here someone touched on pertinent circumstances in Montenegro. Though I am not an expert for the cannonic law, I think that I am still entitled to say that it is the fundamental right of all citizens to establish their religious organizations as they like. However, in Montenegro situation is quite different, because it was Serbia where the division within a regular hierarchy of the Islamic religious community happened. As regards Montenegro, there a former priest, first against the state will, and later with both the state and laymen assistance, founded the church. That makes me say that circumstances are totally different in Montenegro. There one or two church facilities were taken over by the Serb Orthodox Church, though they did not start liturgical services or sent monks there. Therefore the primary motive was to prevent one church to exercise its faith. In Serbia things stand differently. Of course, if we accept my arguments that does not mean that situation in Sandžak is good. In fact both economic and political situation in Sandzak is not good. And it is true that there we should build economic and cultural elite. The same applies to Belgrade, let alone Novi Pazar, Nis or Leskovac. It is also true that we have not fully faced up to recent past, to the 90's developments. But I regret to say that we haven't faced the past in any area. We haven't owned up to the past in places where it was not burdened by ethnic conflicts, controversies. I would like to remind you that since the year 2000, the only progress in that facing process was made when after our great tragedy, assassination of our first democratic Prime Minister, a number of people were convicted of crimes clarified in the post-Sword operation period. If that tragic event had not taken place, we would not have seen dispensation of justice in any area, barring the case of Radio Television of Serbia's bombardment, in which the RTS former director was convicted. Miroslav Filipović, journalist For several decades now Sandžak has been in the grip of the Serb secret services, first the Yugoslav ones, now the Serb ones. I would like to avoid speaking about what is legitimate and legal, and what each state, including ours, is entitled to. However I would like us to discuss a segment which may constitute a blatant misuse of secret services in such a vulnerable area. Sandžak was long-controlled by so-called «green» services, that is military secret services, or counter-intelligence services. That fact gained much importance when Sandžak became a border area of the newly-emerged state, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In fact after disappearance of the SFRY, Sandzak interestingly enough found itself in the midst of continuity of distribution of the Muslim, that is Bosniak people. Thus from the former border with the Turkish state on riverlet Piloreta, when you leave Raška and head for Novi Pazar, nearly up to Cazin area, we had the majority Bosniak-inhabited buffer zone. That fact was proclaimed a terrible danger to the Serb national goal, and the monstrous, no longer mentioned plan «Horseshoe» was first implemented on the right bank of river Drina, in order to interrupt such a strip-like majority spread of Bosniak people. The goal was also to prevent the Bosniak people from laying territorial claims similar to the ones voiced by Milosevic-led nationalists in Serbia. An over-riding concern was that Bosniaks might lay claims similar those espoused by Serbs in Knin, Banija, etc. As far as I recall that was precisely what in the early 90's Sulejman Ugljanin demanded. At the time I interviewed him, and I remember very well one sentence of his, namely that Sandzak Bosniaks want for Sandzak what the Serbs in Knin and Knin area want for themselves. So the right bank of river Drina was totally cleansed of Bosniaks, and believe it or not, consequences of that plan are still felt. Even today someone prevents Bosniaks from those villages on the right bank of river Drina, in Priboj municipality, to return to their homesteads. One must say that even the best government we had, Ðinðić-led government, did nothing to annul the consequences of that indeed monstrous, «Horseshoe» plan. Part of that plan were the aforementioned abductions in Sjeverin and Štrpce. Their goal was to intimidate the Bosniak people and make them flee. But that is a much broader topic. I just hinted at it, deeming it the beginning of a new chapter in the secret services interest in Sandžak. Of course after the disbanding of the Yugoslav People's Army and its secret services, so-called «blue» secret services, that is, police services, gained primacy in that respect. And those structures from the 90's onwards have been advising or ordering the Belgrade authorities what to do in Sandžak. That means, that both Prime Minister Živković and Education Minister Gašo Knežević went to Novi Pazar to hand to Mufti Zukorlic the International University work licence, because they were advised to do that by secret services, and perhaps that such a move would be useful for the state of Serbia. If recently the founding of the new Islamic Community, and I am referring to the Islamic Community of Serbia, was greenlighted, it was due to someone's conclusion that Moamer Efendi's influence was too great…so let us clip his wings. For the existence of 120 mosques, an International University, the Islamic Studies Faculty, and preparations for founding of an Islamic Arts and Sciences Academy, and an important role of Novi Pazar and Sandžak in founding of an European al-Azhar, the highest Islamic University with its seat in Cairo, denoted-too much influence of the aforementioned Mufti. When speaking about influence of secret services, several interlocutors mentioned Moamer Efendi's letter in which he requested from the state bodies files of collaborators of the secret services in the Islamic Community. If I were Moamer Efendi I would not be too sure that they would give me the right files! And the tentacles of those services are everywhere. As a journalist covering Sandzak for 20 years now I am aware of that. There were also allegations that Moamer Efendi was a secret services collaborator. It was also said that the National Bosniak Congress founded in the late 90's as a political party, and the separatism-minded Islamic Community of Presevo, were founded on advice of «services.» Rumour had it that the services appointed the then Mufti Nedzedin Sacipaj. I want to say that secret services are present in Sandzak, but I also say-so what? They are present everywhere, I would not be surprised if they were present here too…here, among us. That is simly the way of life in the post-communist societies, and when shall we be rid of such a practice, I truly don't know. Whether those «services» and to which extent, misuse their duties, it is a very complex, very complicated question, rife with mystifications. Appearances can be often deceiving, but the fact is that those «services» have their rights and duties, for they were founded in keeping with the laws of this country. Border line between use and misuse is very delicate and most surely at meetings like this we shall not be able to grasp the gist of the matter, However, I would not place too much faith in allegations that some political opponents of mine work for «services.» For they make similar allegations about my persona. And as Muslims like to say: «Only Allah knows how things stand now, and what is -true»! MEŠA SLEZOVIÆ, artist: SANDŽAK: CONSEQUENCES OF REPRESSIVE STATE POLICY Minorities are no longer the official policy topic It is generally believed that the minority status was in principle, pending an imminent adoption of some minor legal acts, resolved in keeping with the highest international standards. Recent spolighting of the Hungarian minority status, and continuing negative image of Sandzak, due to a host of religious, political and sports incidents, seem to deny such an assessment. In all likelihood minorities remain the subject-matter of political strategies and genuine political instrumentalizations. In that respect Sandzak reality is extremely interesting. The very topic indicates the extreme complexity of the area. It may be dealt with by various specialists, ranging from psychiatrists, psychologists, economists, legal experts, historians, political experts, and politicians. It can be also the subject-matter of those dealing with spiritual questions, notably sociologists of culture and religion, cultural experts and ethnologists. Aforementioned testifies to the fact that Sandžak is a very interesting region, with distinct features. What makes this theme very topical, is the fact that the state repression in Sandzak is a constant, and not incidental political phenomenon. Its manifestations are varied, pending on the current political situation and very sophisticated strategies thereof, and on various state arrangements in certain historical moments. But nonetheless those manifestations are rife with certain constant stereotypes, which shaped the stances on this area. Consequences of that continuing repression are a continuing emigration from Sandzak, its proverbial economic backwardness, and inadequate political solutions concerning the area. Sandžak is a historical region. Because of its cultural and historical dimensions, it is a multicultural, multi-denominational, and intra-cultural entity. That implies that in the best of cases, cultural, religious and ethnic substrata or dimensions in Sandzak intermingle and interweave, thus forming a general, joint identity of the area and its population. That fact had a bearing on all the political processes which had been unfolding here, on all the state projects which frequently had been in fact very poor experiments, and on all the political strategies which had been tested here. Sandzak was simultaneously important and non-important. Those two co-ordinates of the paradox to a large extent determined its fate and status. In this introductory part I would like to underscore several elements which set the tone of any discussion on the urrent state of affairs. By extensions I shall place a special emphasis on inter-active relations between local political subjects and the state policy, that is its institutions, in the process of creating the image of the present-day or contempory Sandzak and its denizens. It is currently a very dynamic image. From the standpoint of the still unresolved issue of identity of Bosniaks and Sandžak, one may perceive the processes which call into question many standard appraisals. Hyping of Islamic paradigm and of its internal ferment Problem lies in failure of other paradigms-economic and political, and not in the Islamic community. Other dimensions also manifest their failure and inefficiency. Religion, as a stratum of identity, but not as an institutional structure with broader ambitions, found its place in that newly-emerged, broad vaccum. However, cultural dimension of Bosniaks cannot in any terms be reduced only to this paradigm. Between Bosniak national individualism and Islamic cosmopolitanism, between the Bosniak pro-European leanings and Oriental Islamism, there is a vast, empty spiritual space which is slowly and increasingly invaded by an alien body-pseudoWahabism. I would like to bring your attention to an excellent observation by Farid Zaccharia in his study „On the Future of Freedom“, namely «The principal problem is rather the Middle East and not Islam, as Islam». There is also a hypothesis, very much removed from the reality, that some interests may try to plunge the European Muslim enclaves into the maelstrom of the Middle East conflict. Until recently there was much talk about re-islamization of Muslims. In those terms recent developments in the midst of the Islamic community took on a much greater resonance and assumed different repercussions. But in fact they are quite mundane, local, political claims and demands which are detrimental and could have in the near future devastating effects. Wise state policy would never foment dissention and rifts, would not get entangled in them, would have a partner-like relations with this important institution-the Islamic religious community- which is also a national and cultural institution. The foregoing is advisable because all that internal ferment only expands room for uncontrolled outbursts of all kinds of religious and ideological teachings with may be consonant with some militant Islamic trends. Therefore the game aiming at debilitating or destroying such an institution may be very serious and dangerous. Constitutional framework Adoption of a non-European, essentially politicking, inconsitent supreme legal act. Though it deals to a great extent with the minorities issues, that act created a genuinely new legal position of national minorities. And that position is unfortunately indicative of discontinuity with the policy towards national minorities pursued before adoption of the new constitution. Sandzak Bosniaks cannot identify with any state as their domicile state, for they are not considered a constituting element in the state which by definition is simultaneously national and civil, and whose national minority they are. Added to that by definition BOSNIA IS NOT A NATIONAL STATE OF BOSNIAKS. Sandzak Bosniaks are in fact the national minority of their own state, which is not theirs by NATIONAL definition, for in that state they are only citizens. Thus the framework of their de facto inequality was created, and that inequality shall produce many structural and legal consequences. It is important to bear in mind that the ACT of constitution promulgation was the act of a clear political diversification in the midst of political representatives of Bosniak minority, that is, diversification between those supporting and those boycotting the adoption of that act. It is thought that generally Sandzak Bosniaks have not backed that constitution, and have not recognized it as an adequate framework of their status. Political framework Search for the lost identity-schizophrenic situation of splitting the being and identity of Sandzak Bosniaks through clear dichotomy East-West, Balkans and Oriental-European, contemporary and past. What lacks is a CLEAR VISION in the situation when cultural space is being increasingly emptied. Constructive cultural policy is nearly non-extant. There is no clear vision of the future national development and affirmation (dilemmas of multiculturalism and interculturalism). Democracy with all characteristics of non-liberal democracy, autocracy, segregation, partitocracy, totalitarianism on micro plane. Closing of framework, which is AN EVIDENT EXAMPLE OF LOSS OF FREEDOM AND GHETTOIZATION BY LOCAL POWER-HOLDERS. A genuine experiment From the standpoint of the topic, namely repression and its consequences, the current state of affairs could be called a genuine experiment. Since their placing in the position of marginal groups, minorities are increasingly becoming a basis of sure votes for political parties, and paradoxically, of the principal parties in the political arena, and not of those which by definition are the regional or minority ones. Regional or minority hallmark is only a vote-garnering vehicle, while authentic minority interests are lost in some ambiguous political horse-trading and particular interests. An odd co-operation has been established between representatives of minority communities and state representatives and even those political parties whose victims minorities have been. At play is the phenomenon of the HERD and Shepherd. Hence unmasking of such a policy, of such relations is of paramount importance for establishment of liberal democracy. Political reality exposes undignified vassal relations. Servility and vassal-style relations are reflected in the light of the maxim that to serve means to rule. Hence the intention of using the individuals instead of putting in place much-needed minority institutions. The foregoing only worsens the situation, for those individuals are only false authorities who only degrade genuine interests and status of minorities. Numerous on-the-ground facts, that is, facts closely related to Sandzak everyday life indicate that UNWILLINGLY and disinterestedly Bosniaks were placed in the orbit of anti-Western and anti-European policy, which is becoming manifest both globally and-locally. As regards Sandzak it is becoming increasingly evident that such a policy was well-prepared and conditional, and that recent years of open repression, laid down the fertile foundations for such a policy. Hence the role of some, until recently sacred cows of politics, is becoming increasingly transparent. In other words their actions are increasingly seen in the negative light, and assessed as compromising and problematic. The phenomenon of cuckoo's egg is a time-proven mechanism. On the dark screen of Sandzak daily life the true political profiles of some of those leaders are becoming increasingly discernible. And their image is slowly being tarnished. Ordinary citizens because of their growing disinterest in current political affairs, are becoming passive observers. The foregoing consequently enables misuse or doctoring of their unexpressed will. Sandžak is fast-aproaching the borderline which makes nonsensical any democratic process. It seems that the ongoing process no longer hinges on the will of voters, citizens, members of minority community, but rather on the will of state, its services and efficiency of strategy of servility and vassal-style links. So any shift in that process or the continuity thereof is currently a major imponderable. Alas from continuity of such a process shall benefit only representatives of political elite. On the other hand that process shall most hurt citizenry, who in the current policy and in this local modification of neoliberal democracy no longer recognize their own framework of political expression. But perhaps that was the point to which some power-holders strove, the point of ultimate degradation of the role and status of minority communities and their share in politics in the state in which they live. Serbia is an excellent example in that regard. But we should not blame for the foregoing only the state and its government. In fact the responsibility for such a sorry state of affairs rests primarily on alleged, minority political representatives. Though they have been imposed such a framework, they could still act otherwise. Minorities, notably Bosniaks, could also rebel against such a status of theirs. It seems to me that the turning-point is not far away. Thus the issues of identity are stripped of any genuine meaning and content, and well-known verses «Every wolf is entitled to his sheep» are confirmed.» Shall Aska the Sheep manage to perform its whole dance or it shall fall into the jaws of bloodthirsty wolf? Shall it recognize a well-intentioned shepherd or it shall surrender? We shall see. Aska from Andrić's story clearly sets an instructive example. However I would not like to go too far in the analysis of that metaphor. Ramiz Crnišanin, lawyer After war, an old imam met Voja Lekovic. And he asked him: «Before the war you communists used to say that Sandžak was a God's forsaken country, so is it now forsaken by you too?!» And this is what Lekovic replied: «It shall not be forsaken anymore»! But in reality Sandzak remained forsaken. However, some stereotypes about Sandžak and Bosniaks ought to be changed. New Sandzak does not resemble the old on. When I finished secondary school in 1941, only 28 Muslim children attended the Novi Pazar secondary school. Of 9 abolished secondary schools, according to Sreten Vukosavljević, four were in Sandžak. Thus both Serbs and Muslims had to go to secondary schools in other towns, notably in Kraljevo. Muslims tended to enroll at secondary schools in the Muslim-inhabited towns, mostly Prizren. Today we have nearly 100% literacy, Sandžak is reached at the most in 4-5 hours from the remotest parts of Serbia, today we have hundreds of thousands of cell phones, in Novi Pazar alone there are 30,000 cars, both the state and private university, in fact there are three of them, including the one established by Karic, there are over 6,000 students…so the picture is not so bleak, the structure has changed, relations have changed, and we must reckon with all that. Today we have political parties, and they are jockeying for power by all means like political parties elsewhere. So why are conflicts among Bosniaks dramatized so much? But what is really bad is the fact that in Serbia 40% of Radical Party and Socialist Party voters consider us a nation invented by Josip Broz Tito, and call us-Turks. But in fact vis a vis their nationality the majority of Bosniaks have a united stand: they simply consider themselves –Bosniaks. Some friends of mine, when I was an official during the Communist era, told me: «What do you want? You are a Muslim, a Serb of Mohammedan faith.» And I retorted: «So if I am a Serb of Muslim faith, why don't you curse me on that ground, but rather call me derisively-a Turk.»!!? And that vilification campaign has now gathered momentum. All those books in book-stores, their titles attest to that. There is a lot of anti-Muslim, Islamo-phobic, anti-Bosniak sentiment. And it is continually fomented. We must prevent it, not only, we, the Bosniaks, by our actions. I know that we cannot blame for the aforementioned only the state, secret services…We must run around, like Alice in Wonderland, in order to remain in the same place. That is our fate. But the state must at least try to prevent the increase in those differences. Try to reduce them, if possible. And there are significant differences, different treatments, in the area of employment, in all other areas…I would not like to repeat what has already been said. Secondly, the state should try to undo the wrongs done in recent past, notably mete out justice in the case of abduction of Muslims in Sjeverin, house-torching in Kukurovići, etc. We filed property compensation suits against the state. Damage which families have incurred-and those families have lost everything, must be compensated. And then the first municipal court handed down the ruling that the case was –outdated. But how can a criminal offence become-outdated? In fact they are not willing to undo the wrongs. And only will-power is needed for such undoing. We have five MPs, two are from one party, three are from the other party, but they all belong to the same coalition. Instead of accusing each other, they should meet and decide on their future course of action in that parliament. They should say: these are the national interests of Sandzak Bosniaks, Sandzak Serbs, we must advocate them jointly…. We have a minister, we have a vice President, and for the first time Vice President of the National Assembly is of Bosniak descent. And thus we must stop complaining of underrepresentation…because we are well represented. But we voters must compel them to behave as they should. And as regards Bosniaks, the Bosniak identity, stereotypes should be dispelled too. And in that regard I expect a much bigger support of the Serb intelligentsia, of the Serb intellectual circles. Politika's editorial policy is now nearly identical to the «Reactions and Echoe» it published during the Milosevic era. We must get that support, for it is an established fact that in Bosnia differentiation was effected on religious, and not on national grounds. Vuk Stefanović Karadžić spoke about the Turkish law and the Serb law. Among Christians the line of separation was not between Serbs and Croats, but rather between Cahtolics and those of Christian Orthodox faith. Because of that Ilija Garašanin sent to Orthodox churches over 100 agents disguised as priests to convince those of Orthodox faith to declare themselves as Serbs. Franciscan monks did the same thing for Croats. And then differentiation was put in place. And what remained were the Muslims, who were proclaimed Turks, or Balias. In a nutshell, we expect the Serb progressive public and intellectuals to work in terms of decreasing the differences between religions, and not vice versa. Let me give you an example. For seven years Algeria waged a liberation struggle against the French. And as soon as they reached their goal, that is, liberation, the internal, internecine struggles erupted. Therefore, I want to say that we must take care of the following: on the one hand, we must extend support to the local institutions, schools, universities etc., while on the other hand, development programs should not view Sandžak as a foreign body, as a disturbing factor possibly causing the destruction of the Serb or the Montenegrin state. As we have discussed the aforementioned extensively, I would only like to underscore that Bosniaks in the state bodies, either in capacity of MPs, Vice Presidents, officials, should work on resolving the aforementioned issues, should take joint actions to that end. On the contrary, voters may strip them of their trust. All the police forces in the world are glad when they can do their job, and therefore would be only glad to exploit any internal strife. Montenegrins divided the Bosniak population into three parts: the Muslims, Bosniaks and Montengrins-Muslims. That was done because an independent Montenegro would not have come into being if 15% of Muslims declared themselves as Muslims, 9% of Albanians declared themselves as Albanians, and 30% of Serbs declared themselves as Serbs. They had to create fissures and rifts. Of course any state would do that. And that is precisely what this state is doing now. Earlier Pavel Domonji explained why the Serb people failed to extend their support to the Muslims during all those very violent years. In fact even before the Eight Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia an intense psychological priming of the Serb people for justification of the upcoming violence began. Many radios in the early morning hours played the song: «…I shall kill you, Muslim!» And how then can a child listening to such songs from the early days, from kindergarten days, think differently!? Thus spoke also Ljiljana Bulatovic, who even now writes similar Muslim vilification-riddled articles. And even today nationalist rallies are held at the Belgrade Law Faculty. The owner of «Jurišnik» was sentenced to death at the Nurnberg trial. And he was hanged, because he spread anti-Semitism in his paper. Not a single journalist in Serbia was convicted. Not even that Baletic woman, not the others who in their articles spread hatred, demonized other nations and nationalities. What could I possibly add!? We in Sandžak are combatting for those directions mentioned by Slezović, by Mr. Mirko Ðorðević, Mr. Filipović and all others. Beograd, 2007.